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SUMMARY 
 
The impetus for regional integration draws its rationale from the standard international 
trade theory, which states that free trade is beneficial to all. Free trade among two or 
more countries or preferential trade will improve the welfare of the member countries as 
long as the arrangement leads to a net trade creation in the Vinerian sense. The history 
of regional economic integration in Southern Africa (SADC) reveals that it has not yet 
achieved the economic benefits that are attributable to developing regions, namely: 
higher levels of welfare exemplified by low poverty levels, economic development and 
industrialisation. Regional economic integration in Southern Africa is constrained by high 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, archaic infrastructures and multiple memberships among 
different regional economic communities. A SADC-wide customs union can be 
successful, provided that countries are allowed to join, when their economies have 
adjusted and the South African Customs Union (SACU) is used as a nucleus. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Regional integration agreements (RIAs) are entered into by two or more 
countries (not necessarily belonging to the same geographical region). 
In terms of these agreements, member countries agree to lower tariff 
and non-tariff barriers (between each other) so that transaction costs 
will be lowered in the hope that this will lead to a higher level of welfare 
and economic development (McCarthy, 2004).  
 
 
The premise on which these agreements rests is that a home market is 
smaller than the combined markets in an RIA, and as such will not have 
an economic impact globally should the country act unilaterally. A 
combined market will result in the lowering of input costs as a result of 
the enlarged market − a term referred to as economies of scale1 
(Lawrence, 1995: 9; De Melo & Panagariya, 1993).  
 
 
According to Limao and Venables (2001) regional economic 
communities2 may help countries adopt policies, build institutions, and 
develop the infrastructure needed to expand trade in goods and 
services. Jansen and Vennes (2006:14) stress that RIAs can help 
increase the benefits accruing from participation in international trade 
and simultaneously reduce the associated costs. RIAs will help the 
participating countries liberalise trade policy relatively cheaply, reduce 
the risk of possible protectionist measures on the part of trading 
                                            
1 Economies of scale refer to the reduction of input costs as a result of an increase in 
output because of market enlargement. 
2 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Integration Agreement (RIA) 
will be used interchangeably in this document to mean the same thing. 
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partners, boost intra-regional trade, and overcome domestic political 
resistance to broader trade liberalisation. 
 
 
1.2 The history of regional economic integration agreements 
 
According to Viner (1950:7), Meade (1955), Balassa (1961) and 
Machlup (1976) there is a considerable historical antecedent to RIAs 
and RIAs are a precursor to multilateralism. Certain RIAs may be traced 
back to the era of nation-building in Europe, for example, the Zollverein 
of nineteenth century Germany (formed in 1830) and the Cobden Treaty 
of 1860 between France and the United Kingdom. During the post-war 
period (World War II which ended in 1945) developments in regional 
economic agreement were led by the European Union (EU, originally 
the European Economic Community founded in 1957 by France and 
Germany). During the 60s and 70s, there was a plethora of inward-
looking (and largely unsuccessful) RIAs between developing countries 
(Cooper & Massel, 1965; Robson, 1987; Krishna, 1995). The mid-1980s 
and 1990s ushered in a period that witnessed a dramatic increase in 
regional integration activity between developing countries.  These 
regional integration activities, unlike that of earlier years were outward-
looking, in that the promotion of exports was the overriding objective. 
 
 
1.3 The regional integration agreements notified to the World 
Trade Organization 
 
According to the World Bank (2005a) there are more than 300 RIAs 
notified to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which 
was absorbed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  
Almost all countries are members of at least one RIA, and more than 
one third of world trade takes place within the ambit of these 
agreements. The new developments include the expansion and 
deepening of the EU (from common market into economic union); the 
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implementation of new and more open RIAs between developing 
countries (South-South integration) such as the Association of South 
East Asean Nations (ASEAN) comprising member countries whose 
geographical location is South East Asia; and the advent of RIAs in 
terms of which both developed and developing countries are equal 
partners, for example, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
which, in 1994, extended the Canadian-USA free trade agreement to 
Mexico (Bhagwati & Krueger, 1995; Coe & Hofmaister, 1998).  
 
 
RIAs vary in several respects such as income levels (NAFTA in which 
Canada and the US are high-income countries whereas Mexico is a 
middle-income country), in openness to trade, and in the share of trade 
that takes place within the RIA, for example, 60 percent for the 27-
member EU, but just 10 percent for the eight members of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). RIAs also vary in 
structure − from the loose agreements of the African Cross-Border 
Initiative (in Southern Africa in the eighties) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum which aim at facilitating trade, 
through to the deep integration of the EU which involves the 
establishment of shared executive, judicial and legislative institutions 
(Salvatore, 1990; Piazolo, 2002; Aryeetey, 2003). According to 
Bhagwati (1993) the new wave of RIAs differ from the regionalism of the 
1960s in terms of orientation, but the fundamental economic rationale 
still derives from the Vinerian analysis of trade creation and diversion, 
and economies of scale, as exemplified in the motivations of early 
European integration (McMillan & McCann, 1981).  
 
Insofar as they lead to broad-based trade liberalisation in individual 
countries, regional integration agreements contribute to multilateral 
trade liberalisation and complement the multilateral trading system as 
represented by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). For example, 
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many RECs (such as SACU3) contain clauses that indicate that such 
arrangements are a precursor to global integration (Southern Africa 
Customs Union Treaty, 2002). However, Viner (1950) and Meade 
(1955) have shown that RIAs both create and divert trade between 
member and non-member countries. Regional economic integration 
may, however, give rise to vested interests in partial trade liberalisation, 
and this in turn could hinder broader trade liberalisation and render it 
politically more difficult to implement. The discriminatory nature of the 
RIA could also weaken the multilateral trading system, which is based 
on the principle of non-discrimination for all members based on the 
Most Favoured Nation principle4 (Irwin, 1993; Africa Integration Review, 
2007. 
 
1.4 The outline of the dissertation 
 
The focus of the dissertation is to analyse the impact of regional 
economic integration in Southern Africa on economic development in 
areas such as infrastructure development, poverty eradication and to 
ascertain whether it has led to an improvement in the welfare of the 
people of Southern Africa. Regional economic communities in Southern 
Africa are beset by a myriad of problems. For example, fourteen 
Southern African countries are members of four regional economic 
communities, namely, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the East Africa Economic Community (EAC), the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC). The EAC and SACU are customs 
unions whilst it is planned that both COMESA and SADC will evolve into 
                                            
3 SACU refers to Southern African Custom Union which comprises Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The SACU clause confirming the 
region to multilateralism is in the SACU Treaty signed in 2002. 
4 The Most Favoured Nation principle refers to the just treatment of trading partners. 
For example, if country A gives preference to goods from B, it must then give 
preference to all nations trading in similar goods. 
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customs unions by the end 2008 and 2010 respectively (SADC Today, 
2006). This will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
According to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (1993) 
Chapter XXIV,5 a country may not belong to more than two customs 
unions and therefore the member states of the three RECs in Southern 
Africa will have to choose to which customs union they wish to belong. 
SACU is acknowledged as the oldest and most successful of the three 
customs unions. As preparations for launching the SADC customs 
union take shape there is the belief by South African policy makers that 
SACU should form the nucleus of the SADC customs union.  
 
 
South Africa, which is regarded as the guardian of SACU with its 
quarterly payment of SACU collected revenue to the other four member 
states, upholds this view, but cautions that such an arrangement should 
be devoid of the revenue sharing mechanism (RSM), which is currently 
the main feature of SACU. With the RSM, customs duties derived from 
extra-SACU imports are pooled in the Common Revenue Pool and 
shared by member states in proportion to their share of the intra-SACU 
trade (McCarthy, 2004). 
 
 
For SACU to serve as a model for the new SADC customs union, it 
must be reformed from its current structure, which reflects a union that 
exists merely to collect and distribute revenue emanating from customs 
duties. Its reformation need to produce a structure that enhance 
economic development in the region and increase the gains associated 
                                            
5 According to GATT Chapter XXIV, a country may not belong to more than one 
customs union unless the two unions have a timetable which allows for the phasing 
out of tariff lines simultaneously.  It is however difficult to find such a precedent (of a 
country being a member of two customs unions). 
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with trade. For South Africa, it makes sense to lobby for SACU as a 
springboard so that the long tradition and experiences of SACU are not 
lost. A certain degree of lobbying for this position might be required. 
Strategically, the expansion of SACU into a new SADC customs union 
will provide South Africa with an opportunity to influence and guide the 
process. In this dissertation, it will be argued that regional integration in 
South Africa will be successful on condition that the SACU customs 
union model is adopted. The condition of adopting a SACU customs 
union model will hinge on the reform process that is currently taking 
place. The aim of the reforms is to transform SACU from an institution 
whose rational for existence is revenue collection and distribution to a 
fully fledged customs union with common industrial policies, agreement 
on services, competition policies and so forth (Southern Africa Customs 
Union Treaty, 2002; McCarthy, 2004). 
 
SACU will be contrasted with other successful customs unions, in 
particular, with the EU, in order to strengthen the argument that it is the 
correct model on which to build the new SADC customs union. The 
choice of the SACU model over the EU model is based on the fact that 
five SADC members are already members of SACU and this will 
facilitate the transition to the new SADC customs union configuration.  
 
 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the 
theories of regional economic integration, in particular the customs 
union. In Southern Africa, SACU and EAC are already customs unions 
whilst SADC and COMESA are currently in negotiation that will lead to 
the establishment of customs unions. The customs union theory will be 
discussed in terms of traditional theories such as trade creation and 
trade diversion, in terms of economics of scale, polarisation and the 
terms of trade. The attainment of the above (minus trade diversion) will 
lead to the economic welfare of the citizenry and economic 
development within a customs territory. The theory will be traced from 
its evolution, dating back to the 1950s with Jacob Viner‘s seminal 
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analysis of customs union theory in terms of which the emphasis was 
on the production effects in a perfect market, to the current custom 
union analysis which, in addition to the production effects, has added 
the consumption effect in an imperfect market. The customs union 
theory under imperfect competition exemplifies the real-world 
phenomenon in customs unions of both developed and developing 
regions. 
 
 
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the benefits and costs of regional 
economic integration based on the experience of developing regions. 
Here one refers to both static gains of regional economic integration 
such as economies of scale, investments and so forth and the dynamic 
gains such increased bargaining power during trade negotiations and 
sharing of values within the community. Chapter 4 contrasts the 
experiences of regional economic integration in developing regions, in 
particular Africa, South East Asia and Latin America. Regional 
economic integration in EU, NAFTA and SACU case studies will be 
discussed in detail. RECs in Africa will be analysed to ascertain whether 
the current regional economic integration has led to the attainment of 
economic welfare and economic development as per the theory of 
regional economic integration/customs union. Suggestions will be 
made, which, if heeded by RECs in Africa, could lead to the arrest of 
the current state of under-development. 
 
 
In Chapter 5, the focus will be on regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa with particular attention being paid to developments in 
COMESA, SACU and SADC. In light of the progress (through linear 
integration) made by SADC and COMESA towards graduating into 
customs unions, an argument will be advanced for the adoption of the 
SACU model (as opposed to the European Union model) for the future 
SADC customs union, since it will be proved that this model is both 
workable (for a developing region context) and will be beneficial for 
 8 
Southern African economies. In Chapter 6 the discussions will be 
concluded and policy recommendations suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
TRADITIONAL THEORIES ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
According to Viner (1950), Inotai (1986), Robson (1987) and Grossman 
(1995) the rationale behind the formation of regional integration 
agreements (RIAs6) is that both the consumers and producers will 
benefit from such a union. The consumers have the choice of goods at 
lower prices which will have been brought about by economies of scale. 
In the absence of regional integration agreement, tariffs are imposed on 
imports and this means that the consumers are forced to consume at 
higher prices, above the prevailing world price. Within regional 
economic communities, the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) will enhance consumer welfare. The producers, on the other 
hand, will benefit through intra-industry trade in terms of which input 
costs of their production will become cheaper. 
 
 
With the proliferation of RIAs the question arises as to whether such 
arrangements benefit world trade, contribute to economic development, 
enhance the welfare of regions (countries) and increase overall global 
welfare? The answer depends on the difference between the trade 
creation and the trade diversion effects of regional economic 
integration. RIAs have been the subject of considerable economic 
analysis, beginning with the seminal contributions to the subject of 
customs unions by Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) who studied the 
economic costs and benefits of the customs union to its members and 
                                            
6 In the dissertation any reference to regional integration arrangement (RIA) and 
regional economic communities (RECs) will refer to the customs union. 
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to the rest of the world (RoW). In this chapter the traditional theories of 
regional economic integration will be discussed.  
 
 
2.2 Compatibility of RIAs with the World Trade Organization 
guidelines 
 
RIAs are discriminatory in nature and it is member countries only that 
benefit from such an arrangement. The question therefore arises as to 
whether RIAs are not an impediment to multilateral trade liberalisation 
as espoused by the World Trade Organization7 and whether they 
violate the principle of most favoured nation (MFN) which stipulates that 
if a country gives trade preference to country A, then that country must 
extend the same preference to country C, D and so forth. Within RIAs, 
tariff and NTBs or technical barriers are reduced or removed only with 
intra-regional trade, thus implying that the relative prices of substitute 
goods (from non-member countries) will rise. Amid the strong forces 
forging closer economic ties among countries today regionalism has 
emerged as a force with the potential to rival multilateralism with, as yet, 
uncertain implications for the world trading system and the process of 
globalisation itself. RIAs are inconsistent with Article I (MFN) of the 
GATT which requires that nations treat all trading partners as they do 
their most-favoured trading partners. RIAs have constituted legitimate 
exceptions to MFN through Article XXIV of GATT, which permits the 
formation of RIAs if they meet the following conditions (General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 1993): 
 
a. When the members of the RIA gradually remove barriers on all 
intra-trade (not sectoral arrangements). 
 
                                            
7 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an intergovernmental organisation which 
regulates global trade. Through trade rounds representatives of countries negotiate 
the lowering of tariffs and other impediments to global trade. 
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b. Agreed common external tariffs (in the case of custom unions) 
set by RIA members on non-member trade are not higher or more 
restrictive than those prior to the formation of the customs union. The 
common external tariff (CET) charged by members of the custom union 
should be at least the average (if not lower) of the tariffs of the member 
states before integration. 
 
According to Qureshi (1996) and Krugman (1979; 1986) the integration 
of regional economies is seen as a first step in creating a larger regional 
market for trade and investment. This stimulates greater efficiency, 
productivity gains and competitiveness, not just by lowering border 
barriers, but by reducing other costs and risks of trade and investment 
(Mistry, 1996; Abdoulai, 2005). However, regional integration should not 
be seen as universal remedy for the problems associated with the 
economic development of member countries. In fact it has often been 
argued that the proliferation of RIAs hampers progress towards global 
integration and that costs and benefits are not shared equally, 
especially where there is asymmetry in economic development before 
integration.  RIA is however seen as a development tool if it encourages 
a shift towards greater market openness and is geared towards global 
integration. A strong theoretical foundation to the admissibility of RIAs 
has been analysed by, among others, Viner (1950), Meade (1955), 
Lipsey (1957) and Vanek (1965), who have all indicated that, as long as 
RIAs do not lead to the diversion of trade, they are permissible since 
they could not pose a stumbling block to the attainment of global free 
trade (as espoused by the WTO). 
 
 
2.3 Forms and examples of regional integration agreements 
 
There are various types of regional integration agreements. The first 
step towards any regional integration is the removal of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers among member states. The tariffs are removed gradually 
within a specific period of time, for example, after the signing of the 
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Southern Africa Development Community Free Trade Area (FTA) 
protocol in 2000, SADC member states agreed to reduce their tariff 
lines to zero on all trade by 2012 in order for the region to qualify as a 
complete FTA. According to Balassa (1976) and Salvatore (1990) there 
are four classic types of regional arrangements ─ a free trade area, 
customs union, common market and an economic union. 
 
2.3.1 Free trade area (FTA) 
According to Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Krueger (1997) and 
Grossman (1995), member countries belonging to an FTA agree to 
remove tariffs (and non-tariff barriers) gradually amongst each other, 
but maintain individual trade barriers with countries outside the FTA. 
Examples include the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
between the USA, Canada and Mexico, and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) comprising Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein.  
 
2.3.2 Customs union 
In addition to jointly determining the tariff level among the members (as 
in an FTA) the member countries of a customs union agree to the 
unification of custom or trade policies towards non-members. They 
determine a common external tariff (CET) which is applied to trade with 
countries outside the customs union. Since there is a loss of 
sovereignty in terms of the setting up of a tariff level for customs union 
member countries, a mechanism may be put in place to compensate for 
the revenue loss that result from the removal of custom duties among 
member countries. Member countries are represented as a single unit 
in trade negotiations at the international trade rounds or conferences. 
SACU is an example of a customs union (Viner, 1950; McCarthy, 1994; 
Krueger, 1997; 2004).  
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The main features of a customs union include the following:  
• A common set of import duty rates applied on goods from non-
member countries (common external tariff (CET)).  
• Duty-free and quota-free movement of tradable goods among the 
constituent customs territories.  
• Common safety measures, such as sanitary requirements and 
food standards, for regulating the importation of goods from third 
parties. 
• A common set of customs rules and procedures including 
documentation.  
• A common coding and description of tradable goods (common 
tariff nomenclature (CTN). 
• A common valuation method for tradable goods for tax (duty) 
purposes (common valuation system).  
• A structure for the collective administration of the customs union.  
• A common trade policy that guides the trading relationships with 
non-member countries/trading blocs outside the customs union, 
that is, guidelines for entering into preferential trading 
arrangements with third parties.  
 
2.3.3 Common market 
The common market is a customs union characterised by the free 
movement, without restriction, between the member countries of factors 
of production such as labour and capital. Countries agree to remove the 
internal barriers and jointly establish migration policies such as a 
common passport. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) is an 
example of a common market in South America, comprising Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Piazolo, 2002: 1198). 
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2.3.4 Economic union 
According to Baldwin (1994) and Salvatore (1990) an economic union is 
a regional economic agreement in terms of which the level of integration 
is deeper than that of an FTA, customs union or common market. The 
member states adopt common economic policies, for example, the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union which 
regulates production in agriculture. The member states may have a 
fixed exchange rate regime, such as the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Monetary Union. In order to improve the 
management of currency volatility and reduce distortions to trade the 
member states also adopt a common currency, which involves a 
common monetary policy and the harmonisation of macroeconomic 
policies. The ultimate act of integration is likely to be some form of 
political integration in terms of which the national sovereignty is 
replaced by some form of supranational political authority. For example, 
the EU represents an economic union which has evolved gradually from 
the sectoral integration endorsed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
(Baldwin, 1995; European Commission Report, 2005). 
 
2.4 The evolution of customs union theory 
The best known customs unions have included the Zollverein between 
Germanic states in the nineteen century, the Cobden Treaty between 
France and the United Kingdom, and the EEC, now known as the EU. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg established Benelux in the 
1940s, while Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
West Germany set up the EU. Customs union theory builds on relatively 
strict assumptions such as perfect competition in commodity and factor 
markets. It has both positive and negative welfare effects, as compared 
to a situation in which every member state practises protectionism 
(Machlup, 1976). 
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According to Viner (1950) the establishment of a custom union could 
have ambiguous welfare effects. It is all depended on the issue of trade 
creation versus trade diversion. Trade creation would be new trade 
created by the supply of goods from a lower cost source than before. A 
member country would now import from the other member countries 
(within the union) goods that it formerly did not import at all because the 
price of the protected domestic product was lower than the price of the 
import from any foreign source plus the duty. Therefore, there would be 
a gain in welfare for that country. Trade diversion would be a situation in 
which a member country would buy from a more expensive partner 
instead of buying from a country with low production costs outside the 
customs union. In this case, there would be a loss of welfare for that 
country. It would not only increase its cost but also lose the tariff it 
would charge the third country outside the custom union. 
 
 
Viner (1950) thus stressed the discriminatory aspects of regional trade 
liberalisation. The essence of what Viner (1950) said is that the welfare 
costs derived from trade diversion are borne by the consumers of the 
member countries, not by the exporters of third countries. Viner’s (1950) 
customs union theory depended on the assumption that the production 
costs of future partner countries were supposed to be constant, 
whatever the amount produced. Therefore, the rent or excess profit 
element on the side of the producer did not feature in the analysis. 
Modern theory on customs union as espoused by Bhagwati (1977), 
Venables (1990), Baldwin (1994) assert that if costs are variable, a 
much more likely occurrence, then any discriminatory trade 
liberalisation will contain simultaneously elements of both trade creation 
and diversion. 
 
 
Viner's analysis focused on resource allocation changes and on 
production efficiency when a customs union is formed. Viner’s analysis 
did not cover the reaction of consumer demand within a union when the 
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prices of traded goods decreases/increases. Economic theory tells us 
that any price reduction will have a positive impact on welfare, known 
as the consumer's surplus whilst an increase in price will reduce the 
consumer surplus.  
 
Lipsey (1957) focused on this secondary positive effect and affirmed 
that a trade-diverting customs union would be beneficial for its 
members. This statement openly contradicts the conclusions of Viner 
(1950). It is obvious that the consumer surplus effect may compensate 
for the negative trade diversion effect on the production side, provided 
the decrease in local prices is sufficiently large. Meade (1955) and 
Lipsey (1957) argued that there can be an increase in welfare with trade 
diversion if the trade diversion is an option to an autarky system were 
production in a country is protected by a high tariff. Meade (1955) 
emphasised that as long as trade diversion is an option to no trade, it 
will increase welfare. Taking into account the relative prices in the 
countries forming a custom union, Viner’s conclusion that trade creation 
is a “good thing” and trade diversion a “bad thing” should not be final. 
Bhagwati (1977) goes even further by saying that even if there is zero 
demand elasticity, a trade-diverting union can lead to an improvement 
in welfare if one considers that the supply elasticity of the good in 
country is not infinite. 
 
 
Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) eliminated the hypothesis of 
consumption in fixed proportions by discussing the effects of the 
establishment of a customs union on the change in terms of trade 
between the economies involved. They stressed that if a  change in the 
flows of trade is due to the “substitution” of goods, then a substitution 
effect in the consumption of goods would tend to increase the volume of 
imports from the partner country and decrease the imports from the rest 
of the world; and would make consumers replace the consumption of 
goods produced in the local market by goods imported from the partner 
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country, if the establishment of a customs union changed relative prices 
of the goods in favour of the partner country.  
 
 
According to Bhagwati (1977) and the Economic Research Bureau 
(2007) argue that when countries within the customs union end up 
buying from higher cost producers within the union over the least-cost 
producers outside the agreement, consumers still benefit. Despite the 
advantage of reduced tariffs which translate into lower prices of traded 
goods the national treasury of the customs union members suffers 
because it will have lost the tariffs that would have been charged. The 
above argument is especially true for countries whose trade share to 
Gross Domestic Product is higher and the customs revenue share of 
the national budget is larger. If gains to consumers outweigh the added 
amount paid to the producers in the high cost partner country, the result 
can be a net welfare gain for the country, that is, depending on which is 
higher. But this is only true if we assume that output of any industry in a 
particular country increases over the long-run relative to the national 
economy as a whole, its costs of production per unit also rises. But 
there are industries where you could get economies of scale returns. 
But anyway, free traders would argue that there would only be a benefit 
if this lower cost were even lower than the cost in the international 
market (before duties). 
 
 
The theory of regional economic integration has passed through two 
different periods in history (Krauss, 1972). The first period put emphasis 
on the impact of customs union formation on production (Viner 1950), 
consumption (Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 1957) and trade flows. In the 
period, from 1960 onwards, economists began to question what the real 
objectives were of those entering integration schemes. Some time 
earlier, with the development of the second best theory, economists had 
reached the conclusion that regional economic integration would not 
lead to maximum welfare gains in comparison to the global integration 
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which would result from multilateral tariffs reduction. Work by Johnson 
(1965), Cooper and Massell (1965) and later Berglas (1979) was the 
most significant in this respect. In fact, until the mid-1970s, theoreticians 
were fairly sceptical about the economic value of customs union and 
other regional integration arrangements as they considered them 
second-best in comparison with the multilateral trade liberalisation 
advanced by GATT, which has been subsumed into the WTO. With the 
development of the theory of intra-industry trade in the mid-1970s, new 
light was shed on the usefulness of regional trade liberalisation.  
 
 
There was consensus among the theoreticians in the 1970s and 1980s 
that discriminatory trading arrangements, such as customs unions, tend 
to be welfare-enhancing for their members provided these trading 
arrangements are regionally-based and fairly open to new membership 
and, also on condition that the members acting together are able to 
influence the terms of trade with the rest of the world (Oye, 1992). 
Supply-side improvements within the integrating area benefit the non-
member consumers (whether final or intermediary) as well as the 
exporters since fixed costs to penetrate the unified market tend to 
decrease (Smith & Venables, 1991).  
 
2.4.1 Trade creation and trade diversion in customs union 
 
The main argument in favour of the customs union (CU) is that it leads 
to trade creation and economies of scale. Trade creation occurs when 
low-priced imports from member countries replace high-priced domestic 
products. Trade creation benefits the efficient producers at the expense 
of inefficient producers and it results in the expansion of exports and 
increase in employment. The overall gains depend on the impact trade 
creation has on the industrial output of the trading block. For example, if 
the industrial output increases on a bigger scale as a result of trade 
creation then the gains will be larger, but will be lower when industrial 
output increases by a small margin.  
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Major arguments against customs unions include trade diversion and 
polarisation8. Trade diversion occurs when the formation of a customs 
union encourages members to buy expensive goods within the union at 
the expense of cheaper goods outside the union due to the price-raising 
effect and the protective nature of the CET. Therefore trade is diverted 
from a low-cost source to a high-cost source. This is of concern 
because it promotes the inefficient use of resources and reduces 
consumer surplus. The existence of a CET deprives member states of 
the ability to formulate their own tariff policies. The formation or 
extension of a customs union will increase welfare if trade creation 
exceeds trade diversion, and reduce welfare if the reverse is the case.  
 
Baldwin (1995) applied the trade creation and diversion analysis to 
justify the expansion of the EU (from 1994) to accommodate the former 
Communist block members from Eastern Europe. The analysis 
revealed that the chances of trade creation exceeding trade diversion 
increase if the following conditions are in place: 
• The applicant had high tariffs prior to membership, which will be 
lowered to the level of the customs union.  
• The customs union has a low common external tariff.  
• Tariffs in the rest of the world, outside of the customs union, are 
high.  
• The customs union is large enough to have an effect on the 
external terms of trade. 
• The trade structure of the applicant is currently competitive with 
that of the members of the union, but is potentially 
complementary to them.  
 
                                            
8 This aspect will be discussed in section 2.4.2. 
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Baldwin (1995) concluded that the economic gains of twelve new 
entrants to the EU would not be the same, but it would depend on the 
structure of their economies in terms of the criteria listed above. For 
example, Polish farmers might derive more gains9 in the agricultural 
sector as a result of lower input costs to their production, namely labour 
and an abundance of land in comparison to the old EU members such 
as France and Germany. 
 
With the proliferation of regional trading communities such as SACU, 
COMESA and the European Union, the question often arises as to 
whether such arrangements benefit world trade and increase overall 
welfare? The answer depends on the difference between the trade 
creation effects and the trade diversion effects of the customs union. 
Increased specialisation and economies of scale should increase 
productive efficiency within member countries, thus resulting in higher 
levels of welfare.  
 
With trade diversion, production will be diverted away from those 
countries outside the trade bloc that have a natural comparative 
advantage to those countries within the trading block that have high 
cost production structures. Figure 2.110 shows the trade creation and 
trade diversion effects which will occur when Zimbabwe forms a 
customs union with South Africa. Figure 2.1 depicts the trade in maize 
of the two countries. Supply curve Sz applies to Zimbabwe before the 
formation of the customs union. Should Zimbabwe form a customs 
union with South Africa then the supply curve for maize is Sz+sa for 
                                            
9 The economic gains are likely to be a short-term effect as there might be an 
equalisation of factor prices in the long-term, which might erode the initial Polish 
economic gains.  
10 This is a hypothetical example as there is currently no customs union agreement 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
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both Zimbabwe and South Africa. The world output of maize is shown 
by the horizontal supply curve, Sw. The Zimbabwean demand curve for 
maize is Dz. 
 
Fig 2.1: Trade creation and trade diversion in a two-country model, 
Source: Meade 1955 
If the two countries do not trade with each other, the domestic price of 
maize in Zimbabwe will be Pz and the quantity of maize produced will 
be Q1. The formation of a customs union with South Africa would mean 
that the price of maize will fall to Pz+sa and the quantity of maize 
produced will increase to Q2. The triangle AEB represents the resulting 
welfare gain or trade creation effect.  
 
If Zimbabwe were to trade freely on the world market, quantity Q3 of 
maize could be purchased at the world price of Pw. The member 
countries would not benefit from the low prices of maize from the rest of 
the world (RoW) because of the existence of the customs union and the 
imposition of some form of trade barrier, a common external tariff, as 
represented by 0Pz+sa minus 0Pw. There has therefore been a welfare 
loss of BFC. This is the trade diversion effect. A comparison of the two 
effects enables the overall welfare gain or loss resulting from the 
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formation of the trading bloc to be assessed. The welfare implication 
arising from the trade creation and the trade diversion effect are 
summarised in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1:  A summary of trade creation and diversion in a two-
country model customs union 
 With no trade With the customs union With global free trade
Price and Quantity Pz Q1 Pz+sa, Q2 Pw, Q3
Trade Creation - EAB DAC
Trade Diversion ADC BFC -
Source: Lipsey 1957 
According to McCarthy (1999) and Venables (1990) under increasing 
cost conditions, a customs union or FTA established among small 
countries, for example, SACU, (which is unable to influence their 
external terms of trade) will be predominantly trade diverting so long as 
non-member countries continue to supply imports to member countries. 
Although the exports of the producers of the member countries to other 
member countries will be increased under the RIA and these producers 
will thus enjoy welfare gains, the overall welfare of member countries 
will typically decline because these countries will be forfeiting 
substantial tariff revenues and will not enjoy an overall increase in their 
imports. The welfare of the trading bloc and (equivalently) the world 
economy will also typically decline as a result of the increased demand 
for resources necessary to expand exports by member countries.  
 
From the perspective of the developed countries the gains from regional 
economic integration depend firstly on whether the country forms part of 
the trading bloc, and, secondly, on which other countries are also 
members of the trading bloc (Baldwin, 1994). Not being part of a trading 
bloc will often mean that a country will be prejudiced due to the trade 
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diversion effect. Yugoslavia, which is not a member of the EU, faces 
trade barriers such as tariffs when exporting to the EU market and is 
consequently disadvantaged. However, a customs union comprising 
developing countries or least-developed countries (LDC) may result in a 
minimal trade creation effect only as the share of global trade of these 
countries would be insignificant,11 and the trade bloc would have a 
limited influence on the market price and quantity. If an LDC joins a 
trade bloc comprising developed or middle-income countries then this 
might constitute a real advantage to the LDC as resources flow within 
the bloc to the countries where there are cost advantages and the 
potential market for exports is significantly expanded. This perhaps 
explains why the developing world is eager to have some form of trade 
relations with the EU, US and Japan (Coe & Hoefmaister, 1998). 
 
Johnson (1965) and Lipsey (1957) assert that the larger the customs 
union, the greater the possibility that the most efficient producers of 
various goods will be part of the customs union and hence the smaller 
the potential for trade diverting effects. Secondly, when the large 
customs union fixes its CET rate then the possibility of this tariff rate 
affecting the external terms of trade increases and thus the customs 
union is able to obtain an additional welfare gain. For a large customs 
union, a general tariff imposed on imports may lead to gains in terms of 
trade and these gains will exceed the negative welfare effects resulting 
from a decrease in imports to the benefit of domestic production. This is 
the rationale behind optimal tariff rates.  
 
The net benefit (loss) to a country may be determined by comparing the 
trade creation and trade diversion effects. If trade creation exceeds 
trade diversion, then economic integration will enhance the welfare of 
                                            
11 For example, Africa’s share of global trade is less than 2 per cent. 
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the country, but if trade diversion dominates, then the welfare will be 
reduced. 
 
2.4.2 The polarisation effects of a customs union 
Within a customs union, industries tend to cluster in the relatively more 
developed member states since these states offer substantial internal 
and external economies of scale. This phenomenon is known as 
polarisation and is even more probable when huge discrepancies in the 
levels of economic development between member states already 
prevail. This has been the root cause of the limited success of 
integration efforts in developing countries. For example, in SACU, 
South Africa is the most advanced economy and thus attracts more 
investment than the other four member countries. The higher 
purchasing power in South Africa, comparably lower transport costs 
within the South African market and the perception of higher risks in 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLNS) also contribute to 
the tendency of industries to cluster more predominantly in South 
Africa.  
 
 
While there is no evidence that under-development in SACU has been 
caused by the polarisation effect, others argue that South Africa used 
its dominant power in the institutions to develop its own economy and 
thereby strengthened polarisation.  
 
 
The redistributive mechanism, known as the revenue sharing formula, is 
largely perceived by the BLNS countries as compensation by South 
Africa, as it has forced them to consume South African goods that are 
more highly priced than goods from the rest of the world (Venables, 
1990; Baldwin, 1995; McCarthy, 1999; 2004). 
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2.4.3 The impact of customs union on economies of scale 
 
Economies of scale occur when the average cost of producing a larger 
quantity is lower than the average cost of producing a smaller quantity. 
The argument in favour of creating regional economic communities 
(RECs) is the improved exploitation of scale economies which are not 
possible in small national markets. The benefit of economies of scale 
has enabled countries to concentrate production in fewer, larger plants, 
for example, the formation of Airbus (an aircraft producing industry 
owned jointly by Britain and France) was a result of EU integration. By 
combining synergies Britain and France are able to compete with the 
Boeing produced in the United States and the consumers stand to gain 
because the resultant competition in the industry lowers the prices of 
aircrafts. However, this is a general argument in favour of trade 
liberalisation or for worldwide free trade. It must be borne in mind that 
everything obviously depends on the type of product under focus and 
on the relative size of the national market when compared to the market 
of the union (Salvatore, 1990).  
 
 
Global trade is dominated by large firms that have reaped static and 
dynamic economies of scale within the larger regional market. 
Economies of scale enable the firms to meet greater market demand by 
moving down their long-run average cost curves. The economies of 
scale are significant for all customs unions, and include unions 
consisting of countries from both developed regions such as the EU and 
developing regions such as SACU (Balassa, 1961; 1976; Baldwin, 
1994; McCarthy, 1994). 
 
In the 1970s the scale economies argument was combined with the 
theory of intra-industry trade which had been developed initially by 
Grubel and Lloyd (1975). Grubel and Lloyd (1975) observed both intra-
EC trade in differentiated products and the related intra-industry 
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specialisation, and concluded that this is probably due to a 
concentration of local EC producers in particular production lines and 
models once they have been assured that they will enjoy a quasi-
monopoly in the whole EC market in terms of the particular brand they 
produce. Not surprisingly, in the 1980s the scale economies argument 
was progressively linked to new models of international trade under 
imperfect competition, drawing abundantly for their design from 
industrial economics (Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1990). 
 
 
If the initial assumption is that there were unexploited economies of 
scale before (regional) trade liberalisation, then the latter would 
increase concentration and firm scale, and ultimately justify mass 
production which is incompatible with perfect competition. After a quasi-
monopoly in differentiated products has been established in every 
partner country, then the latter may be tempted to increase the prices in 
order to realise the super-normal profit whilst reducing the consumer 
welfare. Clearly there may be a sufficient inducement for implicit or 
explicit collusion to take place under certain circumstances.  
 
 
However, Smith and Venables (1991) demonstrate that the gains of 
removing intra-union trade barriers in such a setting (described in the 
paragraph above) are generally modest. They maintain that the 
difference lies in the fact that nationally-based monopolistic firms 
prevailing before the union was created will not be able to continue to 
apply a price-discriminating strategy; market segmentation is not 
feasible. On the other hand, local firms will no longer be able to dispose 
of goods across borders at prices below cost ─ something they are able 
to do whenever they are able to cover losses by selling domestically at 
monopolistic prices. The forced reduction of domestic prices and the 
increase in intra-union export prices leads to diminished, rather than 
increased, intra-union trade (Krugman, 1979; Venables, 1990). 
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On the other hand, the new theoretical developments indicate a 
different direction as far as trade policy is concerned. In the world of 
decreasing returns "first mover advantages"12 are critical. The 
temptation for government is then to intervene in order to promote 
production in the desired field and pre-empt the entry of competing 
countries. This is what economists term ’strategic trade policy’ 
(Krugman, 1986). However, when sovereign countries decide to 
integrate they are, in fact, indicating that they foreclose autonomous 
intervention, that is, that they renounce the implementation of individual 
trade policies. They prefer (or accept) that intervention be carried out at 
the level of the customs union.  
 
 
2.4.4 The impact of regional economic integration on the terms of 
trade  
 
When analysing the experiences of the EU integration, the 
theoreticians, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, made the mistake 
of assuming that prices in foreign markets were given and ignored the 
terms of trade effects and ultimately made unilateral tariff dismantling 
the optimal policy. Vanek (1965) argued that it is not possible to explain 
integration agreements if one does not take into account the benefits 
that discrimination holds for the discriminators, which he referred as the 
terms of trade effects. Terms of trade effects were examined in detail by 
Mundell (1964) and Vanek (1965) and far more thoroughly by Kemp 
(1969) and Negishi (1969). 
 
 
Pearce (1970) summed up all by stating that the terms of trade with the 
rest of the world allows for the redistribution of world income in favour of 
the member countries of the customs union. In contrast, the neo-
                                            
12 The ability of the firm/industries to be the first to enter the new market. Such 
industries establish a monopoly position and create barriers to entry for firms wishing 
to enter the market. 
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classical alternative of unilaterally dismantling tariffs on a non-
discriminatory basis will not improve the terms of trade and may even 
lead to deterioration, rather than an improvement. In reality the creation 
of a customs union for this purpose is similar to introducing an optimal 
trade restriction at national level. The formation of a customs union may 
be particularly advisable for small countries which would not be in a 
position individually to affect the terms of trade. Joining a customs union 
enables a country to do what it cannot do alone (Pearce, 1970).  
 
 
Vanek (1965) reached the conclusion that the country which, before the 
union, traded mainly with its future partner was likely to gain from the 
integration, whereas partners with large trade stakes in the rest of the 
world would lose, unless the latter were able to improve their terms of 
trade with the rest of the world through trade diversion in such a way as 
to compensate for the deadweight loss derived from being forced to 
switch supply sources. However, any improvement in the terms of trade 
depends on the relative size of the union in relation to third countries.  
 
 
Kemp (1969) expanded on his previous analysis by stating very simply 
that customs union formation would make a positive contribution to 
world welfare (thus contradicting Viner) in as much as it were also 
possible for the partner which gains to compensate fully the loser within 
the union and the non-members outside of the union, and yet still be 
better off.  
 
 
This could always be achieved first by a series of intra-union lump sum 
transfers and then by selecting the correct CET instead of assuming 
that the latter would be equal either to the tariff which had prevailed 
prior to the customs union formation in the importing country or to an 
arithmetic average of the tariffs of the members before formation of the 
union. 
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2.5 Approaches to regional economic integration 
There are three main approaches to regional economic integration, 
namely, regional cooperation, market integration and development 
integration. According to Mistry (1996:52) and Venables (1990), of the 
three approaches mentioned above, regional cooperation has been 
perceived to present a softer option as it allows respective players room 
for flexibility. Regional cooperation consists simply of cooperation and 
collaboration between countries on matters of mutual interest. For 
example, the India, Brazil and South Africa Forum (IBSA), is an 
agreement between the three continental powers whereby cooperation 
in certain sectors of the economy is the overriding objective. 
 
The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC)13 adopted regional cooperation throughout the 1980s as a 
strategy which was geared towards lessening dependence of the region 
on apartheid South Africa. Apart from its success in uniting the region 
against the apartheid government of South Africa, the regional 
cooperation efforts on the part of SADCC did not result in much socio-
economic development. However, regional cooperation may indeed lay 
the foundations for deeper market integration as has been witnessed in 
the European Union in which cooperation in the areas of coal and 
energy production (in 1952) graduated into a fully fledged economic 
union more than four decades later (Mistry, 1996: 56; Njikeu & Gitongo, 
2005). 
 
However, from a theoretical perspective, there are two competing 
visions of regionalism and regional integration models. The first of these 
is the market or liberal-led integration model or open regionalism, which 
                                            
13 SADCC was renamed the South African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. 
It comprised the current SADC countries with the exception of Madagascar, Namibia 
and South Africa. 
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elevates the market, and is the self-regulating mechanism (SRM) within 
society. It is based on classical or neo-classical economic theory which 
states that the market should drive the economic integration processes. 
The other vision, closed regionalism, places less emphasis on the 
market, and stresses that the objective of integration is the achievement 
of social and economic development (Njikeu & Gitongo, 2005). Both 
market and development integration models require that the following 
conditions prevail in order for success to be ensured (Krueger, 1997; 
Mistry, 1996; Viner, 1950): 
• Harmonised national macroeconomic policies. 
• Regional macroeconomic stability based on a certain agreed 
criteria. 
• Some degree of regional political stability. 
• Significant intra-regional trade. 
• Complementary industrial development among member 
countries. 
• Significant distribution of the benefits of integration. 
• A political willingness to share a certain level of sovereignty. 
 
2.5.1 Market integration 
Market integration refers to a process that moves progressively through 
different stages and degrees of linear integration (from the Free Trade 
Area, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union), and 
finally achieves the ultimate goal of political union. Historically market 
integration has been associated with the theory of customs union as 
developed by Jacob Viner in his seminal work, The customs union issue 
(Viner, 1950). Viner defended the neo-classical free trade theory, which 
insisted on unhindered free trade without regional barriers throughout 
the world. Viner argued that the regional exchange of goods and 
services would be beneficial to all the parties within a customs union as 
long as trade was created. Such exchange, he argued, would enable 
the most efficient producers to take a major share of the market, and to 
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replace the less efficient producers. Although the latter would disappear 
from the market he argued that this would nevertheless be beneficial in 
that the most efficient producers would reduce the unit costs of 
production, resulting, in turn, in lower prices for consumers throughout 
the customs union. This would lead to an increase in trade within the 
union as a whole, and would therefore constitute a trade-creating 
customs union (Viner, 1950; Musila, 2005; Vickers, 2006). 
 
 
Baldwin (1994) and Bertelsmann and Draper (2006) emphasise that the 
EU is an example of fully functioning market integration in which the 
national economies are integrated and intra-regional trade is more than 
60 percent of the EU total trade. The EU progressed through the 
developmental integration stages which were aimed at economic 
development, such as building up the industrial base and infrastructure 
which had been destroyed during the First World War (WWI).  
 
According to Baldwin (1994) and Lawrence (1995) the EU integration 
process was incremental and the EU refrained from setting up 
ambitious targets which were not achievable In contrast, developing 
countries have a tendency to create timetables for the achievement of 
the upper end of integration without due regard for developmental 
challenges such as infrastructure development and the prevailing socio-
economic circumstances. Many of developing RIAs fail to reach the 
objectives set. 
 
2.5.2. Development integration 
Development integration emerged as a process to address market 
failure in the provision of goods and services. This approach recognises 
that, when market forces are unleashed on society, their tendency is to 
produce inequalities and widen the economic differences between the 
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lesser developed and the more developed areas. Furthermore, when 
the investment risk is high the market is unable to supply public goods. 
This is even truer for large projects such as the construction of roads, 
harbours, dams and so forth which are long-term projects. Development 
integration seeks to correct the situation by recasting the terms of the 
integration process. It does this by focusing on redefining the objectives 
of the integration process, addressing the controversial question of the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of regional integration, and by 
addressing the issue of timing and the level of inter-state binding 
commitments (Freund, 2000; Oyejide et al, 1999). 
 
Foroutan and Prichett (1993:1323) emphasise that the objective of the 
integration process is defined around the issues of economic and social 
development. The integration model is linked to the theory of 
development and the symbiotic relationship between the state and 
market to produce the desired outcome. Secondly, deliberate efforts 
have to be made to ensure that compensatory measures are in place, 
to compensate member states that become worse-off as a result of the 
agreement. Without compensatory measures, the integration project is 
unlikely to take off. Compensatory measures might assume different 
forms, for example, in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
there is a revenue sharing mechanism in terms of which member states 
share the customs and excise revenue based on SACU intra-trade. The 
SACU mechanism has worked with some degree of success, even 
though the recipient countries, in particular, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, have been far from satisfied.  
 
Thirdly, a high level of political commitment is required for all these 
processes to commence. Whereas market-led integration relies less on 
the states and political intervention, developmental integration seems to 
stress the primacy of the state. Developing regions must undertake 
development integration as a first priority, as it will ensure that 
 33 
economic development and socio-economic conditions, such as poverty 
and unemployment, will be addressed before the developing regions 
move into higher stages of linear integration (Mistry, 1996: 49; 
Bertelsmann & Draper, 2006).  
 
2.6 Preconditions for successful regional economic integration 
Member countries of the regional economic community must abide by 
the collective rules that regulate and govern the behaviour of member 
states. The European Economic Community (and later the European 
Union) was the first RIA to establish such rules in the form of 
convergence criteria, which govern the behaviour (as far as fiscal and 
monetary policies are concerned) of member countries and determine 
eligibility to join the Euro zone. A member country must satisfy the 
preconditions in order to qualify to be a member of the monetary union 
and adopt the Euro14 currency (Baldwin, 1994 & 1995). 
 
Developing countries also have a set of conditions (usually adopted 
from the EU convergence criteria) that need to be met before the RIA 
graduates from one form to another, i.e. from an FTA to a customs 
union. The problem of adapting the set of conditions as applicable to a 
developed RIA (such EU) to apply to a developing RIA, such as the 
SADC, is that the country might have a trade-off between the requisite 
development and fiscal austerity that is necessary to achieve 
macroeconomic convergence (Committee of Central Bank Governors, 
2007; McCarthy, 2002). 
 
 
                                            
14 The Euro is the currency of trade for the thirteen members of the EU who, since 
1999, have qualified under the convergence criteria as set out in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992. 
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2.6.1 Convergence criteria 
 
According to McCarthy (2002) economic convergence refers to the 
phenomenon of catch-up growth, that is, less developed economies 
catching up with rich(er) countries in terms of development indicators 
such as per capita income. The pursuit of macroeconomic 
convergence, which by definition entails the setting of lower and/or 
upper limits for selected macroeconomic variables, is usually 
underpinned by the desire to guide certain key aspects of future 
economic and financial policy and its management among the member 
countries concerned.  
 
 
McCarthy (2002) further stresses that macroeconomic convergence 
serves as an eligibility test in terms of which only those countries that 
attain the convergence benchmarks would qualify for membership of an 
economic grouping. Another reason for seeking macroeconomic 
convergence is the advantages that macroeconomic convergence 
confers on members, either individually or collectively. These 
advantages may include the attainment of macroeconomic stability, for 
example, through sustainable fiscal deficits and public indebtedness, 
external current account deficit, as well as low and stable levels of 
inflation, which are among the key pre-conditions for achieving strong 
and sustainable economic growth. 
 
 
According to Ajayi (2005) and the Economic Commission for Africa 
(2005) both developed and developing regions have macroeconomic 
convergence criteria in place, although those of the latter would have 
been copied from the former, for example, the convergence criteria or 
guidelines for membership of SADC mirror those of the EU, even 
though the target levels differ. Usually a regional power(s) will become 
the custodian of the agreed rules as the regional power(s) will be in a 
position to administer rewards and punishment to other smaller 
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members and at the same time the smaller members can collectively 
impose rewards and sanctions. It is highly unlikely for smaller members 
collectively or alone to impose sanctions on a bigger member. However, 
deviation by the regional power and the failure to impose sanction on 
the deviating member state might undermine the whole system (Siggel, 
2005; McCarthy, 2002). 
 
 
2.6.2 Convergence criteria in RIAs among the developed 
countries 
 
The current monetary union in Europe embodied in the European 
Central Bank and a single currency for member countries originated in 
the Delors Report completed under the auspices of the French Minister 
of Finance of the time, Mr Jacques Delors (Salvatore, 1990; Baldwin, 
1994; Siggel, 2005). This report put forward concrete proposals for a 
European economic and monetary union anchored in pegged exchange 
rate for the currencies of member countries before the introduction of a 
single currency.  
 
 
The next important milestone for European monetary convergence was 
the ratification on 7 February 1992 of the Treaty on the European 
Union, generally referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. In terms of this 
treaty, selected macroeconomic indicators would be targeted in the 
following manner (Baldwin, 1994): 
 
• Inflation rates not higher than 1, 5 per cent above the average 
inflation rate of the three countries in the Union with the lowest 
inflation rates. 
 
• Long-term interest rates may not diverge by more than 2 per cent 
from the interest rates in the three countries with the lowest 
inflation rates. 
 36 
 
• The annual budget deficits of the governments of the countries in 
the Union may not exceed 3 per cent of the GDP of the relevant 
country. 
 
• Government debt may not exceed 60 per cent of the GDP of the 
relevant country. 
 
• In the period prior to the acceptance of the Euro as a single 
currency, the exchange rates of member countries of the Union 
should stay within the accepted exchange rate target range. The 
country concerned must be a member of the exchange rate 
mechanism for two years. 
 
 
Member countries of the EU still experience difficulties in meeting these 
criteria. By 199915 Luxembourg was the only EU member country that 
had met the four most important criteria (inflation, interest rates, budget 
deficit and government debt). It was not expected that France and 
Germany (Euro zone powers) would flout the rules of the convergence 
criteria, but they exceeded the limits in the period 2002 to 2004 by 
spending above the 3 per cent deficit ceiling. Smaller countries have 
taken their cue from the behaviour of the larger powers, and Greece 
and Portugal have also flouted the rules (European Central Bank 
Convergence Report, 2004).  
 
Although there are sanctions that may be imposed on a member 
country deviating from the criteria set, it has proved to be difficult for the 
smaller EU member countries to punish the larger EU powers who have 
flouted the rules. It is important to note that, as soon as a member state 
deviates from the macroeconomic convergence criteria, the member 
state must devise a plan in order to return to the accepted behaviour. 
                                            
15 At the time of the introduction of the Euro. 
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Furthermore, there is an understanding that any deviation from the 
macroeconomic targets will have a negative effect for all member 
countries, as investors regard the EU as one single market. 
 
 
2.6.3 Convergence criteria among the developing countries 
 
It should be noted that, in line with the Abuja Treaty resolution of 1991 
aimed at accelerating regional integration in Africa, all African regional 
economic communities have adopted the macroeconomic convergence 
targets aimed at achieving the Africa Economic Community. Although 
the target points differ, the targeted indicators for the economic 
communities in Africa are similar to those of the EU: 
  
• Abdoulai (2005) and Aryeetey (2000) confirm that, on 20 April 
2000 in Accra, Ghana, the heads of state of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with the 
exception of Liberia, ratified a declaration for the establishment 
of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). The aim of the 
WAMZ is to carry out all those functions necessary for the 
establishment of a monetary union, the establishment of the 
West African Central Bank (WACB) and the introduction of a 
common currency, the ECO, for member countries (WAMZ). The 
primary macroeconomic convergence criteria set for member 
countries of the WAMZ comprise the following: 
 
i. Single digit inflation by 2003 and an inflation rate of 5 per 
cent by 2004, which has not been achieved. 
ii. Stable fiscal position for governments of member 
countries by limiting the budget deficit, excluding grants, to 4 per 
cent or less of the GDP in the period 2003 to 2005, which has 
been achieved by Nigeria and Ghana. 
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iii. Limit central bank funding of the budget deficit to 10 per 
cent or less of the tax income of governments in the preceding 
tax year for the period 2003 to 2008. 
iv. Sufficient gold and foreign exchange reserves to cover at 
least 3 months’ imports for the period 2003 to 2005. This was 
achieved in 2006, after the target date. 
 
 
• The West African Economic and Monetary Union (or WAEMU), 
which comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, adopted the 
macroeconomic convergence criteria set out in 1999 in terms of 
the Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact for 
member countries. According to Diagne (2005), and Masson and 
Pattillo (2005:3), WAEMU member states agreed to achieve the 
following: price stability with an inflation rate of 3 per cent; the 
basic fiscal balance (income excluding grants minus current 
expenditure) of member countries should be in equilibrium or 
positive. Government debt in member countries should be lower 
than 70 per cent of the GDP. 
 
• The Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC), which comprises Cameroon, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Equatorial-Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of 
the Congo, signed a treaty in March 1994 to provide for the 
promotion of the process of sub-regional integration within the 
framework of an economic union and a monetary union and 
accepted the same convergence criteria as the WAEMU 
countries, including the principle that monetary financing of 
governments be limited to 20 per cent of the previous year’s 
budgetary revenues (Ajayi, 2005; Akamanzi, 2006; IMF, 2007). 
 
• The convergence criteria of the SADC also target the same 
macroeconomic indicators as the EU, but differ in respect of the 
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Since the adoption of the macroeconomic convergence target 
indicators, only South Africa has managed to meet all the targets 
(although inflation is in single digit, at about eight per cent, it is 
above South Africa’s inflation target regime, which requires inflation 
to be between three to six per cent). In view of the level of 
asymmetry in development in the region, it is unlikely that the other 
members will meet all the targets in the short-term given that their 
economies still have the capacity to expand and will need cheap 
credit for entrepreneurship (this will necessitate lowering interest 
rates which is inflationary and can lead to higher levels of debt to 
GDP ratio, which exceed the targeted level).  
 
 
In addition, SADC member countries do not possess the required 
funding to expand their production and they depend on borrowing 
from the international market. International borrowing will increase 
the government debt to above 60 per cent (which is the targeted 
level) and furthermore will lead to an increase in government 
expenditure beyond the target 3 per cent.  
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Although the outlook is not good, the member countries could 
concentrate on one target (such as inflation targeting) at the moment 
and then add other indicators as they go forward, or when their 
economies are growing and they have at least addressed the 
developmental challenges such as infrastructure development, 
socio-economic gap and the reduction of poverty, all of which 
require foreign borrowing (McCarthy, 2002). 
 
 
2.6.4 Criticism of convergence criteria in developing countries 
 
The main criticism of the convergence criteria of developing countries is 
that they have been copied from the developed countries (such as the 
EU) without any regard for the economic structures of the developing 
countries. Since the economies of the developing regions are at various 
levels of development, the time envisaged for an RIA to graduate from 
one form to the other is very short and does not allow for per capita 
income convergence or for the strengthening of institutions to regulate 
the behaviour of member states, for example, the period in which SADC 
should graduate from an FTA to monetary union is eight years.  
 
 
This time period for SADC to graduate from an FTA to a monetary 
union is not comparable even to that of the EU that has evolved into a 
monetary union in a time span of fifty years. McCarthy (2002) states 
that, although convergence is a requisite for monetary integration, 
SADC is not ready for this step in regional integration, especially with 
regard to public debt as a percentage of GDP, single digit interest rates 
and the budget deficit which has been targeted at a lower rate. 
Furthermore, the removal of the exchange rate and the rate of interest 
from the portfolio of policy instruments of each member state will restrict 
the ability of each state to manage external shocks. 
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The economic disparities between SADC member countries and sub-
region mean that a fully-fledged macroeconomic convergence 
programme is not appropriate at this stage of SADC’s development. 
However, it may be argued that an adapted single indicator programme 
(such as monetary policy anchored on inflation targeting) would be 
beneficial. Macroeconomic stability requires sound and credible fiscal 
and monetary policies, and this is something that SADC member states 
lack. Experience has shown that many SADC member states resort to 
printing money in order to stimulate the economy, for example, the 
Zimbabwean government printed money to deal with economic decline 
and this has led to hyperinflation (Jebuni & Soludo, 1995; Rowthorn & 
Richard, 1998; Southern Africa Development Community Report, 2006).  
 
 
2.6.5 Proponents of fiscal and macroeconomic convergence 
 
On the other hand, proponents of fiscal and macroeconomic 
convergence believe that the SADC region is ready for this experiment. 
They further reiterate that EU countries continue to deviate from the 
Maastricht criteria without damaging the economic prospects of the 
other member states. The benefits of such criteria far outweigh staying 
out of such convergence. In the EU the larger economies, such as 
France and Germany, have a problem reducing the deficit to the 
acceptable level of EU standards, which is less than 3 per cent. There 
are, however, sanctions which may be imposed on these larger 
members by the smaller members, but the latter choose to allow 
countries some leeway in returning to the accepted levels of behaviour. 
The advantages of a similar interest rate, low inflation rate, and so forth, 
which are inherent in membership of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, have benefited smaller countries, such as Greece and Portugal, 
and they would not have achieved the feat, if they had opted out 
(Mboweni, 2003).  
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For developing RECs, preconditions such as macroeconomic 
convergence criteria may be used to align the region with major trading 
partners, to attract foreign direct investment as well as to prepare the 
member countries for a deeper level of integration such as the 
monetary union. The convergence criteria used by developing RIAs 
should not necessarily mirror those of developed RIAs, such as the EU, 
but the convergence criteria of developing RIAs must be informed by 
the level of economic development in the region and must take 
cognisance of the economic disparities that characterise the economies 
of such a region.  
 
 
As with the exchange rate mechanism of the EU (in terms of which 
currencies were anchored to the German Mark), the currencies 
envisaged in developing RIAs must be anchored to a strong currency, 
for example, the SADC currencies could, as a transition towards the 
envisaged common currency, be anchored to the South African Rand.  
 
 
RIAs should be flexible with regard to timeframes set for achieving 
different milestones of linear integration. For example, if the conditions 
set for achieving a SADC customs union by 2010 are not realised, the 
regional leaders should not hesitate to shift the objective to the latter 
date if there if the problems encountered are beyond the region’s 
control. So saying, however, there is a need for a form of convergence 
in developing RIAs that is informed by the actual situation on the 
ground. In addition there should be a political willingness on the part of 
the leaders of developing RIAs and the citizens to support the process 
(EC Report, 2005; Mboweni, 2003).  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated that regional trade arrangement would be 
desirable if such an arrangement were trade-creating and welfare-
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enhancing. On the other hand it would be undesirable if it were trade-
diverting and welfare-reducing. The overall effects of a RIA (in particular 
a custom union) are not always positive and depend on whether the 
RIA creates trade and increases the welfare of the regional members. 
Should a RIA be trade-creating among member states (even if the 
effect to the rest of the world is welfare-reducing) then such a union will 
be judged to have a positive impact since it will have resulted in certain 
welfare gains in member countries. Although RIAs are discriminatory in 
nature they are permitted under GATT Article XXIV, which allows for the 
formation of an RIA if it aims to liberalise all trade within a reasonable 
given time or if it covers all trade rather than just a specific sector of 
trade. 
 
 
Convergence criteria are a set of conditions by which each member 
state of the RIA must abide if the RIA is to graduate from one form to 
another, for example, from a customs union to a common market and a 
monetary union. Critics have found that RIAs from the developing world 
adopt the same convergence criteria as those of developed countries, 
irrespective of their level of economic development. It was found that 
preconditions are desirable as they enable an RIA to benchmark with its 
major trading partners. It was cautioned that the RIA should set 
conditions (convergence criteria) at a level which takes cognisance of 
economic disparities and which are achievable. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE THEORY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
On the whole, developing regions16 have had their fair share of 
participation in regional integration arrangements. Most RIAs in 
developing regions, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), have 
failed to yield the economic benefits that are accruable to the members 
of regional economic communities. Although the theory of regional 
economic integration (read customs union) implies that gains, such as 
an increase in economic welfare and increased markets through scale 
economies, may be realised by member states, the experiences of 
developing regions reveal that there were in fact few tangible benefits.  
 
 
Developing countries formed the RIA in response to events in the 
developed regions, for example, after the formation in 1957 of the 
European Economic Community (subsequently the European Union); 
developing regions replicated the experience without setting up the 
necessary preconditions that would allow the RIA to flourish (Rodrick, 
1998).   
 
 
In Chapter 3, the focus will be on the theory of regional economic 
integration as it applies to developing regions by concentrating on the 
rationale for RIA formation, how RIA formation differs according to the 
experiences of developing regions, and the measurement of successful 
regional integration.  
                                            
16 Developing regions comprise countries that have not yet achieved a significant   
degree of industrialization relative to their populations, and which have a low 
standard of living in comparison with the developed world. The term is used to 
define most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America as well as 
Caribbean and Pacific regions. 
 45 
3.2 Regional economic integration in developed versus 
developing countries 
 
3.2.1 Replicating the experiences of developed regions 
 
According to Economic Commission for Africa (2005) and Mistry (1996) 
economic integration in the developing world differs from that in the 
developed world in that it is pursued with the aim of fostering economic 
development, industrialisation and the reduction of poverty. In 
developed economies, conditions are such that member countries have 
already reached a high level of economic development and 
industrialisation before pursuing higher levels of linear integration. In 
developed economies regional economic integration is pursued with the 
objective of attaining higher economic growth and sustaining it through 
production on a regional scale. For example, industrialisation in 
Western Europe preceded the formation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957, whereas in Africa, countries participate in an 
RIA in order to attain industrial and economic development.  
 
 
Developed regions/countries have been active participants in 
globalisation and this has helped them to pool regional resources in 
order to deal with the harsh realities of globalisation. Developing 
regions, on the other hand, consolidate regional integration in reaction 
to the forces of globalisation. For example, African countries 
experienced a dwindling market share of the world economy and pooled 
resources in order to arrest the decline in their economies and improve 
the terms of trade, hence the current mushrooming of regional 
economic communities (De Melo & Panagariya, 1993).  
 
 
The experiences of one type of regional economic community may not 
always be relevant to others. Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990) 
emphasise that in developing region, there is a tendency by 
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government to replicate the experience of industrialised regions in the 
way regional integration is pursued. Furthermore, they argue that the 
notion that the experiences of RIAs in developed countries may easily 
be replicated in developing countries is a “fallacy of transposition”17.  
 
 
According to Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990) preconditions 
contributing to integration in Europe, have been overlooked by the 
governments in developing regions, for example, a higher level of intra-
regional trade before the commencement of integration; similarities in 
income and industrialisation levels allowing for intra-industry 
specialisation; political geniality in foreign affairs; and both the capability 
and willingness to provide compensation payments to compensate for 
different levels of development among member countries. Since the 
necessary conditions (such as those mentioned above) for regional 
economic integration were not in place, developing regions, especially, 
SSA have subsequently achieved very little (in comparison with the 
developed region) in terms of accruing the benefits of regional 
economic integration. 
 
 
3.2.2 The orientation of regional economic integration 
 
RIAs, whatever their specific structure, also vary in their end goals. 
Krugmann (1984), Krueger (1997) and McCarthy (1994) assert that a 
distinction has to be made as to whether a RIA has been established to 
support an inward-oriented (based on import-substitution 
industrialisation) or outward-oriented (export promotion) trade strategy.  
Many RIAs in developing countries are inward-oriented in that they 
were established in order to enlarge the domestic market for import-
substituting firms in what members usually refer to as a strategy of self-
sufficiency. In terms of these arrangements, protected domestic firms 
                                            
17 A misleading notion that is without justification.  
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operate on a regional rather than national level. In respect of inward-
looking RIAs, industries are chosen and given protection through tariff 
increases in the substitute imports market to allow a chosen industry, 
referred to as an infant industry, to grow (in a specified period of time) 
so that it may compete with similar industries from outside the region.  
 
 
By contrast, outward-oriented RIAs are often established as a first step 
towards integration with the global economy. Such RIAs are designed 
to expose firms to regional competition with a view towards eventually 
competing in global markets (Salvatore, 1990; Baldwin, 1994; Siggel, 
2005). Despite clauses in the treaties of developing RIAs emphasising 
the need for the outward-oriented model of integration, impediments to 
real economic integration in the form of high tariffs and technical 
barriers remain in place.  
 
 
According to the Economic Commission for Africa (2005) the lack of 
complementary goods produced in many developing countries has 
resulted in lower intra-regional trade as the bulk of Sub-Saharan trade 
is with countries outside the subcontinent18. Another deficiency in 
respect of the RIAs in developing regions has to do with sectoral 
coverage.  
 
 
RIAs in the developing world, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
are limited to industry and, more specifically, to manufacturing. A 
minority encompasses agriculture and services. In general, the more 
limited the agreement, the greater the likelihood that it will exclude 
those sectors, such as agriculture, in which more countries have a 
                                            
18 The European Union, the US and East Asia (in particular China and India) are the 
major trading partners of the African continent. 
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comparative advantage, and this obviously reduces any potential gains 
from increased regional trade. 
 
 
3.2.3 The measurement of successful regional economic 
integration 
 
According to Schiff (2002) and the SADC Report (2006) regional 
economic integration in developing and developed economies differs in 
terms of the instrument used for measuring success. In developed 
regions, the success of regional economic integration is measured 
using per capita income (in terms of the narrowing of the income gap 
between the population from industrialised and poor areas), output 
expansion measured in gross domestic product (GDP), the levels of 
intra-regional trade and specialisation in production. In addition to those 
instruments that are applicable to developed regions, the success of 
RIAs in the developing world is measured in terms of economic 
development programmes, such as the reduction in poverty, human 
development (measured by the Human Development Index) and 
infrastructure developments.  
 
 
The difference in the instrument that measures either the success or 
lack of success of the integration schemes of developed and developing 
economies does not mean that the developing regions are not able to 
attain the benefits of RIAs that are attainable in the developed regions 
─ it merely illustrates the different levels of development between the 
two regions. That which the developing regions seek through regional 
integration would have already been attained by developed economies 
prior to regional integration (Shams, 2005; SADC Today, 2006).  
 
 
MERCUSOR and ASEAN, although developing RIAs, have member 
countries that have attained a higher level of economic development 
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through regional integration. This may be attributed to the orientation of 
the RIAs which were export-oriented, open to new members and 
successful in the production of low-cost manufacturing in sectors in 
which they have a comparative advantage. It will suffice to say that 
once developing regions have reached higher levels of economic 
development measured in terms of infrastructure development and 
reduction of poverty, the measurement instruments used to gauge 
regional integration in developed regions will be applicable to 
developing RIAs (Viner, 1950; McCarthy, 1994). 
 
3.2.4 The rationale for a customs union in developing regions 
The aim of creating a customs union is to enable partner states to enjoy 
economies of scale with a view to supporting the process of economic 
development. Unlike developed countries, economic integration in 
developing regions is not merely for purposes of trade, but is a vehicle 
for bringing about more rapid economic development. Nevertheless, a 
customs union on its own will not bring about economic development. 
Accordingly, a customs union has to be supported by other measures 
such as the development of infrastructure to link production areas to 
markets. In addition, measures to support the development of human 
resources across the region are similarly important (SADC Report, 
2006).  
 
According to Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) and McCarthy (1999) one of 
the most compelling arguments in favour of regional integration in 
developing countries is usually made on the basis of the fragmentation 
of national economies, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa has 47 small 
economies with a combined GDP of US$600 billion, which is equal to 
that of Belgium or 50 per cent of the GDP of Spain. This is in contrast 
with the SSA population of about 600 million inhabitants to Spain’s 50 
million. The small domestic markets, combined with generally high 
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production costs and deficient investment climates, result in limited 
investment (Africa attracts less than 2 per cent of global foreign direct 
investment). The solution to this fragmentation of individual markets is 
the formation of RIAs, in terms of which member countries may benefit 
as a result of larger markets in which goods and services are traded at 
lower or zero tariffs. The customs union is more attractive to developing 
regions as it has potential to redistribute wealth (derived from import 
duties from extra-regional imports) in favour of poorer regions. 
Furthermore it provides for a captive market to test goods that could 
have otherwise been unable to compete in the wider global market. 
 
3.3 The characteristics of a successful regional economic 
integration agreement 
 
A successful regional integration is based on a number of 
preconditions. Integration must be guided by principles, which would 
ensure that the regional and the national programmes are compatible 
and mutually reinforcing. One such principle is open-regionalism, which 
seeks to ensure that a regional strategy is couched in the same 
ideological paradigm as the national reform policies. The principle of 
subsidiarity provides guidelines for dividing responsibilities between 
countries and regional organisations in order to facilitate the integration 
process. Another principle, that of pragmatism/gradualism indicates 
that, given asymmetry in the development of member countries, 
integration may proceed gradually so as to build on demonstration 
cases and minimise the frequency of policy reversals.  
 
 
3.3.1 Open regionalism 
 
Broadly speaking, open regionalism means a coordinated integration 
rather than a collective retreat from the world economy for countries of 
the region. Regional programmes must be outward-oriented, market-
driven and private sector-led ─ all of which comprise the constituent 
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pillars of national reform programmes (McMillan & McCann, 1981). It is 
precisely this need to reinforce the national programmes that has led to 
the current resurgence of regionalism worldwide. Without outward 
orientation as an explicit goal, many regional integration arrangements 
may tend to raise rather than lower external tariffs, partly as a result of 
the consensual internal decision-making process, or as the by-product 
of the increased power of lobbies. For example, in a customs union of 
which each member country has an interest in raising protection in one 
sector and reducing it in all others, the consensual internal decision 
process may lead to a classic “prisoners” dilemma outcome with high 
protection in all sectors, even though each member country would be 
better off with low protection in all sectors. Protectionism may also arise 
as the result of the increased power of lobbies, as the larger scale of 
activities may also increase stakes and hence raise the opportunity 
value of lobbying. The following are some of the characteristics of open 
regionalism (Keck, 2004; Lawrence, 1995; McCarthy, 1999:380; 
McCarthy, 1994; Mistry, 1996; Teunissen, 1996; Viner, 1950; World 
Bank; 2000): 
 
• RIAs must be outward-oriented, which means that regional 
policies must contribute to lowering and eliminating obstacles to 
global trade and investment, including tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to the rest of the world in order to ensure accelerated growth in 
the region. High levels of protectionism not only raise costs for 
both producers and consumers, but also systematically 
discourage investment in export-oriented activities and inhibit 
economic transformation. Thus, lower and more uniform tariffs, 
the total elimination of non-tariff barriers, and the concomitant 
reforms of domestic taxation must remain on the agenda of 
regional programmes. 
 
• Secondly, open regionalism implies a market-driven integration 
process, which means that governments should refrain from 
developing national monopolies. RIAs should embark on a 
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strategy to develop a regional-focused competition policy which 
regulates anti-competitive behaviour, for example, the EU has 
such a body. National monopolies constitute restraints on 
competition, free trade and investment, and the thrust of national 
reform programmes is, among other things, to eliminate national 
monopolies. However as the market expands beyond national 
boundaries as part of the integration process, the region must 
guard against the emergence of regional monopolies, which tend  
to reduce consumer welfare as result of collusion in setting up 
the prices of goods. Instead, countries must cooperate to expand 
markets and competition across borders. This is obviously the 
essence of a common market. However this must go beyond 
traditional goods market integration (FTA, customs unions, etc), 
and extend to infrastructure services, which have traditionally 
remained the domain of national monopolies and which are now 
the targets of national privatisation and liberalisation 
programmes, especially in developing regions. 
 
• The very idea of a well-functioning market implies private sector 
involvement. Ultimately, integration is for the benefit of the 
people of a region ─ they should be the critical actors, and 
governments and regional organisations merely facilitators 
through appropriate choices and policies. Enhanced production 
and trade of goods and services are dependent on the improved 
performance of private firms and farms, and private operators 
and consumers will be the main beneficiaries of larger markets 
and improved investment opportunities.  
 
• This also means that private operators must be involved in the 
design and implementation of regional activities, and this will also 
help change the widespread perception that regional 
organisations are simply remote outgrowths of government 
bureaucracies rather than instruments for empowering the 
private sector on a regional scale. In developing countries the 
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government is the main procurer of goods and services and, at 
times, competes with the private sector to the detriment of 
taxpayers and consumers who pay higher taxes in order to assist 
the government in acquiring goods and services that the private 
sector is able to provide efficiently. The consumers in turn are 
forced to consume at higher prices.  
 
3.3.2 The principle of subsidiarity 
 
According to the Southern Africa Development Community Treaty 
(1992) subsidiarity simply means that regional institutions should be 
responsible only for those activities that are not more efficiently handled 
at the national level. In return, government must be selective and 
economical in creating regional organisations and initiatives. There are 
two main reasons to respect subsidiarity, that is, to avoid overloading 
already scarce regional administrative capacity and resources and to 
assure that there is sufficient commitment and trust so that the key 
regional agencies will be given the authority and the means to 
implement the regional programme. If these conditions are not 
respected the regional effort will lose credibility, and this in turn could 
mean the undermining of future integration efforts.  
 
 
Regional organisations should develop their own well-functioning 
bureaucracy to manage day-to-day activities. The lack of a regional 
bureaucracy is more apparent in developing countries (in particular in 
respect of RIAs in Africa) and this may have adverse results during 
multilateral trade rounds where negotiators from the developing world 
are unable to obtain better concessions on technical matters (Schiff & 
Winters, 2003; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; Fabricus, 
2006:21). In Southern Africa, the Southern Africa Development 
Community Treaty (1992) does acknowledge the creation of self-
functioning institutions under the principle of subsidiarity; one example 
being the SADC Developmental Finance Resource Centre (DFRC) 
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which was established for the purpose of coordinating the activities of 
the national developmental financial institutions so that these 
institutions may be geared towards accelerating the regional agenda by, 
for example, financing infrastructure through public-private partnership 
(PPP) programmes. This is controlled and managed by seconded 
members of the SADC development financial institutions (DFIs) such as 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa and other similar institutions 
in other SADC member countries, as these seconded members have 
the necessary expertise as opposed to the general bureaucrats at the 
SADC Secretariat. 
 
 
3.3.3  Adherence to the principles of pragmatism and gradualism 
 
Fundamentally, accelerated integration means credible integration built 
on pragmatic, gradual steps that reinforce trust and commitment and 
render the process self-perpetuating. It serves no purpose for member 
states to focus on setting a shorter timeframe within which integration 
must be achieved without checking the development imbalances of 
each member state, for example, a least-developed member country 
such as Lesotho (in case of SACU) cannot be expected to reduce its 
tariff level within the same timeframe as South Africa (McCarthy, 1999: 
390; Ajayi, 2005: 20). It makes more sense to set a realistic, longer 
timeframe than a shorter and unrealistic one. Even in the case of a 
developed region such as the EU, it took the member countries at least 
fifteen years to reach a common market19. It is certainly valuable to 
have a clear vision of what regional integration should ultimately mean 
in the region, but experience also strongly suggests that it would be 
wise to move forward in a pragmatic, gradual fashion by creating 
timetables and targets that are credible and realistic.  
 
                                            
19 Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (establishing the European 
Economic Community), the common market was adopted in 1973. 
 55 
 
When goals are not achieved, this can lead to missed targets, 
frustrations and disappointments, and, in the end, reversals. The 
challenge is posed by the very issue integration sought to address, 
namely, the diversity in almost every geographic, linguistic, political and 
economic challenges in member states. In this context, a strategy 
combining variable geometry (the sequencing of integration in 
geographic space, allowing subsets of countries to move faster and 
deeper in certain areas), and variable scope (seizing opportunities to 
advance integration in areas in which conditions are propitious) is 
probably the most appropriate and effective strategy for most of the 
subregions in SSA.  
 
 
Gradualism provides low risk opportunities to build experience and 
mutual trust progressively, which are both essential for integration to 
move forward and deeper over time (Foroutan, 1993: 24). The 
discussion on the experience of regional economic integration in Africa 
in Chapter 4 and 5 will highlight some of the challenges resulting from 
hastily convened regional economic communities that have ambitious 
goals that are not commensurate with the level of the economic 
development in those regions.  
 
 
One other important facet of pragmatism and gradualism is open 
access, which means that regional integration arrangements must 
remain open to new membership from the countries of the subregion. A 
core group of countries may join but they must create the opportunity 
for other neighbours to join if and when they meet certain criteria, such 
as the EU Convergence Criteria.20 Although the process of building the 
African Economic Community may proceed through the amalgamation 
                                            
20 The European Union (EU) Convergence Criteria has been discussed in detail in 
section 2.6.2. 
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of regional economic communities, ultimately, the entire continent will 
become a group of contiguous countries, providing a unified geographic 
base for the markets of goods and services (World Bank, 2000; Ajayi, 
2005). 
 
 
3.4 Gains from regional economic integration in the developing 
world 
 
Among other gains attributable to customs union membership, member 
countries have the potential to act collectively during multilateral trade 
negotiations and this increases their bargaining power. Their terms of 
trade may improve relative to other countries, for example, it has been 
estimated that the EU was able to increase its terms of trade by one per 
cent of gross national product (GNP21) after the formation of the 
customs union. The following are some of the gains that can be realised 
through the membership of RIA: 
 
 
3.4.1 RIA’s impact on productivity within the region 
 
The mechanism of dynamic gain is provided by increased competition, 
which may in turn stimulate a higher level of efficiency. In a more 
competitive market less efficient producers (those producing at 
relatively higher costs) will be undercut and forced either to improve 
their production method or be driven out of business. After regional 
integration monopolies in domestic markets will be undermined by 
exposure to highly competitive imports. In order to stay in business, the 
monopoly pricing firm will have to compete effectively by altering its 
pricing policy. In order for competition to flourish there is a need for a 
regional competition policy to regulate the behaviour of companies. This 
                                            
21 Gross national product (GNP) is the value of goods and services produced by the 
residents of the country and it is calculated on an annual basis. 
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regional policy will prevent any merger and acquisition between 
businesses that could leave the consumer worse-off as a result of the 
restriction in his/her choice of consumption due to an increase in price 
resulting from a monopoly’s discriminatory pricing. The regional 
economic policy will prevent monopolies from more affluent countries 
from acquiring similar businesses from the less developed associates. 
For example, without the EU Competition Policy, conglomerates from 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) will find it easier 
to acquire smaller firms in the other 23 member countries even if such a 
move was detrimental to the consumers who normally suffer through 
monopoly pricing behaviour (Shams, 2005:6; Jansen & Vennes, 
2006:20). 
 
 
If productivity levels depend on the size of the market, then a widening 
market through RIAs would contribute to productivity growth, that is, 
RIAs would lead to an improvement in the dynamic efficiency of the 
economies participating in the union. The establishment of the above 
relationship (between market size and productivity) does not, however, 
imply that integration will necessarily be followed by a sustained 
increase in the rate of growth of productivity.  
 
The transition years after integration will result in an increase in the 
productivity levels, but this may slow down in the long term, for example 
if, after integration, smaller numbers of firms merge to form a bigger firm 
with a bigger market share and this firm is a price-setter, then 
productivity might decrease as the monopoly might not produce 
according to market demands, but rather in order to gain a supernormal 
profit.  
 
The gradual removal of capital controls by the South African 
government has led to an influx of capital (usually from South African 
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monopolies) to Southern African countries (SADC). South African 
monopolies, such as Telkom/Vodacom, have bought large blocks of 
shares in companies in the SADC and the resultant acquisitions have 
led to customers in the region being worse off than before as the new 
companies use South African pricing for customers in the region (Doing 
Business in Africa, 2006). 
 
3.4.2 Attraction of foreign direct investment  
 
A sizeable region may attract foreign direct investment (FDI) both from 
within and beyond the regional economic community as a result of 
market enlargement and production rationalisation (reduced distortion 
and lower marginal cost in production). The formation of RIA encourage 
clustering of firms by increasing market size and allowing for more 
effective exploitation of the links between firms. An RIA may attract 
industry into member countries at the expense of non-members 
(although if the RIA is small such effects will also be very minimal). 
RIAs also frequently result in industries relocating from one member 
country to another (Doing Business in Africa, 2006; Kolala, 2000).  
 
 
It would appear that RIAs between poor countries would be likely to 
increase inter-member inequalities because firms tend to agglomerate 
their productions in the more prosperous countries while still selling in 
the other member countries. For RIAs involving richer member 
countries the results are less clear-cut, and it is possible that poorer 
members could experience industrialisation as a result of joining an 
RIA. When the agglomeration effects are considered integration with 
richer neighbours (in a North-South RIA) look to be a far better option 
for developing countries than does South-South integration (Shams, 
2005:6; Jansen & Vennes, 2006:20). 
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A large regional market is conducive to a higher level of both 
indigenous and inward investment, which is a key factor in raising the 
level of economic growth and economic development. The level of 
investment depends on the performance of the economy, for example, 
during economic expansion, investors flock to invest so that they are 
not left out, but, during a recession, investment diminishes as investors 
are not sure if they will realise the return on their investments. Within 
SADC the signing of the FTA protocol in 2000 and the removal of the 
majority of capital controls have resulted in massive investment by 
South African firms in the region.  
 
 
The logic is that larger markets, more competition and improved policy 
credibility will increase the incentives for investment and so raise 
incomes. This argument is relevant to all investment but is applied most 
explicitly to foreign direct investment (FDI). Early RIAs were activist and 
interventionist, and co-opted regional integration into import substitution 
at a regional level. These policies failed comprehensively and have 
been superseded by a far more market-friendly approach that places 
greater emphasis on policies which guarantee the fair treatment of 
investment. These guarantees are often embodied in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) or in the investment chapters of RIA 
agreements. BITs typically contribute to investment by prohibiting 
certain policies rather than by requiring policies that actively encourage 
investment. However, they may play an important role in facilitating 
investment flows (McCarthy, 2004; Keck, 2004). 
 
 
3.4.3 Regional economic integration arrangements as stepping 
stones to multilateral liberalisation 
 
In broad terms, the desire for closer regional integration is usually 
related to a broader desire for “opening to the outside world”. Regional 
economic cooperation is pursued as a means of promoting 
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development through greater efficiency, rather than as a way of 
disadvantaging others. The majority of members of these arrangements 
genuinely do hope that these regional economic integration 
arrangements will succeed as building blocks for progress with a 
growing range of partners and that they will open the way towards a 
generally more free and open global environment for trade and 
investment. However, regional arrangements will always be the ‘second 
best’ option. The chances of new bilateral or subregional arrangements 
contributing to, rather than undermining, the rules-based multilateral 
system, centred on the WTO, will depend both on the economic 
characteristics of the countries involved and on the details of the design 
of the new partnerships. If designed badly, regional arrangements will 
certainly be a stumbling block rather than a stepping-stone (Lawrence, 
1995; Bhagwati & Krueger, 1995). 
 
 
In Chapter 2, the argument was put forward that, even if RIAs are 
inferior to full liberalisation, they should nevertheless be viewed as a 
positive step in the direction of liberalisation as long as they are trade 
creating and welfare-maximising. According to this point of view, 
regional integration is perceived as establishing a path towards more 
complete global integration, and thus is likely to be beneficial in the long 
run (Summers, 1991). Most RIA protocols usually contain a clause 
indicating that such an agreement is a stepping stone towards 
multilateral liberalisation, for example, in the South African Custom 
Union (SACU Treaty, 2002).  
 
 
RIAs are perceived as being easier to negotiate than full multilateral 
agreements because they involve fewer members, so that some level of 
integration may take place more quickly. Furthermore, the 
establishment of a RIA may be costly for non-members (if they are hurt 
by trade diversion), thus creating an incentive for the non-members to 
make an effort to join.  
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In this ‘domino’ effect the more non-members that eventually join, the 
closer the RIA comes to approximating world trade (as illustrated by the 
earlier bilateralism and regional agreement in the Cobden Treaty and 
the Zollverein agreement in the 19th Century) (Machlup, 1976; Balassa, 
1961, Baldwin, 1994). 
 
 
3.4.4 Development of regional infrastructure 
 
The benefits of a well-developed infrastructure are crucial for improving 
the prospects for regional integration and enhancing regional identity 
(Matlosa, 2005). Region-wide transportation and communication 
networks are likely to be cheaper on a per unit basis. Larger markets 
may also be conducive to spill over effects such as the transfer of 
knowledge from producers to users. Mutual gains may be realised from 
the joint production of public goods of common interest. For example, 
member countries of SADC agree to cooperate in the construction of 
connecting roads or rail networks, or in the joint management of natural 
resources. SADC has identified 800 spatial development initiatives 
(SDIs) that are projected to cost US$ 32.4 billion and generate more 
than 85000 new jobs. The following represent some of the SDIs 
planned for SADC (SADC Today, 2006): 
 
• The Maputo Development Corridor, which links up to the Mozal 
aluminium smelter and iron and steel plant in Maputo and also 
connects Mozambique and South Africa via a toll highway. The 
project has attracted over US$3 billion in intra and extra regional 
investments. At the time of writing, this project was almost 
complete  
 
• The Lubombo SDI, which is regarded as one of the most 
important tourism developments in Africa. The governments of 
South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique are the main players. 
It seeks to develop the trans-frontier park and the supporting 
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infrastructure between the three countries. In addition to private 
sector investment, the three governments will have to make 
commitment in terms of funding. On completion, it is envisaged 
that it will create employment for communities along the park and 
connect them through road infrastructure, enabling them to trade 
with ease. 
• The Coast-to-Coast SDI, which seeks to link the nodes of Walvis 
Bay and Maputo. Other SDIs include the Beira Corridor, the 
Okavango and Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative, 
the West Coast Development Initiative and the Fish River SDI. 
 
• The Westcor project, signed by Angola, Botswana, South Africa, 
Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia on 
October 2004, aims to build a third hydro plant (Inga III) with 39 
000 MW capacity on a tributary of the Congo river. Furthermore 
a new power line will be built connecting oil-rich Angola and 
Namibia. The project is estimated to cost about US$ 80 billion. 
The feasibility studies have been concluded and it is envisaged 
that the hydropower station will be able to supply electricity to 
Southern Africa and beyond (Keck, 2004; SADC Report, 2006). 
 
 
However the financial constraints facing developing countries make the 
realisation of some of the proposed projects impossible. Even in respect 
of SADC, the region depends on donor aid to fund its projects. The 
ability of the region to raise funds externally is hampered by the fact that 
most member states have a poor international rating and this impact on 
their ability to obtain credit from international financial institutions (IFI) 
such as the World Bank. There is a need for the RIAs to develop a 
regional development fund for infrastructure projects, but since this 
should be funded by member countries, some of which are very poor (a 
large proportion of their national budgets is supplemented by donor 
funding), this could be an insurmountable task. It must also be borne in 
mind that certain SADC member states cannot even afford to pay their 
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annual membership fees to the regional body. It is therefore important 
for the developing regions, in particular those in Africa, to maintain good 
macroeconomic fundamentals and political governance, as this may 
lead to good sovereign rating which is the one of the determining 
factors when seeking loans from international financial institutions and 
developmental banks (SADC Today, 2006; African Development Bank, 
2007). 
 
 
3.4.5 Building a sense of security in the neighbourhood 
 
RIA creates a sense of security in the region as a result of 
interdependency among member state This is likely to build trust, raise 
the opportunity cost of war. For example, it has often been argued that 
democracies (countries that share the same value of governance 
regulated by democratic principles) never attack each other, and, thus 
far, history has borne this out. It would be difficult to imagine the 
members of the EU waging war on each other, since, as a result of 
economic linkages and dependency; they stand to lose too much. They 
also have mechanisms in place to resolve disputes. This is also the 
case in the United States where the proposed Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) is linked explicitly to the promotion of democracy as 
well as to economic development. East Asian economies are also 
searching for ways to bring about closer cooperation in terms of security 
as well in economic matters (Inotai, 1986; Lawrence, 1995; Matlosa, 
2005:5). 
 
 
It is also possible that RIAs could create tensions among member 
countries should the existence of the RIA result in more divergence 
than convergence by accelerating the trend of concentration of industry 
in one or more countries. For example, the East Africa Community 
(EAC) was disbanded in 1977 as Tanzania and Uganda viewed it as a 
vehicle for Kenya to promote its own economic interest by dominating 
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their economies and, furthermore, there was no compensatory 
mechanism for trade diversion for the lesser developed members, 
namely Tanzania and Uganda. On the other hand, RIAs may actually 
improve intra-regional security by developing a culture of cooperation 
and mechanisms to address issues of common interest. Cooperation 
may even extend to common defence or mutual military assistance 
such as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security of SADC, which is 
a conflict resolution mechanism in the region (Matlosa, 2005:6). 
 
 
3.4.6 Management of trade friction 
 
The management of trade frictions is another motivation for the 
formation of regional integration arrangements. This was part of the 
underlying rationale for the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Community (APEC),22 which offered an opportunity for trade and 
investment policy dialogue (also between Japan and the United States 
of America) at a time when trade frictions in the Pacific risked impacting 
negatively on other regional economies. The danger is that bilateral and 
sub-regional deals could lead to the proliferation of non-transparent, 
non-WTO consistent mechanisms for the management of bilateral trade 
(Ariff, 2006).  
 
 
Certain countries are of the opinion that being part of preferential 
arrangements is a possible means of avoiding exposure to safeguard 
measures. For example, the fact that Australia is currently seeking an 
FTA with the United States explains the fact that Australia is not joining 
other affected countries in protesting to the WTO about recent US 
safeguard duties on steel. This is, however, a two-edged sword, in that 
                                            
22 APEC is a 20-member RIA comprising Asian as well as Pacific countries. The US 
and Japan are the leading nations of the group. The aim of the group is to reduce 
tariffs and other trade barriers between member countries whilst opening up to trade 
with the rest of the world. 
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resorting to special bilateral and regional arrangements could preclude 
recourse to the rules of the WTO. At the same time signing away these 
hard-won rights in the WTO could contribute to a breakdown in the 
WTO system (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 1993; Wilson et 
al, 2004). 
 
3.4.7 Solidarity during multilateral trade talks 
The solidarity of developing countries as a region or as a group during 
multilateral trade negotiations has given them an upper hand when they 
negotiate trade issues in WTO round talks. The Doha Developmental 
Round has shown that solidarity on specific issues in which countries 
have an interest (for example, the reduction of the agricultural subsidy 
by the EU and the US, which is an area in which the majority of 
developing countries have a comparative advantage) may result in 
sufficient pressure to compel the developed world to succumb. The G20 
and G90 (groups of developing countries) solidarity harnesses their 
intellectual capacity in technical issues in trade talks that an individual 
country is unlikely to provide (Mbekeani, 2002, Ajayi, 2005; Matlosa, 
2005). 
 
On the regional level, solidarity increases the chances of developing 
countries to obtain favourable concessions when negotiating with the 
developed world, for example, the united front presented by members 
of the SADC in their negotiations with the EU over Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) could have been impossible if each 
country had been negotiating on its own with the EU. On the other 
hand, the presence of bigger player(s) within the RIA that demonstrates 
an ability to lead may contribute to the success of the North-South trade 
talks. In Southern Africa the presence of South Africa in both the SADC 
and the SACU enables the two groups to achieve better concessions 
when engaging with any other regional group/country in a trade issues. 
In the absence of this solidarity, the developing countries would simply 
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rubberstamp the decision of the developed world even though it is to 
their disadvantage (World Bank, 1994; Pearson, 2004). 
 
3.5 The costs of regional economic integration 
3.5.1 Overlapping membership in regional economic communities  
 
The constraints of overlapping membership in regional economic 
communities may be classified as an impediment to successful regional 
economic integration. This is more apparent in the RIAs of developing 
regions than developed regions. According to McCarthy (1999: 374) 
and Shams (2005: 4) RIAs in developing regions are constrained by the 
problem of overlapping membership, where a country is a member of 
more than one RIA, each with different objectives. Member countries 
from developing RIAs, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, join 
different regional economic communities in the hopes that they will 
derive more economic benefits. As a result of the fact that the RIAs may 
differ in terms of agenda and end goals, developing countries will then 
be caught up in a scenario that requires them to implement different 
policies with conflicting agendas. More resources (human, money and 
time) than necessary will be utilised to serve these different interests 
which will have arisen as a result of their membership of more than one 
regional economic community.  
 
 
Overlapping membership in different regional economic communities is 
no more apparent than in the Sub-Saharan RECs. For example, the 
future shape and speed of regional integration within sub-Saharan 
Africa will be determined by a combination of internal and external 
factors. Internally SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) have expressed their intention to establish 
customs unions by 2008 and 2010 respectively.  
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Countries that are members of more than one such arrangement would 
be required to choose between these arrangements as it would be 
impractical to claim membership of different customs unions, for 
example, if a country were a member of two custom unions, the 
problem would arise as to which common external tariff (CET) the 
country will implement, taking into consideration that common external 
tariffs are at different levels for different customs unions (Pearson, 
2004; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; Musila, 2005).  
 
 
In addition, the five SACU member countries have recently signed a 
new agreement (in 2002) which broadens the scope and decision-
making practices of the existing arrangement. Externally, a range of 
new trade agreements threaten to drive a wedge between the Southern 
and Eastern African states. For example, SACU has commenced 
negotiations with the United States (US) on an extensive FTA. 
Discussions with MERCUSOR are also underway and South Africa has 
expressed a willingness to lead SACU into bilateral trade agreements 
with Nigeria, China and India. These agreements will help to cement 
SACU as a regional block, but will make it more difficult for its members 
to participate in other regional trade arrangements (as a customs union) 
because of conflicting agendas (McCarthy, 2004, Pearson, 2006). 
 
 
3.5.2 Polarisation effects in regional economic agreements of 
developing regions 
 
McCarthy (1994) stresses that industries in RIAs tend to cluster in 
locations with relatively good market access, or in locations that are well 
supplied with business services or the provision of other intermediate 
goods. This is more likely to occur in developing countries than in 
developed countries, partly because of the sparser provision of 
business infrastructure in developing countries, and partly because the 
small size of their manufacturing sectors means that clustering is less 
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likely to run into congestion and other sources of diminishing returns. 
The clustering may lead to wages being increased in one member 
country at the expense of others. Given that Sub-Saharan Africa has a 
high level of asymmetry in development, the polarisation effect would 
affect all RIAs in the subregion. In Southern Africa businesses tend to 
move south, in particular to Johannesburg and the other major urban 
centres in South Africa. The reason for this movement may be 
attributed to the fact that the RSA is more developed than other 
Southern African countries and has a wealthy population which 
consumes goods and service at a higher rate than in other countries in 
the region. This is one of the justifications used by other members of 
SACU to demand more compensation for being locked in a customs 
union with South Africa. 
 
 
Prior to 1994, the relative isolation of South Africa and the pressure on 
international companies to withdraw from the country could have 
provided opportunities to attract investment to the then BLS states. 
Furthermore, these countries made very little use of Article 6 (infant 
industry protection) and Article 7 (protection of industries of major 
importance). South Africa used the tariff structure and subsidies to 
prevent new industries in the BLS states23 from competing successfully 
with its own industries. In addition, decentralisation incentives provided 
by South Africa to channel investment to the homelands24 in South 
Africa certainly diverted investment from the BLS countries. These 
incentive schemes clearly indicate that, with a stronger political will on 
the part of South Africa, the objective stated in the preamble to 
encourage development in the less advanced countries could have 
been pursued. Thus, instead of compensation, money could have been 
made available for specific programmes to improve the investment 
                                            
23   Namibia was not independent at that time. 
24 The homeland system in South Africa included the ‘four republics’ of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei as well as the ‘governing territories’ of Lebowa, 
Kangwane, Kwandebele, Kwazulu and Qwaqwa. 
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climate in the BLNS states (Southern African Customs Union Treaty, 
2002; McCarthy, 2004). 
 
 
There has been a renewed thrust in recent years toward broader and 
deeper preferential trade arrangements in Africa on both continental 
and regional levels. Southern Africa faces a difficulty inherent in the 
composition of the region: The relatively developed economy of the 
Republic of South Africa and its dominance of the regional market could 
result in economic polarisation within the region, while the pace of 
economic reforms within South Africa could either accelerate or delay 
regional integration initiatives. Furthermore polarisation may also be 
observed within member states, as certain regions are more developed 
than others. For example, South Africa, despite its status as the 
economic powerhouse on the continent, has a problem with inequality 
within its provinces, where the standard of living of people in poor rural 
areas is similar to that of other African countries, whereas the wealth in 
metropolitan areas is comparable to that of the developed world 
(McCarthy, 1994; Abdoulai, 2005; Shams, 2005).  
 
 
There is a need for counter-balancing or countervailing mechanisms to 
accommodate regional objectives such as balanced development, but 
not one of the predominant countries is sufficiently wealthy to consider 
introducing outright compensatory mechanisms. Furthermore, there 
could possibly be the incentive for South Africa, and, implicitly SACU, to 
strengthen economic relations and cooperation with developed 
countries and markets rather than engage in South-South regional 
cooperation with the countries in the region and their intractable internal 
problems (Masson and Pattillo, 2005; Piazollo, 2002).  
 
 
The question arises as to how a regional integration strategy could 
accommodate the disparate levels of development in Southern Africa, 
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as, from South Africa’s perspective, these disparate levels mean that 
any regional integration strategy would resemble more a North-South 
relation. In Latin America (in particular within MERCUSOR25) Brazil 
occupies the pole position such as that of South Africa within SADC 
region. It is important for the leading nations within a REC to provide 
leadership positions to countries in the region and to avoid using the 
lesser developed members as consumption outposts where companies 
from the wealthier member countries establish retail and other business 
which are managed by expatriates and do not contribute to the 
development of the country in which they are operating (McCarthy, 
1994; Schiff, 2002; Schiff & Winter, 2003). 
 
 
3.5.3 Regional trade dependency 
 
Masson and Pattillo (2005) and McCarthy (2004) emphasised that 
regionalism encourages dependency between countries in the region, 
especially in respect of those countries in which the import-export ratio 
of GNP is higher. For example, in SACU there is an obvious 
dependency of smaller economies (such as Lesotho and Swaziland) on 
South Africa, since 80 per cent of their trade is with South Africa. At the 
same time South Africa’s trade with other SACU members is less than 5 
per cent of its total trade. In NAFTA the USA absorbs 81 per cent of 
Mexico’s exports and provides 80 per cent of Mexico’s imports. With the 
US, however, Mexico receives seven per cent only of the total exports 
of the USA and provides only six per cent of the total import to USA.  
 
The problem of asymmetrical trade flow affects all regional economic 
communities. Even in the case of a developed RIA, such as the EU, 
trade flow to the Eastern and Southern members became such a 
                                            
25 MERCUSOR is the Southern Common Market that comprises Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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contentious issue during the accession negotiations that it had to be 
discussed at European Summit level. The accession of twelve former 
communist block countries into the EU in 2004 brought about several 
challenges which were manifested in the asymmetry of trade flows. For 
example, the industrial products from the new entrants despite being 
competitive (in terms of price) as compared to those of EU core 
members such as Germany and England, could be overlooked by the 
consumer who is still of the opinion that products from the former 
Communist block are inferior to those of core EU members (European 
Commission Report, 2005). 
 
In order to address the problem of dependency and trade asymmetry, 
RIAs must contain institutional stipulations that are aimed at developing 
the economies of the poorer regions; the European Development 
Fund/Structural Fund oversees the development of poor regions. 
SACU, despite having a developmental goal as its objective (SACU 
Treaty, 2002), has thus far not been able to assist poor members with 
their economic development.  
 
The problem confronting SACU is that one dominant economy (South 
Africa) cannot meet the challenges of economic development faced by 
its neighbours without jeopardising its own developmental goals. There 
are, however, development financial institutions such as the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC)26 and the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) that promotes investment in the region. These 
two institutions work on a profit basis, and as such, will not attempt to 
invest where profits will not be realised.  
                                            
26 Both IDC and DBSA are owned by the South African government and, despite the 
clause that stipulates that these institutions have an autonomy in the way in which 
investment decisions are made; the government still implicitly make decisions (through 
its appointed board) on projects to be financed on a continental or regional scale. 
These institutions prioritise the poor regions of South Africa over the SADC or any 
other continental projects. 
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3.5.4 Trade deflection 
 
According to McCarthy (1994) and Krugman (1984) trade deflection 
refers to a situation in which a country not in receipt of preferences 
essentially circumvents the MFN tariff of a preference donor by 
transhipping its exports through a country which is in receipt of 
preferences, adding little or no value in the recipient. This occurs when 
a non-member country circumvents the higher tariffs that exist between 
itself and the country to which it intends to exports goods by means of 
an FTA. In order to prevent trade deflection Rules of Origin (RoO)27 are 
set between member countries to ascertain the value-added for all 
intraregional imports. The other function of RoO is to foster industrial 
development within member countries of the regional economic 
integration arrangement. RoO are however costly to manage as more 
resources will be directed to the ports of entry to administer them. 
 
 
As soon as an FTA is declared a customs union, all RoO cease to 
apply. RoO are used to foster economic development in terms of 
building new industries that are able to supply the captive market with a 
choice of capital goods that are normally imported from the developed 
world. In most developing customs unions there exist situations in which 
a non-member country will build an assembly factory within a member 
country that produces capital goods in terms of which there is little 
value-added locally. For example, South Africa lodged a complaint as a 
result of the Volvo company operating an assembly plant in Botswana 
as way of circumventing the Rules of Origin that are applicable to trade 
between South Africa and Sweden, where Volvo has its headquarters 
taking advantage of SACU (which does not have RoO), in which 
Botswana is a member. 
 
                                            
27  RoO are laws, regulations and administrative practices used to identify the country 
of origin of internationally traded goods. 
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3.6 Implications for the multilateral trade regime 
 
The negotiation of inconsistent, non-transparent and overlapping sets of 
regional/bilateral rules outside the WTO system ultimately adds to the 
costs of doing business. It leads to commercial confusion as to which 
rules apply in which markets and under which circumstances. The 
greater the number of new arrangements that are put into place, the 
more complex the tangled web of new rules becomes. Unfortunately 
obtaining consensus from the regional partners about the new rules is 
also often very difficult, time consuming and expensive administratively. 
FTAs, in particular, rely on the enforcement of rules of origin, and these 
are becoming increasingly difficult to administer, since globalisation and 
intra-industry trade are making it more difficult to establish the source of 
products (Schiff, 2002; World Bank, 2005b). 
 
 
If all the regional trade agreements which have been negotiated to date 
had been implemented fully, the WTO Secretariat estimates that as 
much as half of world trade would be tied up in new discriminatory rules 
and this would obviously impede world trade. This represents a 
tremendous leakage from world trade, with significant negative 
consequence for its rate of growth. It is ultimately not possible to have it 
both ways. If governments want multilateral trading systems that work 
to maximise world trade , then regional economic communities must be 
designed in such a way that they do not to undermine the system.  
 
 
The negotiation of new regional and bilateral trading arrangements will 
consume significant policymaking and scarce trade negotiating 
resources, some of which will inevitably be diverted from the Doha 
Developmental Round which is currently at an impasse after six years 
of negotiations. This could lead to a slowdown in the negotiating 
process in Geneva and a problem in terms of the timetable agreed for 
completion of the Round. This would mean a delay in the delivery of the 
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much bigger economic gains available from global rather than from 
regional trade liberalisation. It is important to recall that, while pursuing 
regional/bilateral trade negotiations, liberalisation of trade within the 
WTO context could lead to gains which would dwarf those available 
among smaller subsets of countries under regional economic 
communities (Irwin, 1993; Schiff & Winters, 2003; Fabricus, 2006:21). 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The assessment of regional economic integration has revealed that 
there is a difference between the instruments used for measuring 
success in the developed and the developing regions. In developed 
economies the success of an RIA is evaluated in terms of growth in per 
capita income, economic growth for member countries, the level of 
intra-regional trade and specialisation in the efficient production of 
goods and services. In addition to the measurement criteria listed 
above, the developing world judges the success of an RIA on economic 
development which is measurable in terms of infrastructure 
development and the reduction of poverty among the population. The 
difference in the measuring criteria may be attributed to the dissimilar 
levels of development that characterised each region. In the developed 
world, economic development and industrialisation were pursued before 
the regional economic integration undertaking by member states. 
 
 
In order for the regional economic community to be successful it must 
be open to new membership and to multilateralism, and abide by the 
principle of subsidiarity in terms of which the state and non-state actors 
share the responsibilities of regional economic integration according to 
their relative strengths. This is done in order to avoid overloading 
already scarce regional administrative capacity and resources, and to 
ensure that there is sufficient commitment and trust so that the key 
regional agencies will be given the authority and the means to 
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implement the regional programme. Furthermore, regional economic 
integration should be gradual, and member states must avoid setting 
timeframes that are not feasible, as failure to adhere to these 
timeframes could reduce the credibility of the integration project. 
 
 
Developing regions, like their counterparts in developed regions, stand 
to gain from regional economic integration if there is adherence to the 
principles of successful regional integration (described in this chapter). 
Gains that may be made include, among others, the opportunity for 
regional and international investments, and bargaining power during 
multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time the RIA may be 
hampered by overlapping membership in different regional economic 
communities, it could increase trade dependency on larger member 
states, and it could also slow down progress towards global free trade 
as a result of member states expending time, money and human 
resources negotiating the regional integration arrangements instead of 
multilateral trade rounds through the World Trade Organisation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES  
4.1 Introduction 
The early success of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
(subsequently the European Union) demonstrated the way in which 
regional economic integration may lead to the improvement of the 
welfare of the citizens in member states. This prompted many 
developing countries to seek similar gains within their own regions. 
Certain RIAs are purely South-South integration, for instance, the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) which is between 
developing and least-developed countries. There is also North-South 
integration in terms of which both industrial and developing countries 
are members, for example, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
which is a forum for 21 Pacific Rim countries or regions to discuss the 
regional economy, cooperation, trade and investment. APEC comprises 
United State, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the 
countries occupying the geographical space of Pacific and South-East 
Asia. Still others are North-North agreements, that is, a union between 
industrial countries, for example, the EU (Coe & Hoffmaister, 1998; 
Dick, 2002; Shams, 2005: 6). 
 
Although the focus of this chapter is regional economic integration in 
the developing world, the chapter will also include EU integration as 
many RIA arrangements in developing countries benchmark 
themselves on the developments of the EU. Another case study will be 
the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which is an 
agreement between two developed countries, Canada and the United 
States, and a developing country, Mexico. NAFTA will be discussed to 
highlight the potential gains resulting from economic agreement 
between developed and developing countries (North and South). The 
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Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) represents the success of 
regional integration between developing countries. 
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 4.2 will include the case 
studies on the EU and NAFTA integration processes; Section 4.3 will 
highlight regional integration experiences in developing regions with the 
exception of Africa, which will be discussed in Section 4.4; in Section 
4.5 the economic and developmental effects of African economic 
integration will be discussed:  
 
Section 4.6 advances the lesson EU integration holds for the 
developing regions and in Section 4.7 suggestions will be made 
regarding the ways in which Africa may extricate itself from under-
development and attain maximum benefits from the regional economic 
integration process. The conclusion will then follow. 
 
4.2 Regional integration in the developed world 
Although there are many regional economic communities in the 
developed world, the EU integration will be used as the benchmark for 
full integration as the EU has progressed through almost all the stages 
of linear integration (just short of a political union). Despite differences 
that exist in the stages of industrialisation and economic development, 
developing regions have simply replicated the EU integration model, 
with the aim of reaching full integration in a short space of time. The 
case study on the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will 
highlight the experiences of North-South integration between Canada 
and the US (North) and Mexico (South). 
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4.2.1 Case study I: The EU economic integration process 
The EU is a supranational and intergovernmental union of nation-states 
in Europe. It was established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty, and is 
the successor to the six-member EEC,28 which was founded in 1957. 
As of 2007 new accessions have increased membership of the EU to 
27 member states, and its competences and goals have expanded. The 
EU is the result of a continuing process of European integration (for 
almost fifty years) of which the end state has not been defined29 
(Salvatore, 1990; Baldwin 1994; European Commission Report, 2005). 
 
The EU is now the largest political and economic entity on the 
European continent, comprising approximately 493 million people and 
an estimated GDP of €10.5 trillion, which is second only to that of the 
US.30 The EU is a customs union and a single market with a common 
trade policy. It has its own currency, the Euro, which has already been 
adopted by 13 member states. The EU has a Common Agricultural 
Policy,31 a Common Fisheries Policy and a Regional Policy to assist 
poorer regions. It has initiated a Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and a limited joint policy on crime. The services sector is by far the most 
important sector in the EU, comprising 69.4 per cent of GDP, compared 
                                            
28 The inaugural members of the EU economic community were Belgium, France, 
Germany, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
29 There is no agreement among EU members with regard to what constitutes a 
desirable end state. For certain members the EU has reached its final integration 
stages as an economic union whilst others believe that it should be allowed to 
graduate into a political union. 
30 The US gross domestic product (GDP) is currently 12.4 trillion US dollars. 
31 The agricultural sector is supported by subsidies from the EU in the form of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This currently represents 40-50 per cent of the 
total spending of the EU. It guarantees a minimum price for farmers within the EU. 
This has been criticised as a form of protectionism, inhibiting trade, and damaging 
developing countries – one of the most vocal opponents is the United Kingdom which 
is the second largest economy in the block, but whose agriculture composition is 
minimal The UK complaint lies in the management of rebates which it says are 
unjustified. 
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to the manufacturing industry at 28.4 per cent of GDP and agriculture at 
only 2.3 per cent of GDP (Salvatore, 1994; European Commission 
Report, 2005). 
 
Important EU institutions and bodies include the European Commission, 
which manages the day-to-day activities of the Union, the Council of the 
European Union, which is the executive arm of the Union, the European 
Central Bank, which is the custodian of monetary policy within the 
Union, the European Court of Justice, which is the arbiter of disputes 
between EU member states, and the European Parliament, which is the 
legislative body on EU affairs. Once every five years, EU citizens elect 
the European Parliament directly.  
 
Each member country is represented within each of the above-
mentioned EU structures. Economic performance varies from state to 
state. The Growth and Stability Pact governs fiscal policy within the EU. 
It applies to all member states with specific rules which apply to the 
Euro zone members that stipulate that the budget deficit of each state 
must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and its public debt must not exceed 
60 per cent of GDP. The EU is the largest exporter in the world and the 
second largest importer (after the US). Intra-regional trade is about 60 
per cent of its total trade and tariffs are almost non-existent (Baldwin, 
1994; Pelkmans & Brenton, 1999; European Central Bank Convergence 
Report, 2004).  
 
4.2.1.1 The benefits of EU economic integration 
Regional economic integration in the EU has generated different 
patterns of convergence and growth. Ireland, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain have benefited from integration in the EU and may now be 
considered as developed countries, having formerly, on accession in 
 80 
1974, 1981 and 1986 (for both Portugal and Spain) respectively, been 
amongst the poorer countries of Europe.  
 
Consequences of EU Integration: % of public sector 
investment financed by EU funds
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Fig 4.1: Public sector investment by EU Development Fund, 
Source: European Commission Report 2005 
 
According to Viner (1950), Meade (1955), Salvatore (1990) and Baldwin 
(1994) the major benefits from entry into the EU are: (1) increase in 
trade and capital flows; (2) improvements in hard and soft infrastructure 
as a result of the structural funds given to member states32; (3) reduced  
                                            
32 Aid accounted for: 1, 5% of GDP in Spain and 3, 3% of GDP in Portugal. Public 
sector investment by EU Funds: over 15% was spent in Spain and 42% in Portugal. 
During the period under review, Portugal had the highest burden on EU fiscus 
earmarked for public sector investments. 
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the risk for business by fostering macroeconomic, legal and political 
stability; (4) the improvement in the welfare of citizenry, demonstrated 
by the convergence of GDP per Capita of poorer members to that of 
richer member states; (5) use of efficient methods of production by the 
integration of new technologies, of which the cost is partially subsidised 
by the EU; and (6) reduction of prices of goods as a result of the 
existence of a free market.  
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the public sector investment financed by the EU 
Developmental and Structural Fund between in the period 1986-1996. 
Portugal as the poorest of the four countries received the major share of 
EU funds, followed by Greece, Ireland and then Spain. The funds 
transferred to poorer EU members are used to assist in infrastructure 
development and public expenditure so that the recipients’ do not lag 
behind the wealthier countries in terms of development. 
 
The European Central Bank Convergence Report (2004) refers to 
welfare increase as an important benefit of EU membership. An 
economic analysis carried out in Eastern European countries has 
shown that a welfare increase of 3.8 to 7.3 per cent may be expected 
for countries entering the EU. At the same time Baldwin (1995) 
highlights trade liberalisation as a definite benefit of EU membership. 
Since cuts in trade and agricultural tariffs occur in accordance with 
European Agreements, real trade costs decrease.  
 
At the macroeconomic level the EU enlargement is expected to have an 
impact on the growth rate of the EU GDP. This is linked to the faster 
growth of consumer incomes and purchasing power (owing to changes 
in population structure and preferences) and will, in turn, enhance 
market opportunities. 
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Table 4.1: The convergence of GDP per capita for Spain and 
Portugal on EU average  
 1985 1990 2000 2004 
EU Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Spain 72,5 77,8 84,4 98,0 
Portugal 52,0 55,7 74,4 73,0 
Source:  European Central Bank Convergence Report 2004 
 
With regard to the GDP per capita, as depicted in Table 4.1, indications 
are that the GDP per capita for Spain and Portugal are converging on 
the EU average. An analysis carried out over an eight year period 
(1985-2004)33 has shown that Spain per capita GDP has increased 
from 72, 5 % of EU average in 1985 to 98% in 2004. With regard to 
Portugal, although there is gap between its per capita GDP to that of 
EU, there are signs of improvement as Portugal per capita GDP has 
expanded 30% towards the EU average during the review period. This 
has been made possible by an increase in productivity and investment 
from the other EU members contributing to employment which is 
positively correlated to the demands of goods and services in both 
economies (European Central Bank Convergence Report, 2004). 
 
4.2.1.2 The costs of EU economic integration 
Entrance to the EU is not without costs for new member countries. 
Pelkmans and Brenton (1999) mention the adoption of all EU norms 
and standards by enterprises, and threats to the market position of 
domestic producers as the most serious costs for countries entering the 
                                            
33 The period 1985-2004 has been chosen as this period represents the entry and 
transition of Portugal and Spain into the EU. 
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EU. Another cost refers to the reduced autonomy in the decision-
making process, which is an important factor in view of the different 
backgrounds and needs of countries. The transition costs may be very 
high and costly for countries with weak economies and environments. In 
view of the fact that a free market zone drives down prices on goods, 
the producer surplus of new members, such as Poland and Romania, 
will decrease significantly due to low prices. 
 
In addition, poorer members, notably the twelve new member states, 
will need to import new equipment and technologies from wealthier 
members such as Germany and France. This extra cost may lead to a 
decrease in the producer surplus. Many of the European countries are 
not concerned with accession costs since membership is largely a 
political decision. In other words, countries deciding to join the EU take 
into consideration mostly the security benefits if their political situations 
are particularly grave.  
 
4.2.2 Case study II: The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
 
The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was formed in 1994 
and is a free trade area between Canada, Mexico and the United 
States. NAFTA resulted in tremendous changes in both the economy 
and socio-political system of Mexico and, at the same time, opened the 
Mexican market for goods from the US and Canada. NAFTA has a 
lower degree of formal institutional cooperation than the EU (Baldwin, 
1994).  
 
The arrangement has been beneficial to Mexico for various reasons, 
including the adoption of a strengthened policy framework in the 1990s 
that has complemented the ability of the authorities to lock in major 
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domestic economic reforms. Increased cross-border trade flows have 
contributed to a greater synchronisation of the business cycles of 
Mexico with those of the US and Canada. In the financial sector, the 
significant share of the Mexican banking system owned by US banks 
has contributed to closer financial linkages.34 As trade, economic and 
financial interdependencies have intensified the need to strengthen 
cooperative institutional arrangements might also arise at some point in 
the future (Frankel et al, 1995).  
 
The impact has been both positive and negative: First, NAFTA has 
contributed to the transformation of Mexico into one of the major traders 
and the eighth leading exporter in the world. NAFTA has allowed 
Mexico to diversify its production and reduce its dependence on oil, 
which now constitutes less than 7 per cent of its total exports ─ down 
from 22 per cent in 1993. Secondly, NAFTA has provided Mexico with 
an attractive environment for foreign investors. Thirdly, NAFTA 
enhanced international crisis cooperation by paving the way for prompt 
US assistance to Mexico when the country experienced a financial 
crisis towards the end of 1994 (Dick, 2002; Guha-Khasnobis, 2004; 
World Bank, 2005a) 
 
 
NAFTA has strengthened deregulation and transparency in 
policymaking by Mexico. On the other hand, Mexico's socio-economic 
situation has shown little real improvement. The burden of adjustment 
to NAFTA was much greater for Mexico than for the US because the 
economy of the US is much larger than that of Mexico. Under NAFTA 
there has been trade expansion of the inter-industry type based on 
differences in factor endowments.  
 
                                            
34 Companies took advantage of the synergies created by NAFTA, such as in the 
case of ICA-Reichmann, a joint venture between a major Mexican construction firm 
and the renowned Canadian developer, and also Cifra-Wal-Mart, Cuauhtemoc-
Moctezuma brewery and Canada's John Labatt, and tobacco giants Philip Morris and 
Cigata. 
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4.2.2.1 The costs of NAFTA integration 
 
The continuous re-adjustments in the manufacturing sector produced 
an increase in unemployment of unskilled workers who were then 
absorbed by the informal employment sector. This, in turn, has 
adversely affected the accuracy of employment and job statistics. It is 
not clear whether increased FDI has contributed to an improvement in 
labour quality or not. Secondly, the gap between rich and poor has 
widened, and this has provided critical momentum to increased socio-
political instability, which is an ever-present risk in Mexico. Thirdly, 
Mexico's economic success now tends to depend more than ever on 
US capital, and its economy has become more vulnerable to external 
shocks (Dick, 2002; Guha-Khasnobis, 2004).  
 
 
The timing of the establishment of NAFTA overlapped with the ongoing 
unilateral trade liberalisation in Mexico and the sharp devaluation of the 
Mexican peso amid the financial crisis which lasted from the mid 1980s 
to the 1990s. This further complicates the possibility of offering an 
objective evaluation of the effects of NAFTA on Mexico. Although 
NAFTA proponents speak of the increase in exports, the FDI influx, 
productivity gains, and job creation as positive benefits arising from 
NAFTA, many of these have also largely resulted from Mexico-led 
reforms in trade liberalisation and the devaluation of the peso (World 
Bank, 1994).  
 
 
On the other hand, although NAFTA opponents argue the negative 
effects of NAFTA, such as job losses and company bankruptcies in the 
manufacturing sector, increased vulnerability and socio-political 
instability, most of these had also occurred prior to the implementation 
of NAFTA, or would have occurred even without NAFTA under the 
ongoing liberalisation and globalised environment. Both the positive and 
negative evaluations of NAFTA tend to be exaggerated due to the 
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politicisation of the NAFTA analysis and also because of the practical 
difficulty in distinguishing the effects of NAFTA from those induced by 
other initiatives undertaken by Mexico herself.  
 
 
The analysis of NAFTA integration allows one to extract lessons in 
respect of similar experiments in future North-South economic 
integration, for example, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions 
completed in December 2007. It suffices to say that, without domestic 
commitment to policy reform, regional economic integration schemes, 
whether North-South or South-South will not result in an increase in the 
economic welfare of member states (Coe & Hoefmaister, 1995; 
Pearson, 2004 & 2006). 
 
4.3 Regional economic integration in the developing world 
In this section regional economic integration in developing regions35 will 
be discussed, with as starting point the case study on regional 
economic integration within the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) 
arrangement, which is an arrangement which is regarded as the only 
functional and successful regional economic community in Africa. 
Together with developments leading to the formation of a customs 
union in SADC, SACU is seen as the nucleus of the new customs union 
in the region.  
 
 
In Latin America, the Southern Common Market (MERCUSOR) will be 
analysed to establish whether there are economic gains which may be 
attributed to such integration. The development of South East Asia will 
                                            
35 The developing regions will be represented by the regional economic integration 
experiments in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
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represent regional economic integration in Asia. More attention will be 
concentrated on regional economic integration in Africa and an analysis 
will be carried out of the cost and the benefits of an RIA as measured in 
developing regions, that is, in terms of economic developments such as 
investment in public goods, infrastructure development and a reduction 
in poverty.  
 
 
A key argument in favour of economic integration amongst developing 
countries is that it contributes towards gradual structural change and 
economic development. In addition, a larger regional market brings 
economies of scale that should enable member countries to specialise 
and to develop sufficient productive capacity to compete globally. 
 
 
4.3.1 Case study III: The Southern African Customs Union 
 
The study on the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) will focus on 
its structure, successes and challenges. SACU, comprising Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS) and South Africa, is the oldest 
functional customs union in the world. It has been in existence since 
1910. SACU was established through a customs union agreement 
between the Union of South Africa36 and the three British administered 
territories37 of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The 1910 agreement 
was replaced by the 1969 agreement and subsequently by the 2002 
SACU agreement. SACU is the richest regional integration scheme in 
sub-Saharan Africa with a per capita income of US$ 2 414. All SACU 
                                            
36 The Union of South Africa comprised four provinces, namely Transvaal, Orange 
Free State, Natal and Cape. It was dissolved in 1961 when South Africa received its 
independence from the United Kingdom (UK). 
37 In 1910, Namibia (then South West Africa) was a German colony and was excluded 
from the original SACU Agreement. It was, however, incorporated into the SACU 
agreement in 1948, when the United Nations handed South West Africa over to the 
Union of South Africa, in appreciation for South Africa’s support to the Allied Forces 
during World War II (1938-1945). 
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member states are members of SADC, while Swaziland is a member of 
both SADC and COMESA (McCarthy, 2004; SADC Today, 2006).  
 
 
According to SADC Today (2006), SACU is recognised by the WTO 
and has already, in 2003, undertaken a trade policy review of the 
grouping. SACU has successfully negotiated trade agreements with the 
EU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and SADC. Negotiations 
with the US, India and China will lead to another agreement (Fabricus, 
2006).  
 
 
4.3.1.1 Economic policy and industrial development in SACU  
 
South Africa dwarfs the other four members economically. Imports 
amounted to over 90 per cent of the GDP in Lesotho, about 75 per cent 
of GDP in Swaziland, 36 per cent in Namibia and 16 per cent in 
Botswana for 2007. On average, South Africa provides 85 per cent of 
the imports for Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The direction of BLNS 
exports is quite different from the source of its imports as the major 
destinations for BLNS exports are the EU, Asia and the US. This 
development may be explained in terms of the fact that the basket of 
goods exported are mainly, primary goods, which South Africa itself 
produces in abundance, and hence the low volume of exports to South 
Africa (Masson & Pattillo, 2005; Bertelsmann & Draper, 2006; Economic 
Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
According to McCarthy (2004) the 1969 agreement sought to address 
the problems of economic underdevelopment and lack of 
industrialisation in the BLNS countries. At the time, the rationale for 
SACU integration was for fiscal compensation through revenue-sharing 
mechanisms, but it failed to address the causes of unequal 
development within the subregion (McCarthy, 1994). As a result there 
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has been little industrialisation within the BLNS and South Africa 
continues to record large trade surpluses with all other member 
countries. This lack of industrialisation and economic development in 
the BLNS may also be attributed to the effects of polarisation in favour 
of South Africa. The pursuit of an import-substitution trade policy by 
South Africa almost certainly resulted in significant trade diversion for 
the BLNS. It was therefore rational for the BLNS to focus on efforts to 
maximise the revenue-sharing arrangement. This dependence 
increases the risk that the smaller members of SACU will measure the 
success of the SACU Agreements (1910, 1969 and 2002) in revenue 
terms rather than in terms of their impact on trade, investment and 
economic development.  
 
4.3.1.2 Prospects under the new SACU Agreement 
The 2002 Agreement, concluded after eight years of negotiations, sets 
out a broad framework for enhanced economic integration between 
member states. McCarthy (2004) emphasises that, in essence, the new 
agreement depicts SACU as a true international organisation with a 
legal personality and clear mandates on objectives, institutions, 
decision-making and financing procedures. A clause in the 2002 
Agreement emphasised that any future bilateral trade negotiations 
would be conducted by SACU en bloc and not by individual SACU 
member states (this was the case with EU-RSA in 1999). This means 
that SACU member states have to consider, at least in certain respects, 
common positions for negotiations (Piazolo, 2002:1210; Southern Africa 
Customs Union Treaty, 2002; Oyejide, 2004).  
 
The clause was however violated during SADC-SACU negotiation with 
the European Union for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 
December 2007. South Africa has refused to initial the interim EPA 
agreement because it includes the agreement in services, which SACU 
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does not even have an agreement on. South Africa feels cheated SACU 
partners who have signed the interim EPA (especially on services) but 
also understand that they had to sign an agreement on trade in goods 
as the EU has threatened to impose tariffs on their exports that receive 
favourable preference to the EU market, in particular, the Namibian’s 
and Botswana’s beef industry and the Swaziland’s sugar industries. 
(Business Day, 2008:1).  
 
SACU member-states knew that by signing, they are violating the 
SACU Treaty and this will affect their relation with South Africa. There 
are threats emanating from South Africa corridors of power aimed at 
punishing the BLNS countries, but it is unlikely that the political 
leadership will carry such threat given the importance of the BLNS 
market for South Africa. In all probabilities, a political solution will be 
found to a rather economic problem (Business Day, 2008:1). 
 
In addition, the new SACU Agreement provides for the coordination of 
industrial policy by member states, and also stipulates that all member 
states have a competition policy. This could have a positive effect on 
both national and regional industrial development dynamics. The 
relationship between industrial and competition policy is important with 
regard to, for example, the promotion of small and medium enterprise 
(SME) development, and key questions as to the most effective channel 
of addressing such objectives need to be articulated between these two 
policy areas.  
 
Other areas open for the developments of common frameworks include 
competition policy, coordination of customs procedures and trade 
remedies. However, the 2002 Agreement sets no specific time frame 
within which to attain its targets (Southern Africa Customs Union Treaty, 
2002; McCarthy, 2004).  
 91 
4.3.1.3 Compensation mechanism in SACU 
 
According to Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) the adoption of the CET 
by the members of a customs union provides for compensation for 
inequality in development and adjustment to the new tariff regime 
among the member states. Most compensation mechanisms, for 
example, the Cohesion and Development Fund in the EU, are derived 
from custom duties imposed on trade with the rest of the world. Poorer 
member states are allocated funds to fast-track economic and industrial 
development in the hope that these poorer members will catch up with 
the developed members in the union. In the EU, Ireland and Spain 
typify poorer member countries (on entry in 1973 and 1986 
respectively) that have benefited from the compensation mechanism of 
the EU and are, today, on the same level of development as the other 
wealthier members such as France, Germany and the UK.  
 
 
The revenue-sharing arrangement derived from custom and excise 
duties arising from imports from the rest of the world is a longstanding 
feature of the SACU arrangement. The customs and excise duties are 
pooled and shared between member states according to their share of 
intra-SACU trade. In 2007, South Africa contributed 98 per cent of the 
Common Revenue Pool (CRP), but received far less in receipts. The 
increase in payment of the SACU transfer has prompted the South 
African government to call for a review of the formula for the distribution 
of SACU payments. South Africa argues that the payment to SACU 
members is unfair and is of the opinion that it should be transformed 
into a development fund. South Africa will have discretion as regards 
the usage of this development fund. The discretion on the usage of 
SACU receipts by BNLS member states will guarantee that the money 
will be used for economic development through investment in public 
infrastructure which will, in turn, lower the cost of doing business in the 
SACU region (Piazolo, 2002; Southern Africa Development Community 
Report, 2006).   
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Although the new agreement does provide for democratic decision 
making in all SACU structures and stipulates the development of 
common industrial and agricultural policies the approach nevertheless 
remains fundamentally unchanged. The revenue-sharing formula will 
ensure that Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland continue to receive more 
than one third of their total budget revenue from the pool. This will do 
little to stimulate economic development and expand the tax base within 
these countries as they have an assurance of funds from abroad. 
 
 
Proponents of SACU revenue sharing stresses that the revenue 
payments are justified because the BLNS are ‘forced’ to consume 
South African goods and services as opposed to cheaper alternatives 
elsewhere. Based on the customs union arrangement of revenue 
sharing, SACU member countries receive (McCarthy, 1999; 2004). 
According to McCarthy (2004) the transfer payments are not specifically 
for dealing with shocks, but they do, however, provide a cushion against 
revenue losses resulting from the adoption of a CET. SACU analysts 
have advanced the view that payments are not based on economic 
performance, but are guaranteed payments by South Africa, thus 
rendering these payments a form of quasi-fund against revenue shocks.  
 
 
Despite the clause in SACU agreements indicating that the revenue 
payable to SACU member states should be used for economic 
development (in particular industrialisation), records show that member 
countries use the transfers for current consumption rather than for 
capital goods such as infrastructure development. However, since the 
SACU Treaty does permit SACU members to use the payments at their 
own discretion it is difficult for South Africa to advise BNLS (which are in 
any case sovereign states) that capital investment is the appropriate 
way to spend the money unless South Africa succeeds in amending the 
treaty to grant itself absolute discretion as regards the usage of SACU 
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receipts by other member states (Southern Africa Customs Union 
Treaty, 2002). 
 
 
4.3.1.4 Has SACU benefited its members? 
 
In terms of the benefits attributable to regional integration in a 
developing region context, there have definitely been benefits, as well 
as costs, as a result of SACU membership. For South Africa, SACU has 
created a captive market of about six million consumers (in BNLS 
countries) in addition to South Africa’s own population of about 48 
million. The high GDP per capita in Botswana and Namibia has 
increased the demand for luxury goods from South Africa. In view of the 
high imports from South Africa to other BNLS countries, in contrast to 
the low volume of imports by South Africa, it may be concluded that 
South Africa has gained an extra market. It is not clear whether South 
African companies could have produced less in the absence of SACU, 
but, given its economy, population and the GDP per capita, one may 
assume that South African companies could have produced sufficient 
for consumption by its own population and exported the remainder to 
the rest of the world. There is, however, no denying the fact that the 
CET among the SACU members does give preference to South African 
products (in BNLS market) compared with products from the rest of the 
world (Economic Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
 
The BNLS countries, maintain the argument that they are a captive 
market for South African goods through the CET, and that there is an 
indication of trade diversion favouring South African goods for which the 
BNLS countries must be compensated. This argument is used in 
opposition to the review of the revenue-sharing formula, which the 
BNLS countries view as compensation for the polarisation of industries 
in the subregion to the benefit of South Africa. Whilst it is undeniable 
that polarisation and trade diversion does take place under the auspices 
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of the SACU, it is, nevertheless, difficult to sympathise with the BNLS 
on their failure to develop their industries and reduce poverty with the 
aid of the SACU payments.  
 
 
In their defence, the BNLS argue that, in spite of the provision for infant 
industry protection inherent in all SACU agreements, it is difficult for 
them to establish any industry to compete with South African firms that 
are monopolies and have a first mover advantage in their territories. 
The imperfect competition within SACU does support, among others, 
the assumptions of Krugman (1984) and Venables (1990) regarding the 
imperfect markets inherent in modern customs unions, which has been 
discussed in Section 2.4.3. In accordance with Viner’s (1950) rationale 
for the creation of a customs union, the BNLS countries would have had 
a larger market in South Africa, but they have so far failed to penetrate 
this market due to the lack of diversification38 in their exports portfolios.  
 
 
4.3.2 Regional integration experiences in Latin America 
In common with other developing regions, Latin America experimented 
with regional integration arrangements in the 60s and 70s through the 
import-substitution strategy. The now defunct Latin America Free Trade 
Agreement (LAFTA) was the forerunner to more RIAs which were 
created despite the fact that no tangible economic benefits had been 
attained. This failure to maximise benefits in regional economic 
integration arrangements in Latin America may be attributed to the 
models of import-substitution which were adopted, as these models 
were biased towards supporting import competing industries. LAFTA 
included the ten independent countries of South America as well as 
                                            
38 The BNLS countries produce mainly primary goods, but South Africa also produces 
these primary goods in abundance. The production structures of SACU members do 
not complement each other, making it difficult for South Africa to import from BNLS 
countries and for BNLS countries to import from each other. 
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Mexico, while the Central America Common Market (CACM) comprised 
the five countries of the Central American peninsula. 
 
In the case of LAFTA, the negotiating mechanism was more cautious 
and gradual. The large and medium-sized members had built up 
national industries on the basis of protectionist criteria which were still 
widely adhered to. The industrial structures of the major countries 
overlapped to a marked degree, and the limited size of national markets 
reduced the scope for specialisation and economies of scale. The 
limitations thus imposed by domestic market-oriented development 
were highlighted in a number of studies produced at the time by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) ─ a leading 
advocate of the integration process at the time. The protected 
development strategy based on import-substitution industrialisation 
began to lose credibility in the 1970s.  
 
On the one hand, a number of large and medium-sized countries in 
South America experienced periods of rampant inflation. Subsequently, 
there was a large inflow of ’petrodollars’39 from the strengthened world 
petroleum cartel, and these were offered by private commercial banks 
at negative real interest rates. This stage coincided with a period of 
stagflation in the US and other major developed countries. This, in turn, 
produced a type of subsidy for countries in receipt of credits.  
 
These cheap and abundant Petrodollars flows to Latin America 
appreciated exchange rates, opening the way for trade liberalisation 
                                            
39 Petrodollars are the receipts from oil purchases, which are quoted in US dollars. 
The owners of the Petrodollars are the oil-producing countries, the majority of which 
are Arab countries which have benefited from the increase in the oil price since the 
70s. Most of the Petrodollars were deposited in Western Banks and used as loan 
funds to the developing regions. 
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that began to weaken the uncompetitive Latin-American industries 
(World Bank, 2000). The experience of Latin America provides a lesson 
to the Southern Africa region that an import-substitution strategy, even 
as regional policy is not sustainable and is a drain on resources that 
could have been used for other areas of economic development. 
 
4.3.2.1 Regional integration in the Southern Common Market 
(MERCUSOR) 
Although there are various RIAs in Latin America, this section will focus 
on the integration of the Southern Common Market (MERCUSOR), 
which is a customs union in South America. It undoubtedly represents 
the most ambitious attempt at regional integration in Latin America 
because it involves the two large economies of Brazil and Argentina, 
together with Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (which joined in 2007). 
According to Klonksy (2007) MERCUSOR has a combined GDP of US$ 
2, 9 trillion and a population of more than 260 million people (World 
Bank, 2005a). Argentina and Brazil accounts for 90% of intra- 
MERCUSOR commercial exchange whilst intra-regional trade for all five 
member amounts to 25 per cent of total trade. The first positive impact 
of MERCUSOR has been the growth in intra-regional trade from US 
$10 billion in 1994 to more than US $20 billion in 2000. The success of 
MERCUSOR in comparison with other RIAs in Latin America depends 
political stability and the fact that the customs union has two strong 
emerging market economies in Brazil and Argentina hence it has 
attracted other South American countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Peru, 
Ecuador, and Columbia, all of whom have joined as associate members 
(Frankel et al, 1995; World Bank 2005a).  
 
The limitations regarding the benefits of MERCUSOR membership may 
be attributed to the construction of the CET, which does not cover all 
areas of trade. If a CET has a narrow coverage, most trade tends to fall 
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outside customs union and this encourages members to maintain tariffs 
with each other (Mistry, 1996: 17; Coleman & Underhill, 1998; World 
Bank, 2005a). The potential benefits will be realised once all the 
members have agreed to complete regional trade liberalisation which 
will lead to the inclusion of all trade under MERCUSOR. 
 
4.3.3. Regional integration experiences in East Asia  
According to Mistry (1996:19), the ten-member40 South East Asian 
Nation (ASEAN) represents the third major region of the world economy 
after the EU and NAFTA. Since its inception in 1967 ASEAN has made 
progress in terms of intra-regional trade (which comprises 
approximately 55% its total global trade) and the creation of joint 
policies in investment. The achievements of ASEAN economic 
integration happened despite the absence of a formal regional 
institutional integration framework41 in its earlier years (World Bank, 
1994; ASEAN, 2002; Ariff, 2006).  
 
In fact, although the aims of ASEAN were originally intended to focus 
on economic, social and cultural development, the association played a 
significant role in fulfilling the political needs of South-East Asian 
nations at the time. These political accomplishments included 
normalising relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, and forging an 
alliance among the non-communist members of the region. Although 
integration in both Europe and East Asia was originally for political 
reasons, thereafter the driving force behind integration differed in both 
cases. In Europe, the instigators were governments and regional 
                                            
40 ASEAN comprises of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
41.In 1967 ASEAN was a cooperative agreement of limited scope. The ASEAN Free 
Trade Area was adopted in 2004. 
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institutions (both political and economic); while in East Asia it was 
corporations and markets (Dick, 2002; Asian Development Bank, 2004). 
ASEAN integration is more of a cooperation agreement, but the general 
commitment to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by the ASEAN 
governments will indeed deepen economic integration. East Asia has 
recorded tremendous growth in recent years (1986-2005), outpacing 
both North America and the EU. The Asia Financial Crisis of 1997 
brought ASEAN members together in the belief that such cooperation 
would help the region avert such catastrophes in the future (Siggel, 
2005: 191), hence the institutionalising of ASEAN through linear 
integration processes in 2004 when AFTA came into force.  
 
4.3.3.1 The costs and benefits of ASEAN economic integration 
According to Dick (2002) the East Asian integration model, in contrast 
with other developing region integration models, better fits the market-
driven integration process scheme. The market and corporations-driven 
process in East Asia has been encouraged by the development of both 
regional and global cross-border production networks. Intra-industry 
trade in parts and components and foreign direct investment conducted 
by corporations and encouraged by significant liberalisation have been 
and continue to be the key driving forces of the established production-
sharing scheme. The adoption of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA), formed in 2004, has not led to any significant increases in intra-
ASEAN trade,42 but this is not because of the minimal use of the 
preferential tariffs. The main reason for the latter may well be the small 
preferential margins, now that the most favoured nation tariffs in 
ASEAN countries are relatively low. Another explanation could be the 
stringent customs procedures that many small and medium enterprises 
find too cumbersome. However all these arguments serve only to 
explain why traders might not want to use the common effective 
                                            
42 Intra-ASEAN trade is at 55 per cent of total trade, at the same level as before the 
formation of ASEAN FTA. 
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preferential tariffs facility, but not why intra-ASEAN trade still accounts 
for a small proportion only of the total trade of ASEAN.  
 
The other reason for low intra-regional trade is that ASEAN economies 
compete with, rather than complement, one another, as all of them 
compete in the area of high-value-added manufacturing such as 
electronics and automobiles. Ariff (2006) maintains that the aim of 
AFTA was not to create an internal market, but too make ASEAN 
products internationally competitive so that ASEAN exports to the rest 
of the world would grow. According to the Asian Development Bank 
(2004) it is not really significant whether exports go to a partner country 
or to a non-partner destination.  
 
AFTA seems to have led to considerable rationalisation of the 
production activities of multinationals for supplying the global market 
rather than the region. In other words, intra-regional trade is not a good 
measure of the success of regional integration efforts in ASEAN. 
Integration in ASEAN is better measured in terms of attraction of FDI, 
political and economic stability, and the diversification of production 
structures from the production of primary goods to high-value 
manufactured goods. 
 
4.3.3.2 What does the future hold for ASEAN? 
The rise of China has altered the East Asian equation in a variety of 
ways. It was without a doubt the Chinese factor that expedited the 
ASEAN integration process in the mid 90s. The diversion of foreign 
direct investment from ASEAN to China and the loss of ASEAN’s export 
market share to China have forced ASEAN to quicken the pace of 
AFTA so as to create a single ASEAN market large enough to 
constitute an attractive destination for foreign direct investment. An 
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integrated ASEAN market was seen as a counterweight to China’s huge 
market, notwithstanding the fact that China is more than twice the size 
of ASEAN in terms of population43 and GDP (World Bank, 1994; Asian 
Development Bank, 2004).  
 
China’s north-east and south-east linkages have grown enormously in 
recent years. Japanese and Korean investments in China have 
increased significantly, and this has led to a strengthening of China’s 
trade links with Japan and Korea. ASEAN investments in China have 
also increased sharply, while China has emerged as a major trading 
partner for ASEAN. The composition of ASEAN–China trade has 
changed dramatically with intra-industry trade in capital goods 
accounting for a growing share of the total, which was previously 
dominated by primary products. 
 
While tariffs have been significantly reduced, there are still non-tariff 
barriers in certain East Asian countries that could seriously inhibit trade 
flows. There is also considerable need for further reforms that could 
improve the commercial environment for both foreign and domestic 
enterprises.  
 
These reforms include more effective research and development 
(R&D), better physical infrastructure, legal reform, improved education, 
and administrative reform. Furthermore, the participation of East Asian 
countries in production networks is growing not only on a regional basis 
but also on a global basis (Asian Development Bank, 2004; Ariff, 2006).  
 
                                            
43 The population of China is estimated at 1.3 billion whilst its GDP is US $3.2 trillion at 
current prices. 
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4.4 Regional integration processes in Africa 
 
At a continental level, the broad objective of the African Union (AU)44 is, 
as stipulated in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, to establish an African 
Economic Community (AEC) by means of a gradual process comprising 
six stages over 34 years. In pursuance of the objectives of the Abuja 
Treaty (1991) towards the common goal of establishing the AEC, the 
AU is also currently engaged in a process of rationalisation of the 30 
RECs. In this regard, the AU Assembly adopted a moratorium45 on the 
recognition of RECs that will graduate into the AEC. The AU has been 
selected at the highest political level as the framework which will link 
Africa before integration to the rest of the world (Njinkeu & Gitonga, 
2005; Africa Integration Review, 2007). 
 
 
There are approximately 30 regional economic communities (RECs) on 
the African continent, with each country belonging, on average, to three 
such regional economic communities. In many cases, countries belong 
to integration schemes with inconsistent liberalisation schedules 
(McCarthy, 1999). Despite efforts by African countries to reduce tariffs 
through regional and multilateral initiatives, Africa's share of world trade 
has fallen from 6 per cent in 1990 to 2 per cent in 2002. African 
countries also scarcely trade with themselves; five percent compared to 
46 per cent in NAFTA, 55 per cent in East Asia and 62 per cent in the 
EU. This low intra-regional trade may be attributed to technical barriers 
as well as to the lack of infrastructure; in particular, road and rail 
infrastructure which would lower transaction costs between member 
countries. In contrast to other regions, Africa’s RECs display high 
transport costs between member states. For example, transport costs in 
                                            
44 The Constitute Act establishing the African Union came into force on 26 May 2001. 
45 The Moratorium was adopted at the AU Summit held in Banjul, Gambia in 2005. 
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Southern Africa are on average 73 per cent higher than in the US or 
Europe (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; World Bank, 2007; 
African Development Bank, 2007). 
 
 
Regional economic integration in Africa is pursued as a result of the 
small markets of the member states and the impact it might have on 
economic development, which would result in an improvement in the 
welfare of the African people. African countries are not able to confront 
the forces of globalisation alone, hence the necessity to integrate the 
economies of the African regions so that these regions may benefit as a 
result of the increased market that will lead to scale production. 
According to Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1957), competition from abroad 
should stimulate innovation among import-competing industries, and 
this would lead to increased production efficiency. Enterprises in Africa 
face supply-side constraints such as transport costs and technology 
and these affect their ability to respond quickly to increased competition 
from abroad. The resultant loss in market share often leads to the 
closure of firms in the affected industries. 
 
 
Despite the stringent RoO that are in place to reduce the influx of cheap 
foreign imports in the region. Oyejide (2004) points out that some 
external actors build final assembly plants in SADC countries in order to 
circumvent this control mechanism. These final products are then 
exported to the markets of EU and US as if they originate from SADC. 
This practice has eroded the market share for import-competing 
industries in African countries and has had negative implications for 
intra-African trade.  
 
The discussion on RECs in Africa will be presented in terms of four 
geographical areas, namely Eastern and Southern Africa, Central 
Africa, West Africa and North Africa. Furthermore, the discussion will 
focus on the structures of RECs as well as the evaluation of the 
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economic effects of regional integration on member countries. The 
effects of regional integration and economic development in Southern 
Africa will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.1  Eastern and Southern Africa regions  
 
As Chipeta (2006) and the Economic Commission for Africa (2005:155) 
point out, regional economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA) has been actively pursued with the twin objectives of fostering 
economic and political development, and arresting the further 
marginalisation of the region and its communities. These communities 
are, in the main, poor, underdeveloped and vulnerable to the harsh 
realities of globalisation. Deeper regional integration is of the outmost 
importance if Eastern and Southern Africa are to achieve meaningful 
industrialisation, develop higher levels of intra-regional trade and 
investment flows, reduce poverty and participate effectively in the 
evolving global economic linkages. 
 
A further examination of the various regional structures and agreements 
in Eastern and Southern Africa highlights the potential problems of 
overlapping membership, particularly among those members with 
commitments to forming a customs union and those who are 
negotiating economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU. The 
problems of road/rail/port infrastructure inhibit the potential of the 
countries in the subregion to trade efficiently. Even in cases where the 
tariff barriers have been reduced significantly amongst member states, 
non-tariff barriers of all sorts continue to constitute an obstacle to trade.  
 
 
As pointed by McCarthy (1999), the problem also exists that countries 
of the subregion compete in the production of similar goods, namely, 
primary commodities. Without the diversification of production 
structures intra-regional trade will remain low even when the tariff and 
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non-tariff barriers are absent. The polarisation effects are fairly high 
when South Africa is included in the equation. South Africa’s larger 
population, its wealth, high GDP per capita and industrialisation mean 
that industries seeking expansion in the region tend to move south, 
taking advantage of the larger population and high levels of economic 
development in order to attain the maximum profit. 
 
 
In Eastern and Southern Africa there are the following four main 
regional economic communities (RECs) which are all aiming for deeper 
integration, namely: 
 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
•  East Africa Community (EAC) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
• Southern African Customs Union (SACU)  
 
According to SADC Today (2006:3) the Africa Union46 recognises only 
the EAC, COMESA and SADC in Eastern and Southern Africa as the 
means for the projected African Economic Community (AEC). The 
failure to recognise SACU is a point of concern as SACU is the most 
successful customs union in Africa and is recognised by the WTO. This 
may be largely attributed to South Africa and other SACU members 
which have failed to defend the success of SACU and press for its 
inclusion as a building block in the AEC. Furthermore, SACU has 
                                            
46 During the African Union Summit held in Banjul, Gambia (2006) the moratorium was 
passed according to which only eight RECs in Africa are recognised as the building 
blocks towards the establishment of the African Economic Community in 2028. Of 
these eight, only SADC, COMESA and East African Community (EAC) have been 
identified in the Eastern and Southern Africa regions. 
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successfully concluded agreements with, among others, the US, the EU 
and China. 
 
4.4.1.1 Overlapping membership in the Eastern and Southern 
regions 
 
While the existence of numerous agreements within the region does not 
in itself constitute a problem, it does mitigate the benefits to be obtained 
from integration. According to the African Economic Commission (2005) 
and ADB (2007) overlapping membership between the groupings has 
the potential to cause conflict and certainly imposes greater transaction 
costs on the business communities and governments. As these regional 
groupings move toward deeper trade and economic integration, these 
problems become more severe. The move toward free trade areas 
(FTAs) within the above groupings has so far been technically possible, 
but the next stage of establishing a customs union (CU), to which all 
RECs aspire, is not. Within an FTA, each country has autonomous 
control of their external trade agreements, but the countries may not 
grant a greater degree of preferential treatment to any third party than 
they grant to the current members of the FTA. Within a customs union, 
however, this autonomy is lost and each member of the CU must adopt 
the CET of the group and apply this rate to all third parties. It is not 
realistic for one country to apply two different external tariffs (Krueger, 
1997). In Eastern and Southern Africa, the EAC and SACU are already 
customs unions, whilst COMESA and SADC are planning to launch 
customs unions in 2008 and 2010 respectively. 
 
Multiple memberships of overlapping customs unions with different 
trade regimes are geographically, economically and politically 
unsustainable (Vickers, 2006). According to GATT Chapter XXIV (1993) 
it is not possible for any member state to belong to more than one 
customs union regime, unless each of these regimes adopts identical 
trade regulations and the same CET. It is technically unrealistic to 
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belong to two different customs unions. This development in Southern 
Africa mirrors that of all sub-Saharan African (SSA) regions and is a 
major obstacle to the development plans of the regional economic 
communities in SSA (Mistry, 1996; Siggel, 2005; Berteslmann & Draper, 
2006). 
 
According to Africa Today (2006) and Pearson (2004; 2006) EPA 
negotiations with the EU add another layer to these overlapping intra-
regional processes, since the new partnership agreements and related 
tariff reductions are to be negotiated and implemented by the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries subregions (which include among 
others the Southern African countries) and not individual states. Hence, 
countries in the region have chosen the configuration in which they wish 
to participate ─ either Eastern and Southern Africa47 (ESA) or SADC-
minus which comprises five SACU members plus Angola, Mozambique 
and Tanzania. 
 
 
The EPA negotiation has sown confusion in Southern Africa since it has 
divided countries into groups that are not compatible with the traditional 
RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa. Since many of the EU 
developmental grants will be linked to the outcome of the EPA 
negotiation (expected in December, 2007), Southern and Eastern 
African countries have taken the decision to convert their regional 
communities into customs unions, irrespective of whether the conditions 
are ripe for such a development, but this is a requirement for EPAs. If 
the ESA and SADC-minus group present different tariff preference to 
the EU, this will have the potential to frustrate efforts by both SADC and 
                                            
47 The ESA configuration consists of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. At the end of 2005 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) decided 
to suspend its membership in the ESA EPA configuration and change to the Central 
African group. 
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COMESA to graduate into customs unions within their traditional 
configurations. 
 
4.4.1.2 The rationalisation of RECs in Eastern and Southern 
Africa 
 
The programme of rationalisation of RECs is informed by the AU 
Gambia Declaration, which seeks to speed up the integration process at 
eight RECs identified as the building blocks of the African Economic 
Community. The rationalisation process in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA) is beset with complexities. Most countries are still in the process 
of implementing the trade liberalisation programme of COMESA with 
the progressive adoption of the four-band common external tariff of 0 
per cent for capital good, 5 per cent for intermediate goods, 15 per cent 
for primary goods, and 30 per cent for agricultural goods respectively. 
Certain countries (Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) had implemented the intra-COMESA FTA decision by 2000, 
whilst the following countries had managed to achieve the low simple 
average tariff rate within the COMESA CET range: Madagascar (5.7%), 
Malawi (13.4%), Rwanda (9.9%), Uganda (9.0%), and Zambia (14.0%). 
Several other countries in this group have average tariffs of below 20 
per cent, although their maximum rates were much higher than that 
specified by COMESA’s CET, i.e. Ethiopia (18.8%), Kenya (17.1%), 
Mauritius (19.0%), and Zimbabwe (18.3%). 
 
 
Within the Eastern and Southern Africa EPA subregion, a limited 
number of countries only have simple average tariff rates in excess of 
20 per cent and these include Djibouti (30.8%) and Seychelles (28.3%). 
In the SADC EPA subregion most of the member countries are also 
SACU members. In 2002 the simple average tariff rates of countries 
such as Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland 
were uniformly 11.4 per cent which was within the range of 0–60 per 
cent established by SACU’s CET. In the case of Tanzania, the simple 
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average tariff rate in 2000 was 16.3 per cent with a maximum rate of 25 
per cent (Oyejide et al, 1999). 
 
Rationalisation will necessitate a review of the tariff lines to ensure a 
rapid convergence to a uniform level. A variable geometry appears to 
be the suitable option for this convergence programme. A variable 
geometry is a term used to describe the method of differentiated 
integration which acknowledges that there are irreconcilable differences 
within the integration structure and therefore allows member states to 
join when they are ready for the process.  
 
 
The case of the East Africa Community (EAC) is more problematic, 
however, as four of its members (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and 
Rwanda) are in COMESA while Tanzania is in SADC. Unless there is 
harmonisation of external tariffs between COMESA, EAC and SADC, 
the project of deepening EAC integration is bound to fail (Oyejide et al, 
1999). 
 
 
4.4.2 Regional economic integration in West Africa  
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been 
designated as the building block for the AEC for West Africa. The 
following countries are members of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. With the 
exception of Guinea all French-speaking members of ECOWAS 
(namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo), together with Guinea Bissau, have formed a customs union and 
a monetary zone through the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU). This move led to further reform as a result of the 
involvement of the regional central bank, namely, the BCEAO 
(Economic Commission of Africa, 2005).  
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WAEMU has generally been perceived to have been successful 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). There has been a significant 
increase in the development of convergence criteria with harmonisation 
in such areas as public finances, public sector reform, budgetary and 
accounting classifications of local governments. The most significant 
progress has been in the harmonisation of indirect taxes, namely, 
value-added tax (VAT) and excise tax. Since November 1997, the 
Union has implemented the harmonisation of the West African 
accounting system (SYSCOA). The West African Development Bank 
(BOAD) is the financial arm of WAEMU. It concentrates on such 
activities as investment projects and integration-promoting 
infrastructure. 
 
There has been significant progress with respect to the free movement 
of people and the implementation of a CET for trade. A common 
commercial policy has harmonised national efforts within such 
frameworks as the World Customs Organisation (WCO), the WTO, 
bilateral arrangements such as within AGOA and with the EU. A 
compensation mechanism has been introduced to compensate for 
revenue loss resulting from harmonisation. At the sectoral level the 
Commission has commissioned regional programmes in the areas of 
energy, agriculture, environment and infrastructure (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2005). Despite the progress made in deepening 
regional integration in West Africa economic development and poverty 
remains a problem. This could be attributed to the absence of a trickle-
down effect of the economic benefits to touch the lives of the ordinary 
citizens. 
 
 
4.4.3 Regional economic integration in Central Africa 
 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is the 
recognised regional bloc for Central Africa. ECCAS comprises Angola, 
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Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and 
Sao Tomé and Principe. There is also a variable geometry approach 
within the ECCAS region with six members having belonged to a 
customs union and monetary zone, the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) since 1994. These members of 
CEMAC are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad.  
 
 
CEMAC also shares several economic institutional cooperation 
arrangements with other French speaking West African countries on 
such policies as exchange rates, insurance, business law and 
intellectual property rights. In the Central African region intra-regional 
trade is insignificant at less than 10 per cent of total trade.  
 
 
Trading between members follows a hub-and-spoke pattern ─ a 
situation where smaller and poorer members of the regions rely on 
regional trade from wealthier and larger members who trade primarily 
with non-members (Economic Commission of Africa, 2005, Shams, 
2005). There is a lack of complementarities in the exportable as 
member countries produce the same products, namely, petroleum, 
minerals and agricultural products, for export outside the region.  
 
 
4.4.4 Regional Economic Integration in North Africa 
 
According to the Africa Economic Commission (2005) and Bensouiah 
(2002) the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), comprising Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia, is the building block for North Africa. 
A particular feature of the AMU is that Arab countries outside Africa 
may apply for membership.  
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This region is not negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) 
although separate agreements do already link certain of the countries to 
the European Union. The union exists more as an Arab solidarity forum 
than a regional economic integration arrangement and has closer links 
with the Middle East than with sub-Saharan Africa (Siggel, 2006). 
 
 
The economies of the Maghreb countries are sustained by large 
contributions from customs duties imposed on foreign trade, and any 
reduction in these tariffs would decrease the revenues available to their 
governments. In Tunisia, for example, customs tariffs account for 22 
percent of government revenues, while imports from European 
countries represent 71.5 percent of the total imports.  
 
 
A reduction in tariffs by adopting a lower CET than the prevailing one 
would result in significant reduction in the revenue from custom duties. 
A reduction in the value of customs duties would lead to a decrease in 
the level of public expenditure. Unless fiscal reform, such as a 
broadening of the tax base (to reduce the dependency on tariffs as a 
source of revenue), is introduced, countries will continue to maintain 
their external tariffs and this will slow down the process of regional 
economic integration in Maghreb (Bensouiah, 2002). 
 
 
4.5 The economic and developmental effects of African 
economic communities  
 
Africa's record in regional integration since independence has been 
disappointing. To date African countries have formed over 200 regional 
cooperation organisations. Most of these have concentrated on 
economic integration, but not one has been able to achieve the goal of 
genuine regional economic integration. The most common problem that 
led to the failure of African economic integration arrangements during 
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the period 1960-1994 may be attributed to the application of an import-
substitution strategy and protectionism of most regional groupings 
during the first and second waves48 of regionalism. Shallow integration, 
based on import-substitution and physical integration, has failed in 
Africa. Hardly any of the African trade blocs have been successful in 
terms of economic development, industrialisation, growth of intra-
regional trade and the reduction of poverty (McCarthy, 1994).  
 
 
Therefore, it seems justifiable to conclude that the signing of treaties 
and the establishment of regional institutions have not resulted in 
economic integration in Africa (Mistry, 1996:561). The successes of 
African regional schemes have proved to be limited when measured in 
terms of traditional gains from regional economic integration terms. It is 
only the arrangements in Francophone West Africa (in particular 
WAEMU) and in Southern Africa, for example SACU, that have had 
limited success in terms of a customs union, while attempts at deeper 
economic integration in the rest of the Africa have not produced any 
appreciable benefits (Mistry, 1996:556). 
 
 
The bureaucracies managing the regional organisations have been 
weak, and none of the regional communities has been able to boast of 
a bureaucratic institution similar to that of the EU. The presence of well-
functioning bureaucracies at regional level would have either promoted 
the regional interest or overseen that regional commitments were 
transformed into effective national policies, as has been the case with 
the European Commission. Even the newly created regional economic 
communities, such as SADC, have, in their design structures, granted 
                                            
48 Regional economic integration has gone through three phases (waves), the 1960s 
and 1970s (first wave), the late 1980s and early 1990s (second wave) during which 
the RECs were created for regional self-sufficiency based on the import-substitution 
paradigm, and the current period that is based on an export oriented strategy. 
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as little power as possible to the supranational level (Mistry, 1996:557; 
Chipeta, 2006; Economic Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
4.5.1 Unwillingness to cede sovereignty 
  
The unwillingness on the part of African governments to cede at least 
some degree of sovereignty in matters of common regional interest in 
order to achieve long-term regional economic goals has contributed to 
the failure of African integration arrangements. The lack of monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms to ensure adherence to agreed 
timetables led to African governments’ failure to translate their 
commitments in regional treaties into substantive changes in national 
policies, legislation, rules and regulations. There was also no follow 
through in translating regional commitments into national actions. 
 
 
The bureaucracies established to manage the African economic 
communities suffer from indecision and a shortage of skills and funding 
to enforce the regional agenda. Many countries that are members of 
RECs face a difficult trade-off between public revenue losses from trade 
liberalisation and the benefits arising from trade integration which will be 
only realised in the long term, thus making it difficult for political office 
bearers to influence their constituencies into buying into the regional 
integration agenda. This tends to produce delays in the ratification of 
trade protocols and postpones the implementation of these policies 
(Economic Research Bureau, 2007).  
 
4.5.2  Low volumes in intra-regional trade 
Despite enthusiasm about the formal adoption of regional trade 
arrangements in Africa intra- and inter-regional trade continue to lag 
behind other RIAs in both developing and developed regions. On 
average intra-regional trade in the African RIAs is less than 20 per cent 
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of its total global trade (Rodrik, 1998; Longo & Serkkat, 2004). Trade is 
also constrained by a lack of diversification, which is due to the high 
concentration on similar primary commodities and a lack of value-
adding, as well as the marked exclusion of the informal sector trade.  
 
 
Furthermore, RIAs tend not to honour their own commitments, pay 
insufficient attention to distributional consequences, and are 
characterised by inadequate funding of regional projects and initiatives. 
The poor trade and development performances of African countries 
suggest that the overall approach to regional integration needs 
significant revision in order for it to provide a framework for accelerating 
trade and promoting development in the 21st century (Foroutan & 
Prichett, 1993, Mistry, 1996; Longo & Serkkat, 2004). Small and remote 
economies are inherently uncompetitive primarily because of the 
misfortune of diseconomies of small scale and high transaction costs. 
These countries cannot generate adequate quantities of competitive 
exports of an acceptable quality, and are not able to attract significant 
amounts of foreign investment. They could strive to overcome the 
constraints of small internal markets by specialising and trading 
internationally, however, exporting at world prices would be either 
impossible or would generate factor incomes not sufficiently high 
enough to address the chronic poverty in their countries (Winter & 
Martins, 2004; Wilson et al, 2004). 
 
 
Even if tariffs were to be reduced to zero, technical or non-tariff barriers 
(NTB) would remain an obstacle to free trade. African countries have all 
manner of requirements, such as quality standards, health standards 
and others, that prevent the free flow of goods across borders. The 
removal of NTB constitutes another domain which African regional 
integration should prioritise. For example, the harmonisation of product 
standards, certification and accreditation systems, transport links and 
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customs harmonisation could prevent the border delays that are 
encountered when each individual country has its own requirements 
(UNCTAD, 2007).  
 
Freedom of transit is the cornerstone of African regional integration 
schemes and this encompasses provisions for transportation, border 
crossing, the harmonisation of relevant national regulations and the 
development of coherent infrastructure networks for road, rail and 
inland waterway transport. For example, the ECOWAS Treaty 
mandates that each member state provide for full and unrestricted 
freedom of transit through its territory for goods proceeding to or from a 
third country indirectly through that territory or to or from other member 
states. If this mandate were enforced, transit would not be subject to 
any discrimination, quantitative restrictions, duties or other charges for 
member states (Mistry, 1996; Oyejide, 2004; Shams, 2005).  
 
4.5.3 The challenges of financing infrastructure development in 
Africa 
African countries suffer from an infrastructure backlog, some of which 
dates from the period of independence. The lack of road, rail and port 
networks within member countries and across the sub-Saharan region 
constitutes an impediment to trade. The state of neglect of these 
transport networks is such that it will take billions of American dollars to 
improve the situation and many African countries do not have financial 
capability to fund infrastructure development The backlog of 
infrastructure development is such that no single country could address 
the problem individually and, since the benefit of infrastructure renewal 
would accrue to the whole region, it is imperative that regional funding 
be used for infrastructure projects. A lack of resources on the part of 
member countries would hamper any potential funding for bigger 
projects. The use of development financial institutions such as the 
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World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation as funding 
vehicles for infrastructure development would alleviate the burden on 
member countries. It is essential that African countries establish 
development funds that will be used for regional development projects. 
Each member country will have to contribute a portion of its GDP to the 
envisaged fund.  
 
The use of pension funds to develop infrastructure within each member 
state could also help address the problem of lack of funding inherent in 
many African countries (Limao & Venables, 2001; Africa Economic 
Commission, 2005). However, one is forced to acknowledge that, with 
the exception of South Africa, none of the sub-Saharan African 
countries have accumulated pension funds of sufficient magnitude to 
fund the infrastructure backlog. South Africa would also not be prepared 
to use its own pension fund to prop up regional projects as this would 
not be politically or economically sustainable. This dilemma is further 
compounded by the perception in the Southern Africa region (and to an 
extent the whole of the continent) that South Africa is playing a big 
brother role similar to that of the US and, even when South Africa’s 
intentions are good, the prospect of using South Africa’s pension fund 
for regional/continental projects might be rejected on the basis of such a 
perception. 
 
4.5.3.1 Case study IV: The Pan-African Infrastructure 
Development Fund 
The case study reflects the successful mobilisation of African pension 
funds for infrastructure development on the continent. The most 
important development regarding the mobilisation of pension funds for 
infrastructure came from the commitment by the NEPAD Heads of State 
 117
and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC)49 who 
recommended the investment of African Pension Funds in selected high 
priority infrastructure projects. The Pan-African Infrastructure 
Development Fund is aimed at creating a platform for basic 
infrastructure for accelerating growth for sustainable development in 
Africa. The Fund will focus on infrastructure sectors: transportation 
(roads, rail, ports, and airports), telecoms, water and energy projects in 
gas and electricity (Africa Integration Review, 2007; Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2007). 
 
As a result of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee (HSGIC) resolution, the Pan-African 
Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) was launched at the ongoing 
9th African Union Summit in Accra, Ghana in 2006, with an initial seed 
capital of US$ 625 million raised from eight investors within the 
continent. The initial investors included Ghana's Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), South Africa's Public Investment 
Corporation (representing South African Pension Fund), the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of South Africa and 
the Barclays Bank/ABSA Group. The rest were Metropolitan, Old 
Mutual Group and Standard Bank Group all from the southern part of 
Africa. To date, it has raised US $1.2 billion to serve as a financing 
platform for infrastructure development on the continent. The fund is 
based in South Africa (Africa Integration Review, 2007). 
 
According to the African Development Bank (2007), there are already 
18 projects in the pipeline vying for funding from the PAIDF. The 
stringent investment procedures by the fund are that not more than 25 
per cent would be invested in a particular region, not more than 20 per 
                                            
49 NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee comprises of 
the presidents of Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. 
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cent would be invested in a particular country and not more than 30 per 
cent in a particular sector. The identified 18 projects would require 4.2 
billion US dollars but the PAIDF currently has 1.2 billion US dollars, 
which is intended for the most viable projects. This clearly illustrates 
that with commitment, African countries can mobilise resources to solve 
the problem of under-development. Although the funds raised are not 
nearly enough to solve the state of infrastructure decay, it does serve 
as a positive signal to foreign investors that the Africans themselves are 
committed to addressing the infrastructure backlog.  
 
4.6 Lessons for the developing regions from the EU integration 
process 
The EU is a fully functioning economic union to which many developing 
RIAs aspire at some point in the future. The records of the various early 
regional arrangements in the developing world (and Africa in particular) 
have, in general, not been encouraging. In part this is due to what 
Mistry (1996) and Schiff and Winters (2003) term a ‘fallacy of 
transposition’, which refers to coping the EU integration scheme without 
having similar economic structures. Governments of developing 
countries have misinterpreted the European process as a case of 
limited cooperation without surrendering national sovereignty, and have 
tried to emulate this in their own countries. However, many pre-existing 
conditions, which were conducive to integration in Europe, have been 
overlooked, for example a high level of intra-regional trade before 
integration, similarities in income and industrialisation levels allowing for 
intra-industry specialisation, corresponding interests in foreign affairs, 
and a willingness and capability to provide compensation payments to 
replace revenues forfeited as a result of the liberalisation of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers (Oyejide et al, 1999; Longo & Serkkat, 2004).  
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The developing regions failed to acknowledge that the EU had already 
undergone economic development and industrialisation before the 
deepening of integration between member countries and, in its current 
phase, European integration seeks to attain a higher and more 
consistent economic growth. Developing countries, on the other hand, 
still need to pursue economic development with vigour. This need is 
illustrated by the infrastructure backlog and massive poverty in the 
developing regions, which, if not addressed, will mean that economic 
integration, will remain elusive. Despite problems with previous 
attempts at integration, a renewed interest in regional integration 
schemes was observed in the 1990s which saw a shift from import-
substitution strategies to outward-oriented industrial development 
strategies. Despite the fact that the state still occupies the centre 
position in regional economic integration there has been an 
acknowledgement that the private sector has to be involved in regional 
integration as the state is not able to produce efficiently for both the 
domestic and foreign markets. 
 
The success of EU integration rests on the undertaking by the 
European leaders that they all genuinely need to integrate their 
economies, hence their acceptance that they would have to cede some 
degree of sovereignty to the supranational body. For example, all the 
members of the Euro zone have accepted that they have to transfer 
macroeconomic policymaking to the EU Central Bank and abide by the 
Convergence Criteria. This also holds true for other EU institutions, 
such as the Parliament, the Commission, and the Court of Justice, in 
which member states are represented by their top personnel. The EU is 
a well-functioning region with an efficient bureaucracy that deals with 
the day-to-day management of the institution. 
 
With regard to governance, most African countries face unstable 
political environments as well as regional tensions and instability. The 
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effective implementation of regional cooperation frameworks will only 
take root in healthy, democratic environments in which economic 
management are both transparent and accountable (Fabricus, 2006). 
Leaders with vision and the will to implement change are essential to 
build this kind of political security. Apart from political and economic 
prerequisites, the availability of indigenous institutional capacity is also 
vital. A strong institutional setup at regional and national level is 
fundamental, and links between national and regional institutions (the 
interface level) are required to integrate regional agreements into 
national policy.  
 
In conclusion two lessons may be drawn. Firstly, there can be no 
effective regional economic integration without national integration and 
participation. The European experience has shown that national-level 
arrangements, such as inter-ministerial coordination committees or 
consultation mechanisms with chambers of commerce, trade unions 
and pressure groups, are essential for effective participation in regional 
initiatives.  
 
Efforts at the regional level will be sustained only if African countries 
first put their own domestic houses in order. Secondly, there are no 
simple recipes or models. Success or failure hinges on the specific 
context and environment, in which the cooperation is to operate, and 
care must be taken not to transplant or copy models from different 
contexts and circumstances. These models must be adapted to local 
needs and realities. Some of the approaches and mechanisms from 
Europe that may be useful in Africa are the principle of subsidiarity, 
targeted policies to reduce welfare disparities between regions, and the 
gradual implementation of RIAs at different rates, in other words, 
variable geometry.  
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4.7 What may be done to advance regional integration in Africa: 
The way forward? 
Despite all the efforts to consolidate regional integration in Africa, 
economic development has remained elusive and the continent’s 
percentage share of global trade continues to decline. Furthermore, 
Africa has not caught up with other developed regions in terms of 
welfare improvements exemplified by low GDP per capita and 
worsening in terms of trade. In order to arrest this decline, African 
countries have to find a way of confronting the challenges that constrain 
regional economic integration. The following suggestions are proposed 
as a way forward for Africa to end its decline and accelerate that 
development that is inherent in regional economic integration:  
 
4.7.1 African countries should honour regional commitments 
African governments will not be taken seriously by the private sector 
(domestic and foreign) if they continue with the proliferation of RIAs that 
are largely under-funded, given conflicting mandates or have no 
concrete actions on the ground. The rationalisation process needs to be 
concluded urgently.  
 
As discussed Section 4.4.1.2, it is not possible to generalise. In some 
cases, for example, in Central and West Africa, a variable geometry 
approach could work, whilst in a second category (e.g. COMESA and 
SADC) each of the schemes has accumulated experience that should 
be factored into the consolidation. Where there is an inconsistency (e.g. 
membership of two customs unions) political decisions based on the 
potential economic benefits that could accrue will have to be made with 
respect to which regional economic community is preferred (Mistry, 
1996; Siggel, 2005). 
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4.7.2 Regional policies must be infused into the national agendas 
According to Coe and Hoffmaister (1998) there is a need for 
liberalisation on the African continent with the focus on intra-regional, 
and then inter-regional trade liberalisation towards the formation of the 
African Economic Community. A transparent, predictable and rule-
based global trade and economic system will foster growth and 
development in Africa, hence the need for active engagement in the 
globalisation process. There should, however, be proper sequencing in 
the liberalisation process. Given the level of vulnerability of the 
economic and social institutions, the immediate application of 
multilateral international rules could curtail long-term development. 
African countries need to ensure that involvement in the global 
economy is consistent with their overall development objectives. This 
would require trading rules that promote rather than undermine 
economic opportunities.  African trade is constrained by market 
imperfections that also explain the high cost of doing business. An 
overall coherent trade strategy with proper sequencing between 
building the relevant export base before further ambitious liberalisation 
on the import side is crucial (Doing Business in Africa, 2006).  
 
If regionalism is to be a building block to openness to the rest of the 
world then African regional integration will need to address core trade 
and development problems. Regional integration needs to promote the 
convergence of macroeconomic policies that will help provide a more 
stable economic framework, and should involve a concerted effort to 
remove official and unofficial impediments to intraregional merchandise 
trade. In all subregions there are grounds for optimism. The institutional 
framework should include credible mechanisms that foster a healthy 
business environment.  
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Credibility may be reinforced with carefully negotiated additional 
commitments in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Africa should take 
advantage of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations to 
obtain better concessions. The second possibility is to make credible 
commitments within the framework of ongoing Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the African regions and the 
European Union. The third possibility is to set regionally agreed targets 
in critical policy areas such as the NEPAD peer review mechanism or 
macroeconomic convergence criteria as these could reduce transaction 
costs, for example, the three members of SACU, namely, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, have surrendered monetary policy to the South 
African Reserve Bank. This in turn protects their economies from 
speculative attacks on their currencies since their currencies are 
pegged to the rand and they benefit through the lowering of transaction 
costs as trade is carried out in rands (Guha-Khasnobis, 2004; Pearson, 
2004; World Bank, 2005b; Bertelsmann & Draper, 2006). 
 
4.7.3 Addressing the core problem of competitiveness 
A significant constraint to African trade expansion is related to behind 
the border agenda issues that focus on infrastructure (soft and hard) 
and institutional deficiencies. There would also be a need to develop a 
regional framework in key policy areas such as investment and 
competition. The focus should be on three aspects, namely, trade 
facilitation, regulatory reform, and funding mechanisms (Diagne, 2005). 
 
According to Diagne (2005) and Jebuni and Soludo (1995) the agenda 
on trade facilitation involves primarily the implementation of regional 
economic integration. Trade facilitation programmes focus on raising 
awareness among national and regional policymakers of the need to 
reduce transport costs in sub-Saharan Africa, and the ways in which 
effective policies may be devised to address this issue. The reduction of 
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transport costs could be achieved through the design and 
implementation of systematic regional/corridor data collection and 
management systems, thus making it possible to produce and 
disseminate reliable statistics on the cost efficiency of transport services 
along major regional corridors and for the principal commodities traded. 
Recurring bottlenecks, be they administrative, regulatory, informal or 
due to infrastructure shortcomings, would have to be identified and 
solved to improve the situation. 
 
All RIAs have trade facilitation projects. The following is a selected list 
of regional projects in transport and trade facilitation to improve access 
of landlocked countries to export markets and thereby reduce trade 
costs and transit times: The West Africa Road Transport and Transit 
Programme; the East Africa Road Transport Programme, the Central 
Africa (CEMAC) Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, the West 
Africa Power Pool, the Southern Africa Power Pool, the West Africa 
Gas Pipeline, the Senegal River Basin Development, the Nile River 
Basin Development, the Regional WAEMU Communications 
Infrastructure Programme, the WAEMU Partial Risk Guarantee Facility, 
that African Trade Insurance Agency, the Southern Africa Productivity 
Programme in Agriculture, and the West Africa Productivity Programme 
in Agriculture. These projects and programmes are based on the 
NEPAD Short-term Action Plan priorities and the Africa Action Plan 
(AAP) (Hoekman & Njinkeu, 2006). 
 
Diagne (2005) indicates the urgency of a regional Transit and 
Facilitation Agency in each of the African subregions. Such an agency 
could oversee the installation and the management of the material 
infrastructures and services necessary to ensure the smooth transit of 
goods in the region. While all countries would benefit from such an 
agency it would be of greater benefit to the landlocked countries, as this 
agency would definitely address transit-related problems.  
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The agency could also provide an excellent opportunity to consider 
previous decisions as yet not implemented but aimed at facilitating the 
transit of goods, which would include issues such as juxtaposed border 
posts, and the harmonisation of customs information processing 
systems. Regional trade facilitation committees that already exist in 
most regions could be generalised and their structures and operations 
harmonised (Jansen & Vennes, 2006:13; Wilson et al., 2004). 
 
4.7.4 Diversification of production structures 
According to Freund (2000), in order to diversify their economies there 
is a need for African countries to spend more resources on technical 
training, as well as research and development, in order to enhance 
innovation in the production of industrial goods. It would not be 
necessary to return to the era of the failed import substitution strategy 
as this strategy requires the erection of high tariff walls to protect infant 
industries. Since a number of African countries are signatories to the 
WTO agreements that seek to liberalise trade, they would not be 
allowed to increase tariffs beyond their current levels. The key to 
reviving Africa's trade is innovation. It is essential to find more creative 
ways to develop African exports.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Regional economic integration in the developing, as well as in the 
developed, world has produced mixed results. RIAs in the developed 
world, in particular the EU, have been successful in terms of intra-
regional trade and sustained economic growth. This is evidenced by 
good infrastructure in all sectors of the economy, industrialisation, an 
expansion of GDP and the convergence of per capita GDP amongst the 
EU members. In South East Asia, the region has experimented with a 
loose integration model but, because their production structures 
complement each other, they have derived better results from RIAs and 
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hence intraregional trade within the region is above 40 per cent of total 
trade.  
 
The better result for ASEAN may be attributed to an outward-oriented 
model of integration as opposed to an inward-looking model which 
emphasises the protection of infant industries indefinitely. The Latin 
American economic integration scheme has not been as successful as 
that of the EU and East Asia because Latin America prolonged the 
infant industry protection to the detriment of other industries. However 
Latin America has fared better than Africa, in particular, Sub-Saharan 
Africa. According to Njinkieu and Gitonga (2005) and Siggel (2005), 
despite efforts by African countries to liberalise their economies, the 
continent's share of global trade is a paltry two per cent (UNCTAD, 
2007). Africa continues to rely on the export of primary products of 
which prices are volatile resulting in worsening terms of trade.  
 
As highlighted in this chapter Africa’s integration schemes are fraught 
with various problems such as overlapping membership, ambitious RIA 
projects with short timeframes, lack of industrialisation, infrastructural 
backlog and stringent non-tariff barriers that hinder trade across 
borders. In order for Africa to derive more benefits from RIAs, African 
countries will have to set up conditions conducive to on economic 
development instead of replicating EU market integration. The 
replication of EU integration without changing the structure of the 
economies will not have positive results but will rather lead to the 
disappointment of the population of the sub-continent who expect a 
better life from regional economic integration. African economic 
integration will only be successful once leadership shows a willingness 
to confront the sensitive question of sharing sovereignty with 
supranational institutions and shows political boldness in advancing a 
regional agenda. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an analysis of regional integration in Southern Africa will 
be undertaken by means of investigating the impact of regional 
economic integration on economic development and the improvement 
in the welfare of the populace. The greater part of the chapter will be 
devoted to the South Africa Development Community (SADC), of which 
all Southern African countries are members (McCarthy, 1994; Harvey, 
2000; Keck, 2004). Furthermore, a position will be advanced that seeks 
to motivate the use of SACU as the nucleus of the new SADC Customs 
Union envisaged in 2010. 
 
5.2 Regional economic communities in Southern Africa 
 
In discussing regional economic communities (RECs) in Southern 
Africa, the discussion will centre on the COMESA and SADC to 
highlight their structures and the developments in as far as deepening 
regional economic integration is concerned. Although SACU is also an 
REC in Southern Africa, it has already been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
5.2.1 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  
According to Business Day (2007) the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), with twenty50 (20) members, is the largest 
                                            
50 COMESA members are Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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REC in Africa. It comprises a population of about 400 million people and 
intra-regional trade has risen from US$4 billion in 2001 to US$9 billion 
in 2006. This represents approximately 10 per cent of the total trade of 
the region. It has been designated as one of the eight building blocks to 
the Africa Economic Community (AEC). COMESA formally came into 
being in December 1994 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa, which had been established in 
1981. The establishment of COMESA was in fulfilment of the 
requirements of the PTA Treaty, which had provided for the 
transformation of the PTA into a common market ten years after 
entering into the PTA Treaty.  
 
The COMESA Treaty of 1994 “seeks to promote joint development in all 
fields of economic activity and the adoption of common macroeconomic 
policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of all its 
peoples” (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 2006). The 
1994 Treaty also outlines a framework aimed at achieving a customs 
union by 2004. This was subsequently revised to a new target date of 
2008 (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 2006; Pearson, 
2006).  
 
 
COMESA’s primary instrument for deepening and broadening the 
integration process among its member states is the adoption of more 
comprehensive trade liberalisation and facilitation measures. Such 
measures include, but are not limited to, the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade. Concrete objectives and achievements 
include the COMESA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which now includes 
11 members and was entered into in 2000 (The COMESA Treaty, 1994, 
Article 3(b)). The failure to achieve the planned milestones such as the 
launching of the customs union (as scheduled in (2004) may be 
attributed to the different levels of development within the region and 
possibly also to a lack of political will. 
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With the planned adoption of customs union by the end of 2008, 
COMESA envisaged a common external tariff (CET) with three broad 
bands set at 0–5 per cent (capital goods and raw materials), 10–15 per 
cent (intermediates) and 20–40 per cent (final goods). The substantial 
variation in the final goods target band reflects differences amongst the 
member states owing to different starting points and approaches to 
trade liberalisation. According to Bosire (2007:6) and Pearson (2004) 
the implementation of the CET remains problematic for several reasons, 
chief of which are fears over revenue loss arising from the adoption of 
CET. Furthermore there is also a fear amongst the potential members 
of the COMESA Customs Union over the loss of policy space to pursue 
infant industry protection. Countries continue to pursue hedging 
strategies to figure out the directions in which the different RECs in 
Southern Africa are heading, as member countries want to join the most 
beneficial REC. 
 
 
Significant harmonisation work, as noted by Pearson (2004), has been 
undertaken towards the attainment of the customs union (CU) by 2008. 
The COMESA Secretariat has implemented a number of practical 
solutions, such as the COMESA Customs Document (COMESA-CD) to 
help in reducing the volume of documentation required to move goods 
within the region. Improvements in related areas could contribute 
substantially to increasing intra-regional trade. COMESA’s revised draft 
Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) for 2007 to 2011 outlines its 
integration targets.  
 
Among the set goals is a revised roadmap to guide member states 
towards the achievement of a customs union by the end of 2008. 
Progress on the ground does indicate that the COMESA customs union 
will be launched as scheduled, albeit with fewer members (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2007; Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, 2006). The members opting out for now have an 
opportunity to join at a future date, when their economies are ready. 
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5.2.1.1 Challenges of COMESA integration 
 
The gradual evolution to a CU by 2008 is being impeded by the poor 
state of domestic and inter-regional transport and communications 
structures, access to information on trade opportunities, and 
bottlenecks at border crossings. The other formidable challenge is the 
low level of intra-regional trade, currently at about 10 per cent of total 
trade, which indicates that COMESA member states trade with each 
other less than they do with non-members (Musila, 2005).  
 
 
Low intra-regional trade is a common feature of all RECs in Africa as 
the continent trades more with non-African countries51. The low level of 
intra-regional trade may be attributed to the lack of complementarities in 
production structures manifesting in the overproduction of raw materials 
at the expense of finished goods. It may also be attributed to the 
geographical positioning of COMESA members given the problem of 
transport linkages between member states, which are compounded by 
high transportation costs on the African continent. Without innovation 
that will lead to the production of finished goods the trend of low intra-
regional trade will continue, irrespective of whether tariffs are lowered to 
zero or not (Pearson, 2004 & 2006; Business day; 2007). 
 
 
5.2.3 The South African Development Community  
 
The South Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), the 
predecessor of SADC, was formed in 1980 as a bulwark against 
apartheid South Africa and the aim of its existence was to pool regional 
resources so as to reduce the dependency of members on South Africa. 
                                            
51Africa’s intra-regional trade is lagging at 5 per cent of its total trade. What may be 
observed is that the bulk of Africa’s trade is with the EU, the US and Asia (in that 
order). 
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It was reformed in 1992 into SADC with the aim of focusing on regional 
economic integration. Southern Africa has experimented with a variety 
of integration initiatives, resonating with the ‘new regionalism’ wave that 
animated such projects worldwide in the 1980s and early 1990s (Africa 
Economic Commission, 2005; Schiff & Winters, 2003). The SADC block 
comprises fourteen member states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Economic Commission for Africa, 
2005; SADC Today, 2006). 
 
South Africa joined in 1994. The reformation of SADC in 1992 has 
institutionalised a market integration model, underpinned by a strong 
developmental agenda. This approach, premised on a developmental 
integration paradigm, reflects an understanding that a free market 
integration project, accompanied by a minimalist state participation, is 
highly inappropriate for a developing region such as SADC, a region in 
which the economies are characterised by deep structural disparities, 
socioeconomic rigidities and a lack of investment by the private sector. 
Developmental regionalism may thus only be catalysed by strong states 
that are institutionally effective, politically responsive, and efficiently 
regulated. In the absence of a developmental orientation vis-à-vis 
regional integration and regional governance it would be impossible to 
meet basic human needs and eradicate poverty, mitigate the existing 
disparities in the levels of development between SADC countries, and 
forge deeper, equitable, and mutually beneficial regional relations, as 
the SADC Treaty enjoins its members to do (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2005; SADC Today, 2006).  
 
SADC integration is skewed in nature in that it is centred on South 
Africa as the hub for trade, food, labour migration, investment and 
capital goods, and the rest of SADC can be likened to the spokes in the 
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wheel. The SADC Treaty (1992) lists the objectives of a regional 
integration project in Southern Africa as not only the removal of barriers 
to intra- and extra-regional trade flows but also as the principle 
advocated by development regionalism, which is to encompass a 
significant vision that promotes regional industrialisation, structural 
diversification, and sustainable human development and security (Tagg, 
2001; SADC Report, 2006). 
 
The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 
which was adopted by Heads of State and Government at the August 
2003 Summit, is the blueprint for the SADC regional economic 
integration programme. According to RISDP (2003) the region seeks to 
consolidate and deepen regional economic integration beyond an FTA 
as envisaged by the SADC Trade Protocol (2000).  
 
 
The RISDP reaffirmed milestones in facilitating the attainment of the 
SADC FTA by 2008, CU by 2010, Common Market in 2015, Monetary 
Union by 2016 and a single currency by 2018 in line with the Africa 
Economic Community schedule. In this plan, the effective 
implementation of a SADC FTA by 2008 would facilitate a smooth 
transition towards a SADC customs union (SADC Today, 2006). 
 
 
5.3 Regional economic integration and economic development 
in Southern  Africa 
According to the theory on regional integration, the formation of regional 
integration arrangements will foster economic development in the 
region. The success of regional economic integration in Southern Africa 
will be measured in terms of economic development, welfare 
enhancement, reduction of poverty and infrastructure development. The 
liberalisation of tariffs and removal of non-tariff barriers will increase 
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intra-regional and intra-industry trade. Economies of scale will result in 
lower transaction costs and the benefits of specialisation by regional 
industries. With all the publicity about regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa one realises that many of benefits that accrue to 
membership of RIA have not been achieved due to constraints such as 
overlapping membership and supply-side constraints, such as 
infrastructure development and the non-tariff barriers prevailing in 
various forms in Southern Africa. In meetings of all Southern African 
RECS, member states refuse to discuss or reveal their choice of REC 
as they have dubbed this ‘a sovereignty issue’. However, taking refuge 
behind the sovereignty issue will only delay the deepening of regional 
economic integration in Southern Africa, for example, by not making a 
choice between COMESA, SADC and SACU; Swaziland will delay the 
realisation of the envisaged COMESA and SADC customs union by 
2008 and 2010 respectively. This is also true of other member 
countries, with the exception of Mozambique which is affiliated only to 
SADC (SADC Today, 2006; SADC Report, 2006). 
 
 
The lack of development agendas in RECs has led to a backlog of 
infrastructure and other common projects in the region. The low level of 
industrial development in the SADC region reflects in part the archaic 
state of infrastructure, which is not supportive to industrial strategies 
that that the region might want to pursue. 
 
 
The projects that are exemplary in the region have been undertaken 
through bilateral agreements based on public-private partnerships52 
(PPPs). For example, the multibillion rand Maputo Development Project 
                                            
52 PPP model refers assigning function(s) or an assignment to the private sector on 
behalf of the public sector. The private party arranges the funding necessary to meet 
the capital and other expenditure requirements of a project from its own balance sheet 
resources. Upon delivery, the state party assume payments to the private party over 
an agreed period (National Treasury PPP Unit, Standard PPP Provisions, March 
2004). 
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could not have been realised without the financial backing of South 
Africa, which in turn resulted in guaranteed funding from, among others, 
the South African banks and development finance institutions such as 
Development Bank of Southern Africa and the International Financial 
Institution (World Bank). SADC still has to draw up the infrastructure 
master plan for the region and it appears that even this initiative is being 
fostered by the EU and the World Bank. The finalisation of the regional 
infrastructure master plan will not lead to the development of 
infrastructure unless funding is forthcoming from member states (SADC 
Today, 2006; SADC Report, 2006).  
 
 
Currently, most of SADC projects are earmarked to be funded by 
international cooperating partners53 (ICPs) as member states do not 
have the capacity (or are not willing) to contribute. SADC does not have 
a developmental fund to undertake socioeconomic development in the 
region. For the foreseeable future any attempt at infrastructure or 
industrial development in SADC will be undertaken through bilateral 
agreements between the countries concerned, as is the case with the 
Maputo Development Corridor between the RSA and Mozambique. The 
poverty in which the population of the region find themselves will need 
to be addressed through the creation of employment and the 
willingness on the part of governments to supply the welfare and social 
services which are at present largely non-existent (SADC Today, 2006). 
The success of an REC has always been judged in terms of the 
growing intra-regional or intra-industry trade. Despite the liberalisation 
of tariffs, to the extent that the average tariffs in the region are below 5 
per cent, intra-regional trade has remained low (about 20% of SADC 
total trade) in SADC. These low levels of intra-industry trade may be 
attributed to a lack of complementarities in the production structures in 
the region (see Section 3.2.2). Furthermore, countries outside the 
                                            
53 This refers to donors. The acronym ICP was coined at the Windhoek Summit in 
2005, where SADC adopted guidelines for dealing with donors.  
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SADC are the major trading partners54 of SADC member states, in 
which the primary commodities are inputs to the outputs of these 
countries (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; Economic Research 
Bureau, 2007). The bulk of the goods traded are primary commodities 
and this reduces the opportunity for intra-regional trade. For example, if 
both Malawi and Zimbabwe produce maize and tobacco for export 
market, the result is that there will be minimal bilateral trade between 
the two countries since they produce similar goods. Even if the tariff 
lines between the two countries were to be reduced to zero, it is 
probable that the two-way trade between the two countries would not 
improve beyond the current levels.  
 
 
With the exception of South Africa, which is an industrial economy (in 
comparison to all other African countries), the largest proportion of 
SADC exports is made up of primary commodities. Therefore, it is 
difficult to use the extent of intra-regional trade as a yardstick to 
measure the deepening of regional integration in Southern Africa. 
Irrespective of whether or not the FTA will be attained in 2008 (it is on 
track) intra-industry or intra-regional trade will not change significantly. 
This assertion is supported by the theoretical argument on regional 
integration, which states that greater efforts are needed to ensure that 
industries in Southern Africa complement each other (Economic 
Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
 
SADC has definitely made progress in terms of solidarity. No matter 
how much the actions of a member state may be contrary to the good 
spirit of SADC, such member state is guaranteed the full support of 
other member states. The foundation of the current solidarity has to be 
found within the nature of SADC as an organisation. SADC has still not 
                                            
54 The European Union, Asia (in particular China and India) and the US, in that order, 
are the major trading partners of SADC countries. 
 136
progressed beyond its inception as an intergovernmental institution 
formed in 1980 as a bulwark against an oppressive South Africa. 
Oppressive South Africa has since been replaced by all sorts of 
‘perceived enemies such as neo-colonialists and those that seek to 
derail economic development in the region so that they remain in 
control of its destiny. The move towards a regional economic 
community with greater emphasis on economic development has been 
somewhat slow and disappointing (Matlosa, 2005). 
 
5.4 The challenges of regional economic integration in Southern 
Africa 
The adoption of the SADC Trade Protocol in 2000, subsequently 
followed by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme 
(RISDP) in 2003, has institutionalised developmental regionalism as a 
strategy to arrest under-development in the region. However, relatively 
low levels of intra-regional trade flows, ongoing protectionism and 
supply-side constraints, and a lack of political will on the part of many 
SADC members have cast doubt on the feasibility and attainability of 
the targets set. Many of the prerequisites that would ensure the benefits 
of market integration are obviously lacking in SADC, as they are 
elsewhere on the African continent. These conditions include: 
• A similar level of industrial development among member countries; 
• Harmonised national macroeconomic policies, as well as regional 
macroeconomic stability exemplified in the achievements of 
macroeconomic convergence targets; 
• Significant intra-regional trade and complementary industrial 
development; and 
• A politically stable region, with a willingness to cede some degree of 
sovereignty to a supranational body that has enforcement authority. 
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5.4.1 Economic structure and trade patterns in Southern Africa 
 
McCarthy (2004), Shams (2005) and Vickers (2006) note that South 
Africa is the largest economy in the region as it accounts for almost 76 
per cent of the SADC GDP. The other countries in the region are fairly 
small, with each accounting for less than 5 per cent of the regional 
GDP. However, on a global scale South Africa (and Africa in general) is 
small compared to the other major trading partners of the region. A 
similar pattern holds true for exports in which South Africa is the major 
exporter among the SADC countries, but it is small on the global market 
when compared to the EU.  
 
 
SADC countries are more dependent on trade than the EU55. The 
international trade share to GDP average 50 per cent of GDP for SADC 
countries. In contrast, the EU exports trade share to GDP amounts to 
14 per cent of GDP. A similar pattern emerges for imports as a share of 
GDP. The high trade dependency means that trade liberalisation could 
induce large structural changes in Southern Africa. It is this which made 
SADC leaders see the potential of trade policies to change their 
economies to respond to the challenges of poverty and 
underdevelopment (SADC Today, 2006; Economic Research Bureau, 
2007). 
 
 
All SADC countries have engaged in significant reform of their tariff 
regimes in recent years. These reforms have generally resulted in the 
lowering of most favoured nation (MFN) rates and the adoption of a 
cascading structure of tariffs, according to which the lowest rates are 
applied to capital goods and raw materials, median rates are applied to 
intermediate goods, and the highest rates are applied to finished goods. 
                                            
55 The comparison with the EU on trade dependency is made on the basis that the EU 
is SADC biggest trading partner. 
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Such tariff reductions are viewed as a necessary part of a broad 
restructuring process to make the region more competitive 
internationally. Tariff liberalisation enhances market access, allowing 
the entry of new firms, products and services into regional markets 
(McCarthy, 1994). 
 
 
5.4.1.1 Trade dependency in Southern Africa 
 
All SADC countries depend heavily on the EU for export sales. 
Botswana has the highest dependence and it sells 76 percent of its 
exports to the EU (primarily diamonds). Other SADC countries sell 
between 28 percent (for Zambia) and 39 percent (for Malawi and 
Mozambique) of their total exports to the EU. Despite its relatively low 
export dependence on the EU, Zambia depends on the EU for certain 
commodity sales ─ it sells 94 percent of its fruits and vegetables, 90 per 
cent of its textiles, and 85 per cent of its processed food to the EU. The 
other SADC countries also depend heavily on EU markets for the sale 
of their processed food, textile, apparel, and fruits and vegetables 
(USAID, 2007; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). 
 
 
SADC countries are less dependent on South Africa than on the EU as 
a market for their exports. The export shares to South Africa range from 
0.4 percent for the rest of the SADC to 13 percent for both Botswana 
and Zimbabwe. With the exception of South Africa, which is an 
important destination for exports, there is little trade among the SADC 
countries. Zimbabwe is the next most important country in the region, 
after South Africa, as an export destination for all SADC countries. 
However, the export market shares to Zimbabwe are small, ranging 
from 0.2 percent for the rest of the SADC to 3.2 percent for Botswana 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; SADC Today, 2006). 
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5.4.1.2 Contrasting production structures in SADC 
 
According to the Africa Economic Commission (2005) and SADC 
Report (2006) there are significant differences in the production 
structures of SADC countries, as well as between the individual SADC 
countries and the EU, which is the biggest trading partner. With the 
exception of South Africa, primary products account for a higher 
percentage of most of SADC countries. Primary products of many of the 
countries in the region comprises a high proportion of their total exports 
– 69 percent for Malawi, 46 percent for Tanzania, 39 percent for 
Zimbabwe, and 18 percent for Mozambique agricultural products such 
as grains, fruits and vegetables, livestock, forestry and fisheries account 
for as much as 31 per cent of the value of output in Tanzania, 29 per 
cent in Malawi, and 24 per cent in Mozambique (Economic Research 
Bureau, 2007; United States Agency on International Development, 
2007).  
 
 
In contrast, primary products account for only four percent of the value 
of output in South Africa, while in the EU primary products account for 
only three per cent of the value of output. Food processing is also an 
important sector for many of the SADC economies (11% each). Mining 
is an important sector for Botswana, as it accounts for 28% of its GDP 
and 21%, for the rest of SADC.  
 
 
As for capital such as machinery and equipment production, this 
comprises a low share of the output of many of the SADC countries with 
the extreme example being Mozambique (0.7% of the value of total 
output) (Petersson, 2005; Economic Research Bureau, 2007; United 
States Agency on International Development, 2007). 
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5.4.1.3 The extent of protectionism in trade 
 
According to the Economic Research Bureau (2007) and the SADC 
Report (2006) import protection rates vary considerably by sector and 
source of imports. South Africa protects apparel (with rates varying from 
31% against the rest of SADC to 13% against Mozambique), textiles 
(ranging from 20% against Malawi to 10% against the rest of SADC) 
and food processing (ranging from 100% against Malawi to 49% against 
Tanzania). South Africa has a high trade weighted average tariff against 
Malawi (21%), Tanzania (20%), and Mozambique (19%). Its average 
tariffs against other SADC countries range from 0 to 10 per cent. It also 
has a relatively low average tariff against the EU at eight percent. 
However, in certain sectors, the tariff rates against EU imports are fairly 
high: 71 percent for food processing, 39 percent for grain, 26 percent 
for apparel and 26 per cent for fruits and vegetables. 
 
 
With the exception of Botswana and South Africa, which have both 
eliminated bilateral tariffs, intra-SADC tariff rates are high and uneven 
across countries in the region. The highest average tariff rate against 
another SADC country ranges from 94 percent (Zimbabwe against 
certain category of imports from Tanzania) to 20 percent (Zambia 
against imports from Malawi). Zimbabwe has the highest average tariff 
rates against other SADC countries, ranging from 12 percent against 
imports from Malawi to 94 percent against imports from Tanzania 
(Petersson, 2005; Economic Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
 
5.4.2 Poverty and inequality in Southern Africa 
Thus far, regional economic integration in Southern Africa has yielded 
few social and economic dividends. Over the last four years, the 
majority of countries within SADC have experienced reversals in many 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators, which is a key 
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measurement criterion for success in halving poverty by 201456. 
Poverty and unemployment remain a common problem for the 
population of Southern Africa. The majority of the problems may be 
attributed to the populist policies pursued by governments, for example, 
Zimbabwe continues to pursue indigenisation57 policies that have the 
potential to reduce the majority of the population to abject poverty. 
Furthermore, natural calamities such as drought and floods continue to 
wreck havoc in the farming communities exacerbating the shortage of 
basic foodstuffs. Poor management of water resources and lack of 
water infrastructure such as dams and irrigation schemes have 
contributed to shortage of food (Petersson, 2005; Southern Africa 
Development Community Report, 2006). 
                                           
 
Even South Africa, which is the biggest economy (in terms of output) in 
the region, has poverty levels (especially in rural and peri-urban 
centres) that are not commensurate with her level of economic 
development. The inequality in South Africa between the rich and the 
poor, as measured by the Gini Coefficient, is currently one of the 
highest in the world, at 0.64 and is comparable only to that of Brazil 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). The success of the SADC 
regional project is, moreover, confounded by a myriad of political, 
economic, security and institutional pressures and variables, both 
internal and external to the region. These include the impact of foreign 
competitive pressures, notably from the Chinese and on the vulnerable 
economies and underdeveloped industrial structures of the region, 
which are in turn balanced by a bullish commodity cycle that has seen 
significant windfalls for other minerals-based economies (SADC Today, 
 
56 Poverty datum is measured in terms of ability to afford basic needs, especially for 
those whose disposable income is less than one US dollar per day. 
57 The indigenous policy refers to government stated policy aimed at forcing the 
private sector to give a substantial share (up to 50 per cent) of their equity to 
indigenous population (read black). In the Zimbabwean situation the policy is 
controversial in that the receiver will not pay for equity they receive and that the 
economy situation cannot sustain such a policy. 
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2006). Although the eradication of poverty has been identified as a 
priority for SADC, the reality on the ground reveals that the region is still 
a long way from addressing the problem, or meeting the Millennium 
Development Goal target of halving poverty by 2014. 
 
5.4.3 Different developmental paths of member states 
 
This integration project has been further complicated by the fact that the 
SACU nations, led by South Africa has forged trade relations with the 
EU and EFTA, as well as recently concluding a Trade and Investment 
Cooperation Agreement with the US (leading to an FTA in the future to 
‘lock in’ AGOA58 market access) There is even the vision of a trilateral 
trading arrangement between India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA). In 
addition to these dynamics, there is great concern about the direction of 
the post-Cotonou EPA negotiations with the EU and their effect on 
regional solidarity and regional integration, as envisaged by the Abuja 
Treaty (Pearson, 2006; SADC Report, 2006; UNCTAD, 2007).  
 
In the case of SADC, the effects of external actors on the regional 
integration process are of particular importance. The overall SADC 
market is not large enough to achieve the growth objectives of its 
members. This has spurred SADC to actively engage external actors 
such as international cooperation partners (ICPs), the EU, the US, 
China and MERCOSUR, whose attached conditions (for cooperation) 
are often detrimental to the developmental agenda of Southern Africa.  
 
                                            
58 AGOA stand for the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000. It is an agreement 
between the US and Sub-Saharan African countries whereby the latter are given 
preferential access to the US market once they have demonstrated significant 
progress in political and economic governance. 
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5.4.4 SACU challenges in the face of the SADC Customs Union 
SADC Today (2006:6) and the Economic Commission for Africa 
(2005:46) argue that SACU is currently facing global and regional 
developments that have serious implications for its work activities in the 
medium term. SACU recognises the unfolding regional development 
process of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the projected formation of the SADC FTA by 2008, as well as the 
establishment of the SADC Customs Union by 2010. It has been noted 
by SACU members that the attainment of the full SADC FTA by 2008 
and the projected SADC Customs Union would have an impact on the 
different member states of SACU. SACU’s problem is further 
compounded by the resolution of the AU which does not recognise 
SACU in the REC rationalisation towards the establishment of the Africa 
Economic Community. SACU is therefore cognisant of the call for its 
demise and has devised a way of dealing proactively with the process 
of consolidation (read Southern Africa Customs Union Treaty, 2002) to 
postpone its demise (McCarthy, 2004; Vickers, 2006).  
 
With regard to developments related to the SADC customs union, 
SACU has indicated its willingness to provide inputs into this process 
and to articulate its position on the proposed SADC Customs Union. 
The general feeling among SACU members (in particular, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland) is that SACU provides financial benefits that 
contribute to a large proportion of their budget and, before any 
agreement to dissolve SACU is reached, they must be guaranteed that 
they will be compensated for these SACU transfer payments. On the 
other hand, South Africa has indicated that it will ensure that any future 
SADC customs union configuration will exclude the revenue sharing 
arrangement in its current form, which is not linked to economic 
performance of member countries (Vickers, 2006; Economic Research 
Bureau, 2007).  
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With the exclusion of Botswana, which does not overly depend on the 
SACU transfers, the other members agree that SACU is an institution 
with fine traditions and should be the nucleus of the SADC Customs 
Union to which new members may accede through variable geometry 
(SADC Report, 2006; Economic Research Bureau, 2007). With variable 
geometry, differentiated integration is pursued whereby countries join 
when they have already undergone the adjustment process taking into 
consideration the aspect of asymmetry in development. In SADC, with 
SACU as the nucleus of the new SADC customs union, the five current 
SACU members will automatically qualify based on their similar policies 
such as macroeconomic convergence, the common external policies 
and other policies inherent in customs union. The new members will 
have to adjust to the policies whilst making sure that that they don’t 
come out worse-off. This is in contrast to the findings of the Study on 
SADC customs union which concluded that the envisaged SADC union 
should be inclusive for all 14 SADC members irrespective of their stage 
of economic development (Economic Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
5.4.5 Progress with the launch of SADC Free Trade Area in 2008 
 
The SADC Protocol on Trade (2000) commits the signatories to the 
establishment of an FTA. After extensive negotiations through 1996 to 
2000, member states agreed on a series of tariff phase-down schedules 
that would result in 85 per cent of all intra-SADC trade being duty free 
by 2008, with the remaining 15 per cent, consisting of sensitive 
products, being liberalised by 2012. Four countries, namely, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania were found to be behind in their 
implementation schedules. The recent report has indicated that the four 
countries are again on schedule. Five countries have heavily 
backloaded59 their offers and will have to remove tariffs on a significant 
                                            
59This is a method of tariff liberalisation, which allow for a country to reduce gradually, 
starting at a low pace and reducing significally at the end, for example, if a country is 
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number of lines in 2008 (Malawi 50%, Mozambique 64%, Tanzania 
69%, Zambia 56%, Zimbabwe 26%). An audit study on the 
implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol has revealed the following 
(Economic Research Bureau, 2007; USAID, 2007): 
 
• The Democratic Republic of Congo has not acceded to the Trade 
Protocol whilst Angola has not yet submitted its tariff reduction 
schedule. This implies significant adjustment costs for these 
countries if they have to be on schedule. South Africa/SACU and 
Mauritius are up to date with their implementation schedules.  
 
• The study further reveals that, outside of SACU, an increasing 
amount of intra-regional trade is taking place under COMESA or 
under revived bilateral agreements. There has been a small 
increase in trade with SACU, for instance, in clothing from 
Mauritius and in the regional sugar trade under the Sugar 
Protocol. The audit recognised that some degree of progress had 
been made in adopting more flexible Rules of Origin, and 
harmonising and improving trade facilitation measures.  
 
Given the time constraint faced by countries that still have to backload 
their tariffs before August 2008 (when the FTA is due to be launched), it 
is unlikely that they will achieve the feat. 
 
 
 For SADC to move forward, in particular countries that have already 
implemented the SADC Trade Protocol, a variable geometry strategy 
should be adopted where qualifying countries can form an FTA, and the 
rest join when they are ready. If SADC member countries are not 
agreeable to the variable geometry strategy, it is unlikely that SADC will 
                                                                                                                   
required to reduce 80% of its tariff within a period of five years, it can reduce half the 
amount in the first three years and the rest in a shorter period, in this case, half. This 
is done to allow countries to adjust and in many cases to build other sources of 
revenue that will replace the revenue derived from import taxes. 
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be able to launch an inclusive FTA as scheduled given the tariff 
reduction backlog that some countries are facing. 
 
5.5 Gains in regional economic integration in Southern Africa 
5.5.1 Macroeconomic convergence in SADC 
 
According to the Economic Research Bureau (2007:12), McCarthy 
(2002:8) and Mboweni (2003), a significant level of macroeconomic 
convergence is necessary in order to achieve the policy objectives of 
regional integration. SADC is currently in the first phase of market 
integration and, if the road to the progressive deepening of integration is 
taken into account, monetary integration will be an important 
development. The integration of the money and capital markets will 
lower the transaction costs of regional trade and will increase the 
efficiency of capital allocation in SADC.  
 
The SADC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on macroeconomic 
convergence sets out modalities, principles, institutional arrangements, 
monitoring and surveillance mechanisms, indicators/criteria, data 
requirements, and monetary and fiscal policy cooperation parameters 
for the member countries. Chapter 2 advanced the argument in favour 
of adopting few macroeconomic targets that are commensurate with the 
level of economic development. There is no deviation from that 
argument as this section seeks to analyse the current situation of 
macroeconomic convergence in SADC (McCarthy, 2002). 
 
Macroeconomic convergence in SADC is premised on the recognition 
by member countries of the need for financial and economic stability, 
soundness of institutional structures and policy frameworks. This is 
deemed critical in achieving fiscal balances that avoid the monetisation 
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of deficits, unsustainably high or rising ratios of public debt to GDP, 
wide external current account and financial imbalances, and market 
distortions resulting in high rates of inflation and a slow pace of 
economic development amongst SADC member countries. There is an 
understanding that, in preparation for the higher stages of integration, 
there is a need for the region to converge on key market indicators 
informed by the level of development in the region (Southern Africa 
Development Community Report, 2006; Committee of Central Bank 
Governors Report, 2007).  
 
Every year the national economic data collecting agencies, such as 
Statistics South Africa and the Reserve Bank (in the case of South 
Africa), submit the macroeconomic data to the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors (CCBG) to compile a paper on macroeconomic 
developments in the region which is then published annually on the 
websites of the SADC Central Banks (McCarthy, 2002; SADC Today, 
2006; FOPRISA, 2007).  
 
Member states have further agreed to establish the Macroeconomic 
Surveillance Unit and the Peer Review Panel to review progress by 
member countries in meeting the targets and to offer guidance to any 
member states that may be deviating or struggling to meet the targets 
through no fault of their own, that is, when the underlying factors are 
global or natural60 (Southern Africa Development Community Report, 
2006). 
 
                                            
60  Global influences on macroeconomic indicators are issues that are beyond the 
control of the member state or the region. These include factors such as rising oil 
prices whereas natural calamities are factors that are beyond the control of mankind 
and include drought, tsunamis, etc  
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McCarthy (2002), the Economic Research Bureau (2007) and Mboweni 
(2003) all emphasise that macroeconomic convergence in the SADC 
region is guided by the criteria and benchmarks that have been 
specified by a Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG). These 
focus on the key essential requirements for macroeconomic 
convergence: inflation rate to reach single digits by 2008; 5 per cent by 
2012; and 3 per cent by 2018; the ratio of budget deficit to GDP should 
not exceed 5 per cent by 2008, and 3 per cent by 2012 through to 2018; 
and the nominal public debt to GDP ratio should be less than 60 per 
cent by 2008 and beyond to 2018.  
 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the level of convergence/divergence between 
member states in 2005/200661 compared with the targets of the SADC 
Macroeconomic Convergence Programme.  
 
 
                                            
61 The paper on the macroeconomic performance of member states for 2007/8 is still 
under compilation. 
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Table 5.1: Status of macroeconomic convergence in 2005 and 2006 
 
Country  Inflation rate  Budget 
deficit (-) / 
surplus (+) 
as 
percentage 
of GDP  
Public debt as 
percentage of 
GDP  
Current 
account as 
percentage of 
GDP  
Real growth 
rate  
            2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Angola  18.5 12.2 7.3 -3.4 37.8 25.5 15.7 16.4 20.6 19.5 
Botswana  8.6 11.6 1.2 8.1 4.4 3.8 15.7 20.9 9.2 -0.8 
DRC  21.3 18.2 -1.2 -0.7 158.7 133.4 -4.4 -7.5 6.5 5.1 
Lesotho  3.5 6.0 2.0 13.3 50.3 49.9 -6.8 4.3 4.0 6.2 
Madagascar  18.4 10.8 -10.3 -
10.3 
87.0 30.0 10.9 -8.8 4.6 4.9 
Malawi  15.4 13.9 -1.2 -1.5 105.4 28.5 -34.0 -31.2 2.3  
Mauritius  4.9 8.9 -5.0 -5.3 58.3 57.9 -5.2 -9.5 2.2 5.0 
Mozambique  6.4 13.2 -3.5 -1.0 70.0 47.7 -11.09 -8.0 6.2 8.5 
Namibia  2.2 5.1 -1.1 2.1 33.6 31.4 7.1 18.3 4.2 4.6 
South Africa  3.9 4.6 -0.8 0.04 36.6 33.3 -3.8 -6.4 5.1 5.0 
Swaziland 4.8 5.3 -1.8 -2.1 16.9 17.1 0.26 1.8 2.3 2.8 
Tanzania  4.4 6.2 5.0 -5.5 63.8 49.97 -6.9 -10.9 6.7 6.2 
Zambia  15.9 8.2 -2.6 -1.9 64.5 25.8 -11.8 -1.2 5.2 5.8 
Zimbabwe  585.8 1281.8 -3.5 -5.5 110.2 76.2 -12.0 -7.9 -3.8 -1.8 
SADC – Zim  9.9 9.6 -0.9 -0.6 60.6 41.1 -4.3 -1.7 6.1 6.3 
SADC(All 
Average)  
51.0 100.4 -1.1 -1.0 64.1 43.6 -4.9 -2.1 5.4 5.7 
Convergence 
Criteria  
(2004-08)  
single digit 
inflation rate 
by 2008  
less than 
5% by 2008 
less than 60% 
of GDP  
Less than -
9% of GDP  
not less 
than 7%  
 
Source: The Committee of Central Bank Governors 2007 
 
 
With reference to Table 5.1, when comparing the 2005/6 ratios with 
SADC convergence targets review for 2008, the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors (CCBG) concluded that:  
 
• With regard to the attainment of convergence targets, SADC 
member states as a group recorded mixed performances. 
• The number of countries with single-digit inflation declined from 
eight to seven in 2006 .The projection from the interim report62 
                                            
62 The final report on macroeconomic convergence by the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors will be launched at the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in 
August 2008. 
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for 2007/8 by the Committee of Central Bank Governors 
highlights regression in member states, especially in meeting the 
inflation target. This has been attributed to the global food and oil 
prices that feed into the Consumer Price Index minus mortgages, 
which is used to measure inflation in SADC economies. For 
example, South Africa which has been a flag bearer on low 
inflation has recently seen its targeted inflation breaching the 
targeted range of 3-6%. Although inflation in South Africa is still 
within the single digit range at about nine per cent, it is by far 
above the target set by monetary authorities in South Africa. The 
situation in other SADC countries is not any better, as they will 
be unable to attain single digit inflation as per SADC targets. 
•  Certain SADC countries, in particular, Malawi and Mozambique, 
are making significant progress in reaching their 2007 single-digit 
inflation projections.  
• The average budget deficit for the SADC region is expected to 
increase in 2007 to 3.4 per cent of GDP.  
• If Zimbabwe is excluded from the regional average, the deficit is 
projected to widen from 0.6 per cent of GDP (2006) to 2.0 per 
cent in 2007. Budget balances are expected to improve for 
Swaziland, Angola, DRC, Mauritius, Zambia and South Africa. 
The outlook for 2007 indicates that the SADC countries will do 
well, but not as well as in 2006. 
 
In compiling SADC regional statistics, the availability of data remains a 
problem, especially in countries that do not publish their national 
accounts data by the end of the year when an analysis of Convergence 
Criteria is compiled. In addition, there are anomalies in the statistics 
provided by national institutions such as central banks and statistics 
offices. The harmonisation of data collection tools and interpretation of 
data will help to alleviate the problem (CCBG, 2007; FOPRISA, 2007). 
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5.5.2 Foreign direct investment in Southern Africa  
According to Kolala (2000), Tagg (2001) and UNCTAD (2007), foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is a cross-border investment made by an 
investor with a view to establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise 
and exerting a degree of influence on the operations of that enterprise. 
The foreign investor will hold an interest of at least 10 per cent in equity 
capital. The attraction of FDI remains one of the salient features of 
regional economic integration. In Southern Africa, local investment is 
insufficient for the fulfilment of the developmental challenges faced by 
the region. FDI is seen as a lead driver for economic growth and 
economic development. It has been indicated that regional economic 
integration enhances cross-border investment as well as FDI.  
 
FDI may contribute positively to GDP, gross fixed capital formation 
(total investment in a host economy) and the balance of payments. 
There is a positive correlation between higher GDP and FDI inflows, 
however, this link does not hold for all regions. FDI may also contribute 
to debt servicing repayment, stimulate export markets and produce 
foreign exchange revenue. FDI, where it generates and expands 
businesses, may help stimulate employment, raise wages and replace 
declining market sectors. However, the impact of FDI will depend 
largely on the condition of the host economy, for example the level of 
domestic investment, saving, the mode of entry (whether it be a merger 
and acquisition or the setting up of a new firm) and the sector involved, 
as well as the ability of the country concerned to regulate foreign 
investment.  
 
With respect to SADC countries, the main factors preventing an 
increased inflow of FDI are that most countries are regarded as high 
risk and are characterised by a lack of political and institutional stability 
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and predictability (Doing Business in Africa, 2006; UNCTAD, 2007). The 
status of FDI in SADC will be now analysed per country.  
 
5.5.2.1 South Africa 
Doing Business in Africa (2006) and UNCTAD (2007) confirm that 
South Africa is the largest contributor of intra-SADC investment as it 
accounts for 95 per cent of these investments. The economic policy 
strategies currently pursued in SADC countries are intended explicitly to 
improve conditions for FDI. The present analysis of the performance of 
the region shows that the SADC share of global FDI flows is very small. 
The region faces challenges as a result of weaknesses in its individual 
member countries. Even South Africa, which is relatively developed and 
rich compared to other SADC countries, attracts considerably less FDI 
than anticipated, and this despite the explicitly investor-friendly 
macroeconomic policy framework that is in place. FDI inflow into the 
region is predominantly in resources. This will become evident in the 
analyses of Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
5.5.2.2 Angola 
Angola has attracted huge amounts of FDI in recent years, although 
inflows have been volatile. This FDI consists largely of investments in 
the oil and natural gas sector. The oil sector accounts for more than 50 
per cent of GDP, 75 per cent of government revenue, and 90 per cent 
of exports. Angola accumulated US$5.4 billion in foreign currency in 
2006 and, according to a report from the UNCTAD (2007), was one of 
the countries that contributed most to increase reserves and investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The report showed that foreign currency reserves in the region rose by 
US$33 billion. The report further noted that Angola and Nigeria, along 
with the group of oil producing countries, have been the main 
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beneficiaries of a strong increase in FDI, (approximately 43.5% 
increase on the previous year) to US$18.5 billion. Angola was the 
second largest recipient in sub-Saharan Africa with over $2 billion in 
2004. In Angola, FDI rose by more than 100% from US $304 million to 
US $1650 in 2002 (IMF, 2007; UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
Table 5.2: FDI flows in SADC, 1997-2005 (in US$ millions)  
Country 1992-
1997 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2002-
2005 
Angola 304 1.114 2471 879 2,146 1,643 1,415 1650,5
Botswana -10 96 37 57 31 405 86 389,6
DRC -6 61 11 23 82 117 158 408,5
Lesotho 25 27 33 31 28 27 42 42,3
Madagascar 13 16 58 69 84 8 50 51,1
Malawi 10 12 59 26 19 6 23 3,0
Mauritius 27 12 49 277 32 33 70 33,1
Mozambique 46 235 382 139 255 155 337 259,1
Namibia 106 77 20 186 365 181 84 226,4
South Africa 1045 561 1,502 888 6,789 757 762 2167,3
Swaziland 45 109 100 91 51 47 44 18,9
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
90 172 542 282 467 240 248 475,0
Zambia 93 198 163 122 72 82 100 188,0
Zimbabwe 72 444 59 23 4 26 20 35,3
Total 1,860 3.134 5,486 3,093 10,425 3,727 3,439 3,908 
Source: Doing Business in Africa 2006 
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The available data indicate that the experience of SADC countries in 
attracting long term capital flows has been mixed. Table 5.2 provides 
data on FDI to SADC in (US$ millions) terms. As depicted, the inflows 
of FDI into SADC have been dominated by Angola and South Africa. 
While the oil and natural gas sector has been the main destination of 
FDI in Angola, South Africa has attracted foreign investment across a 
broad range of economic sectors.  
 
5.5.2.3 Botswana 
According to International Monetary Fund (2007) significant amounts of 
FDI have been attracted to Botswana in the diamond mining and 
banking services. While incentive schemes have been important for 
these sectors other factors have also bolstered FDI. Among these are 
the stable political environment in Botswana, a stable macroeconomic 
policy and competitive exchange rates relative to the South African 
rand. Low levels of crime and good human capital development also 
make Botswana an attractive investment destination. This has resulted 
in Botswana graduating from least-developed country status to a 
middle-income country and Botswana was rated as one of the 
frontrunners with high FDI potential. However, despite the existence of 
a more conducive environment in Botswana, FDI has been low in 
comparison to other SADC countries, but the growth of FDI has been 
quite significant during the ten year period, 1992 to 2002. 
 
5.5.2.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo 
During the period 2000 to 200563 the Democratic Republic of Congo 
witnessed an increasing flow of FDI, chiefly in the mining sector. The 
                                            
63 The table does not include an infrastructure investment amount of 7, 5 US$ billion 
from China in the beginning of 2008. If included, the DRC will have outperformed all 
countries in the SADC region in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. 
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continuation of the relative stability in the country will further increase 
the positive outlook for that country (UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
5.5.2.5 Lesotho 
Lesotho has made significant progress in attracting FDI. The 
remarkably good performance of the textile and clothing industry has 
been stimulated by FDI from the Far East, in particular, China and 
Taiwan. This followed the designation of Lesotho by the US as one of 
the beneficiary countries of AGOA, which allows duty and quota-free 
access for textile exports into that country until 2015. Infrastructure 
projects may also be the reason for most of the substantial inflows into 
Lesotho, particularly the Lesotho Highland Water project, which is a 
long-term venture between Lesotho and South Africa, However there 
have also been inflows as a result of privatisation and manufacturing 
investment.  
 
Lesotho had surpassed most LDCs in attracting FDI ─ predominantly 
export-oriented and in significant amounts to the apparel industry. This 
has generated employment and foreign exchange. However, this FDI 
was dependent on temporary trade privileges, and Lesotho has to face 
the challenge of full global competition once these trade privileges 
expire (Doing Business in Africa, 2006; IMF, 2007).  
 
5.5.2.6 Madagascar 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2007) foreign direct 
investment in Madagascar has increased steadily since the early 
nineties, with overall inflows totalling US$ 50 million in 2005. Estimates 
for 2006 suggest that inflows will amount to over US$ 80 million. Most 
FDI originates from France, Mauritius, China, the US, India, Switzerland 
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and Sri Lanka. In 2004 the total assets of foreign companies amounted 
to approximately US$ 3 billion.  
 
The primary sector receiving investments includes textile and apparel, 
in which Madagascar has seen an increase of Asian investment. In 
order to develop its full FDI potential the government of Madagascar is 
continuing to improve the investment climate of the country, as is 
evidenced by the current efforts to revise the investment code and to 
create an investment promotion agency.  
 
5.5.2.7 Malawi 
Foreign direct investment in Malawi has increased from US$ 28.9 
million in 2004 to US$ 52.0 million in 2005. According to UNCTAD 
(2007), inward investment in 2005 generated employment opportunities 
for approximately 5700 people. Most of the FDI inflows recorded in 
2005 were in the form of new investments and there was very little 
investment in the form of mergers and acquisitions or the expansion of 
existing investments. Both domestic investment and FDI inflows into 
Malawi are expected to continue on the upward trend. This may be 
attributed largely to the further consolidation of prudent macroeconomic 
policies as well as other policy and structural reforms undertaken by 
government. All these initiatives form part of the broader policy context 
of private sector development aimed at creating a competitive economy 
that is both production and export oriented.  
 
During the last quarter of 2005, the Malawi Investment Promotion 
Agency (MIPA) initiated a review of the Statement of Investment Policy 
and investment incentives. This initiative aimed at updating policy in 
order to make it more relevant to the current economic development 
agenda. In addressing the uncompetitive elements within the current 
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investment environment the review will improve Malawi's 
competitiveness relative to the region as an attractive environment for 
doing business and making investments. Besides reviewing the policy, 
the Investment Promotion Act (1991) will be updated to reflect the 
changes in the policy.  
 
In the past few years investment promotion activities have been greatly 
affected by the delays in the implementation of the merger of the 
Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and the Malawi Export 
Promotion Council (MEPC). Government had signalled its commitment 
to conclude the MIPA/MEPC merger during 2006. This was a welcome 
development, as it enabled the successor institution to refocus its 
approach and to undertake effective investment promotion for Malawi 
(Doing Business in Africa, 2006).  
 
5.5.2.8 Mozambique 
The relatively high levels of investment in Mozambique in the late 1990s 
are, in part, due a number of successful mega projects. The 
establishment of the Mozal Aluminium smelter attracted US$1.3 billion 
of foreign investment. Also investment in the Maputo Corridor transport 
and related infrastructure is specifically intended to act as a catalyst for 
further foreign direct investment (Jansen & Vennes, 2005; UNCTAD, 
2007).  
 
5.5.2.9 Namibia 
Namibia has always been able to attract substantial FDI flows, ranging 
from slightly less than US $106 million in 1992 to over US226.4 million 
by 2002. The total FDI in Namibia as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 17.8 percent in 1998 to over 25 percent in 2004. This is high when 
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compared to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, but is below that of Botswana. FDI may still be 
considered as a cornerstone of economic development in Namibia. The 
recent investment opportunities offered by the Malaysia Textile 
Company, RAMATEX and the Scorpion Zinc Mine show the attraction in 
terms of the incentives and policies offered by the government in 
providing an environment conducive for increased FDI (IMF, 2007; 
UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
5.5.2.10 SADC is not receiving adequate FDI 
The FDI picture for Southern Africa indicates that the region is not 
receiving sufficient FDI flows to arrest underdevelopment. In the final 
analysis what is important for investors is a good rate of return on 
investment more than the prevailing security conditions of the country. 
At present resources command more interest as their prices are high 
and this guarantees a good return on investment. This is the reason 
why Angola, which has recently emerged from a civil war, attracts more 
investment than Namibia, which has been stable since independence in 
1990. Since there is no alternative to FDI as a vehicle for economic 
development, Southern Africa should continue to create conditions that 
are attractive for FDI. 
 
5.6  The role of SACU in regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa 
 
According to Jansen and Vennes (2006) and Masson and Pattillo 
(2005) RECs in Southern Africa have to rationalise in line with the AU 
moratorium. Although SACU is not recognised as a building block for 
the attainment of the Africa Economic Community (AEC), it is the oldest 
and a relatively successful customs union. The first step for SACU 
leaders is to market it at the African Union level so that its status is 
recognised as a building block to the AEC. SACU leaders believe that 
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the union is able to reinvent itself so that it may form the nucleus for the 
projected SADC customs union. This reinvention includes 
harmonisation of trade facilitation measures (customs, standards, 
documentation) and the proper establishment of those institutions 
provided for in terms of the 2002 agreement. Furthermore, a 
development fund should be set up to replace the volatile and 
contentious portion which is based on customs revenue and intra-SACU 
trade (McCarthy, 2004; SADC Today, 2006).  
 
 
The political leaders need to back SACU as the core of a variable 
geometry option upon which a SADC customs union could be based. In 
order to achieve this SACU member states should embark on concerted 
diplomatic efforts targeting key ‘swing states’ such as Mozambique 
(which belongs to the SADC only) with an interest in joining SACU as a 
prelude to the mooted SADC customs union. As things stand, 
Mozambique is negotiating the European Partnership Agreement with 
the SACU group and this is the first step to harmonising its common 
external tariff and other policies with the SACU members. Given the 
residual suspicions of South Africa’s motives, the BLNS would have to 
put aside their narrow self-interests and collaborate with South Africa 
(McCarthy, 2004; Economic Research Bureau, 2007; Business Day, 
2008). 
 
 
In 2007, SACU member states initiated a study whose finding provides 
an empirical analysis of the potential economic and developmental 
impact of the attainment of the SADC FTA and the projected SADC 
Customs Union on each member state of the SACU. The study 
assumed the SACU will be used as a nucleus for the SADC Customs 
Union and that additional members will be accede to the Southern 
Africa Customs Union Treaty (Economic Research Bureau, 2007; 
FOPRISA, 2007; Southern Africa Development Community Report, 
2006). 
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Even with talks of the SADC customs union envisaged in 2010, SACU 
will continue to exist in years to come, albeit in a possibly expanded 
format. The current SADC configuration will make it highly unlikely for 
its graduation into a customs union. This can be attributed to 
overlapping membership among SADC members with other regional 
economic communities in South Africa, in particular COMESA and EAC. 
In this scenario, Tanzania can be excluded from the SADC customs 
union as it is a member of EAC customs union. In anticipation of 
COMESA customs union by end 2008, non SACU SADC members 
such as Angola, DRC, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe will have to decide sooner, whether to form part of the 
COMESA customs union or withdraw their commitment to SADC 
customs union which an unknown entity. COMESA offers the best 
market for countries aiming to diversify their market beyond primary 
commodities as the SACU region is a de facto captive market for South 
Africa (SADC Report, 2006; SADC Today, 2006; Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2007). 
 
 
A desirable situation would be one in which SADC members were to 
indicate which customs union they wished to join. At present, a serious 
debate at Summit of Heads of State and Government level or at a 
Council of Ministers should result in other SADC members disengaging 
from the projected SADC Customs Union in 2010 in favour of the 
COMESA and the EAC. The current SACU members could be expected 
to form the backbone of the new SADC Customs Union and might 
possibly be joined by Mozambique. This would depend on the review of 
the revenue sharing formula and whether the current SACU member 
states agree to it. At present SADC member states remain non-
committal and indecisive with regard to the SADC Customs Union and 
this will delay any serious undertaking regarding the SADC Customs 
Union. Whatever outcome is achieved with regard to consolidation of 
regional economic integration in Southern Africa, each REC must 
remain open to new membership as long as the potential member is 
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open to adhere by the rules of the REC it wishes to join. For example, a 
member state that intends to join SACU must abide by the rules as 
stipulated in the SACU Treaty of 2002 (McCarthy, 2004). 
 
 
If South Africa has its way the SACU institutions could be retained 
without the revenue sharing arrangement, but this could be blocked by 
the other four members whose interest in the SACU is solely as a result 
of this kind of arrangement, in terms of which they are guaranteed 
quarterly payments irrespective of the conditions prevailing in their 
economies. This arrangement has lasted for almost a hundred years 
and will not disappear easily. The old arrangement worked for the 
benefit of its members. The new arrangement is also bringing about 
benefits for its members. Another important fact is that South Africa is a 
major player in the region from both a trade and investment perspective 
(USAID, 2007). 
 
5.7 RSA Position on SADC economic Integration 
 
South Africa’s position on the rationalisation process of regional 
economic integration in Southern Africa is important since South Africa 
is the biggest economy and is the most likely to be affected by the 
process.  South Africa’s position on SADC integration is that the South 
African Custom Union (SACU) should form the nucleus of the new 
SADC Customs Union which SADC members will join through variable 
geometry64. This view has been pitched to the BNLS states on the 
expectation that SACU members would articulate this position together 
in SADC forums, but so far it has not gained momentum. South Africa 
                                            
64 Variable geometry means that member states may only join the new SADC 
Customs Union once they have fulfilled the conditions set, such as liberalisation of 
tariffs, removal of non-tariff barriers and other conditions as set out by an 
agreement/treaty which was discussed in detail in Section 5.4. 
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has also refrained from engaging other SADC member states for fear of 
being labelled divisive. It must also be borne in mind that South Africa is 
new to SADC matters. 
 
Of all the SACU members Botswana has not accepted the notion of the 
SACU forming the nucleus of the SADC Customs Union and South 
Africa cannot expect support from Botswana on this matter. Botswana 
is planning to become an industrial country producing capital goods. If 
Botswana accepts South Africa’s version of the rationalisation process 
its ‘industrial exports’ will encounter stiff competition from RSA products 
in the SACU captive market − a market that is currently dominated by 
South African capital goods. However if the customs union were to 
evolve out of the fourteen SADC member states there would be 
potential new markets for the industrial products envisaged by 
Botswana. 
 
If SACU were to form the nucleus of the 2010 customs union then 
current SACU members would qualify automatically whereas new 
members would have to meet the criteria for SACU membership. The 
current SADC structure would evolve into the SADC free trade area 
(FTA) scheduled for 2008, and, thereafter, members would choose the 
customs union which they would prefer to join. If SACU model is used 
as the nucleus for the new SADC Customs Union in 2010, there are 
indications that it would be a success since new members would join on 
the basis of meeting the current SACU conditions, for example, 
comparable low tariff lines, the macroeconomic convergence that exists 
among members (USAID, 2007; Vickers, 2006).  
 
South Africa envisages a new customs union that would not encompass 
the revenue sharing aspect of the current customs union, but would 
rather embrace a developmental fund of which the main objective would 
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be to fund economic development projects. The architecture can take a 
form of EU Development/Structural Fund.65 The SADC Customs Union 
would be based on a new treaty which would negate the Common 
Revenue Pool (CPR) in its current configuration in the SACU. It may be 
expected that SADC/SACU member states will initially oppose the idea, 
but, given time and intense lobbying on the part of South Africa, the 
idea could succeed. South Africa will have to speed up the review 
process of the revenue sharing formula (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2007; Economic Research Bureau, 2007). 
 
South Africa is of the opinion that the rationalisation of RECs in 
Southern Africa should take the following dimensions, namely: 
 
• Non-SACU countries, such as Mozambique, should be allowed 
to join SACU much sooner than 2010, whilst Malawi, Zimbabwe 
and Zambia may join after 2010. If Mozambique should join there 
are two likely scenarios: it could join once the reforms have been 
finalised and accede to these reforms, or, alternatively, it could 
be part of the reform process. (In fact, SACU reform could also 
include discussions around new and additional member). In the 
event of a FTA by 2008, and with Mozambique as a member, 
other SADC Members would be invited to join on the basis of a 
new and reformed SACU, a gradual process that hopefully would 
lead to a fully-fledged SADC Customs Union by 2010.   
 
• The challenge for the new members would be the discrepancy 
between their tariff levels and the SACU CET. These new 
members would, under the WTO, be prohibited from introducing 
new and higher tariff barriers (Viner, 1950) and this is the reason 
                                            
65 The EU Developmental Fund is sourced from the custom and excise duties which 
are collected and channelled to a common fund. The EU gives back 25 per cent of the 
monies collected to members for use at their discretion, whilst 75 per cent is 
administered and distributed by the EU to fund its programmes (Baldwin, 1994).  
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why they could join only after backloading their tariffs to a SACU 
tariff level, as per the SADC Protocol on Trade (USAID, 2007). 
South Africa’s position on the SADC integration is not well 
articulated and this could present a problem for the country in the 
process. Instead of waiting for the SADC Secretariat to make 
decisions regarding the integration agenda South Africa should 
be proactive in suggesting solutions to the challenges of regional 
integration, especially as regards the rationalisation process.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
The history of regional economic integration in Southern Africa reveals 
that it has not yet achieved the economic benefits attributable to 
developing regions, namely, higher levels of welfare exemplified by low 
poverty levels, and the economic development inherent in infrastructure 
development and industrialisation. Intra-regional trade is low as a result 
of lack of complementarities in the exports of the region, as most trade 
is with countries outside the region.  
 
The region has taken an important step in adopting macroeconomic 
convergence criteria, which, if achieved, should lead to the inflow of 
investments into the region by investors taking advantage of the 
favourable macroeconomic fundamentals that are in place. There is a 
need for the indicators targeted to be re-examined, for example, the 
targeting of low inflation will bring immediate benefits to the region as a 
low inflation level is conducive to direct foreign investment. The 
rationalisation of the regional economic communities will solve the 
problem of overlapping membership − a problem which is particularly 
severe in the Southern Africa region. There are indications that the 
SACU will be a nucleus of the SADC customs union and this will lead to 
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its expansion to include those countries that are willing to join through 
variable geometry. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The focus of the dissertation was to analyse the impact of regional 
economic integration in Southern Africa on economic development in 
areas such as infrastructure development, poverty eradication and to 
ascertain whether it has led to an improvement in the welfare of the 
people of Southern Africa. Regional economic integration has been 
found not to have contributed to economic development in areas of 
deepening industrialisation and infrastructural development. Even in 
cases where the region has identified common infrastructural projects, 
such as the spatial development initiative, a shortage of funding has 
hampered the realisation of such plans. The region has a backlog in 
infrastructure development, and considerable sums of money are 
needed to overcome this backlog, sums which member states do not 
have. The other problems that led to a failure of regional economic 
integration to achieve the benefits that are attributable to regional 
economic integration is the overlapping membership by countries in 
Southern Africa in various regional economic communities with 
conflicting objectives.  
 
Chapter 2 focused on theories of regional integration. It was found that 
the theory of regional integration has its roots in Viner’s Custom Union 
Theory (1950). Viner’s analysis on regional integration, particularly on 
trade-creating and trade-diverting customs unions as well as on the 
static and dynamic gains from regional integration, became the 
theoretical foundation for regional economic integration.  
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The objectives of regional integration in the developed world differ from 
those in the developing world in that, in the case of the former, regional 
integration was pursued once the economies had already undergone 
development and industrialisation, and the aim of integration was to 
ensure that these economies continued on the high economic growth 
path trajectory. In the case of the developing regions regional 
integration was fostered as a result of external forces that sought to 
marginalise local/regional economies. Regionalism was a response to 
those forces which a single individual country was not able to withstand 
− forces which required a collective response. Relevant factors in this 
respect are those features of the economies of developing regions such 
as small markets, lack of infrastructure, and socio-economic problems 
such as poverty which transcend national borders. 
 
Chapter 3 sought to illustrate the theory of regional economic 
integration as applicable in developing regions. The advantages 
pertaining to membership of a regional economic community far 
outweigh the costs of non-membership. Regional economic 
communities in developing regions were found to be besieged by 
overlapping membership and trade dependency, and produced fewer 
economic benefits accruing to membership as a result of a lack of 
complementarities in the production structures and the level of 
economic development. As a result intra-regional trade was found to be 
minimal in developing regions in comparison to that in developed RECs, 
such as the EU and NAFTA.  
 
 
The benefits of regional integration arise from the scale and 
competitiveness effects of domestic market enlargement, and from the 
trade creation associated with switching of demand to cheaper 
suppliers in partner countries. It may also often be the case that, 
although the net effect of trade creation and trade diversion is negative, 
there may nevertheless be positive welfare gains for certain individual 
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partners to a regional trade agreement. For example, the NAFTA 
agreement has had significant welfare effects for Mexico and Canada. 
In developing regions (especially sub-Saharan Africa) the benefits 
accrued as a result of regional economic integration are insubstantial. It 
is clear that, in order to reap the perceived benefits motivating regional 
economic integration, it is essential to avoid or minimise the potential 
costs. It is important for policymakers to be conscious of the economic 
risks involved and design new regional arrangements accordingly.  
 
 
Several other dynamic gains may result from RIAs, including the 
increase in intra- and extra-regional investment as the size of the 
market increases and internal trade barriers fall. The imports of capital 
goods and the importation of best practices and new technologies may 
also lead to an improvement in technology. The dynamic gains could be 
especially significant if the RIA were designed as an intermediate step 
towards global integration, rather than as an end in itself.  
 
In Chapter 4 the experiences in regional economic communities were 
discussed in terms of whether they are compatible with the theory on 
regional integration as regards the benefits that are accruable. In 
developing regions the South East Asian and Latin American regions 
were found to be making gains through regional integration in 
accordance with Viner’s theory on regional economic integration. It was 
found that the European Union is the ultimate example of deepening 
regional integration. The EU has evolved from a cooperative 
arrangement in 1957 to the full economic integration we know today. 
The danger of developing countries emulating the EU integration 
process is that, in many cases, conditions are not permissible for the 
deepening of regional economic integration. Africa was found to have a 
large numbers of RECs with multiple memberships. The continent has 
ambitious targets in terms of deepening RIAs which are not feasible. 
This has resulted in targets not being achieved, which has, in turn, been 
compounded by Africa’s obsession with sovereignty as member states 
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refuse to surrender the level of sovereignty that is required to deepen 
integration. 
 
In Chapter 5 the focus was on regional economic integration in 
Southern Africa. It was revealed that the end objective of integration in 
Southern Africa was to overcome problems related to the small market 
of Southern Africa. As per the theories on regional economic 
integration, it was thought that the integration of the market would lead 
to economic benefits for member states. Closer analysis, however, 
revealed that the Southern Africa region is not deriving benefits as a 
result of the integrated market. This is because of overlapping 
memberships, in terms of which member states belong to more than 
one regional economic community, all with the aim of deepening 
regional integration. With SACU, COMESA and SADC all aiming at 
further deepening integration, it may be concluded that it will not be 
possible to realise the timetables set unless member states make a 
conscious choice on the regional economic community to which they 
wish to belong. Furthermore, intra-regional trade is minimal compared 
to other developing regions, such as East Asia, and developed regions, 
such as the EU. 
 
It is acknowledged (at least by SACU members) that if SACU is used as 
model of the SADC customs union, it will be successful as SACU is an 
old institution with respectable credentials. But for such an occurrence 
is to happen, SACU itself should be reformed from an institution that 
exists to collect and distribute revenue to an architecture which 
promotes trade and economic development. As preparations for 
launching the SADC customs union take shape there is the belief by 
South African policy makers that SACU should form the nucleus of the 
SADC customs union.  
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South Africa is the economic powerhouse of Southern Africa and must 
lead the region into realising the benefits of regionalism. South Africa 
must also take the lead in agenda setting. South Africa should continue 
to lobby other SACU/SADC members to support the idea of the SADC 
Customs Union which is based on the SACU as a nucleus. Such 
arrangements should take cognisance of the need to review the SACU 
revenue sharing mechanism which is not based on the economic 
activities of the member states. Membership through variable geometry 
must be well articulated and must be based on realistic criteria that are 
realisable (even if it is over a period of time) by SADC member states.  
 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
In order for Africa and Southern Africa to benefit from regional 
integration and realise the dream of the Africa Economic Community 
there must be policy shifts by member states in terms of the following: 
 
• Countries should seek membership in those regional economic 
communities in which they will attain the best economic benefits. 
A conscious decision has to be made at the political level to 
reduce membership to one economic community, for example, in 
Southern Africa Swaziland must choose whether it wishes to 
belong to COMESA, SACU or SADC. The same condition 
applies to all African regions in which countries belong to more 
than one regional economic community, all of which are aiming 
at deepening regional integration beyond the FTA. The choice of 
affiliation should be guided by the economic benefits accruable 
from such an undertaking, for example, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe66 should choose SADC as opposed to COMESA 
because their biggest trading partner(s) are to be found in SADC. 
                                            
66 South Africa is the biggest trading partner for both Swaziland and Zimbabwe 
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• There should be a concerted effort to mobilise resources for 
regional organisations in terms of finance and human resource 
skills. Currently, many regional organisations are hampered by 
the lack of competency in technical matters within their 
bureaucracy. For example, SADC has several decision-making 
structures, such as the Sectoral Committees of Ministers, the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), the Council of Ministers 
and the Summit of Heads of State and Governments. These 
bureaucratic layers all delay decision making and delay the 
process of regional economic integration. There is a need to 
reform SADC to enable it to deal with the real issues of regional 
integration by allowing those ministers responsible for regional 
integration to decide on the matters of their competency to 
bypass other structures and report to the Summit of Heads of 
States and Government. 
 
• Member states must show commitment to the signed 
agreements. Sanctions must be imposed upon member states 
that deviate from the stated principles.  
 
• Governments must involve the private sector in the regional 
agenda as the private sector could be efficient in producing most 
goods and services. The principle of subsidiarity should be 
respected, in terms of which government leads in those projects 
in which it has a comparative advantage over the private sector. 
For example, the government should lead in terms of the 
procurement of public goods, such road and rail infrastructure, 
building of dams and other projects in which the risk is high and 
the private sector has little interest. Should the government lack 
funding for the procurement of public goods, a private-public 
partnership arrangement could be used as a funding mechanism. 
 
 172
• In Southern Africa no meaningful regional integration will take 
place until an effort has been made to address the hindrances, 
such as infrastructure backlog and a lack of complementarities in 
production structures. The role of South Africa in the region 
should be that of a leader rather than a follower, especially in 
those areas in which South Africa is prepared to expend 
resources for the regional agenda. 
 
 
Regional economic integration in Southern Africa (in its current state) 
has achieved little in terms of economic development and the 
improvement of economic welfare. There are potential economic gains 
to REC membership provided the structures of the economy in the 
SADC region is changed in terms of product diversification, building of 
infrastructure, especially in transport, communication and energy. Going 
forward, Southern Africa has the potential to attain maximum economic 
benefits from regional economic integration if the region/member 
countries adhere to policy choices that lead to an investor friendly 
environment, confining membership to one REC where the maximum 
economic benefits can be attained. The idea of using the SACU model 
as a blue print for the new SADC customs union is very sustainable 
provided that the institution is reformed to rid it of its revenue sharing 
formula and replace it with a member-funded development fund, which 
will respond to the economic developments needs of the region. New 
members to the SACU-modelled SADC customs union will join through 
variable geometry. 
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